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Review of the UNJLC Operation in Liberia

Summary Report – Final

World Food Programme - WFP

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[Map for the UNJLC Liberia Operation]

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The UNJLC Liberia operation (August 2003 – March 2004) has been reviewed to derive lessons and best practices for improving its application in future deployments. Its mission was to complement and co-ordinate logistics capabilities of humanitarian agencies. This operation was the first UNJLC deployment alongside a peacekeeping operation (UNMIL) since its institutionalisation.

The IASC – WG activated UNJLC Liberia in line with the standard protocol. However, internal WFP consultation with the West Africa Regional Office could have been better, specifically on the UNJLC tasks for co-ordinating inter-agency air operations, resulting in UNJLC's withdrawal from this task. Future UNJLC assignments require consultation with WFP, who are now the responsible agency (as per January 01, 2004) for handling all non-peacekeeping UN flight operations for passengers.

UNJLC was successful in identifying and updating logistics information needs of UN agencies and NGOs (demand driven) and in providing the requested information. The weekly Joint Logistics Meetings and bulletins were effective tools. UNJLC logistics maps were highly appreciated by the stakeholders as tool for planning their operations. The promotion and marketing of UNJLC could be enhanced by presenting a catalogue of their products and services.

The distribution of diesel fuel to UN agencies in the first weeks after the crisis was instrumental in keeping humanitarian operations moving in Liberia. The UNJLC Fuel Study analysed the impact of UNMIL operations on the Liberian fuel situation and on the humanitarian community. Fuel assessments should remain on UNJLC's services pallet.

UNJLC completed technical assessments of the transport infrastructure in Liberia (e.g. airports, sea ports, and roads), often together with other agencies and NGOs. UNJLC should explore ways of matching required repair projects with donor funding to accelerate timely project implementation.

The compilation of the custom and immigration guidelines, negotiation of reduces fees and handling charges at entry points contributed to a smooth flow of humanitarian assistance into Liberia. The Customs and Immigration Study indicated areas for international assistance on capacity building in the short and medium term, and this document was highly appreciated by the donor community.

UNJLC established a vital civil – military co-ordination with the peacekeeping forces UNMIL in Liberia, thereby de-conflicting humanitarian and military logistics operations. The Humanitarian Operations Centre (HOC) was established by the (acting) HC (jointly implemented by UNJLC with OCHA) to create an umbrella location for humanitarian and military parties to exchange logistics information. However, stakeholders in the field reported confusion in the roles of UNJLC and HOC and clearer delineation of these roles is needed.

Consultants again observed that a purely non-operational role for UNJLC achieves the best recognition and acceptance. Only on specific request should UNJLC be involved in actual logistics operations for orphan issues such as temporary fuel supply.

UNJLC Liberia staff received general praise from all stakeholders interviewed on their ability to identify and solve logistics bottlenecks and they had good relations with the local WFP staff. This UNJLC operation was completed without the direct involvement of the originator of the UNJLC concept OTL, which is a major step towards the institutionalisation of the UNJLC.

1 OBJECTIVE AND METHOLOGY FOR UNJC LIBERIA REVIEW

1. The objective of the UNJLC Liberia review[1] was to derive lessons and best practices to improve the application of the UNJLC concept in future deployments. This review was based on a highly participatory and collaborative approach and was carried out as a three-phase exercise.

- During Phase I (Preparatory / Documentary – The HQs) all relevant documents were reviewed by the Consultants and interviews held with key UN agencies at HQ level.
- Phase II (Learning from Action – The Field) was carried out in Liberia, Ivory Coast and Senegal.
- Phase 3 (Identifying lessons – The Reports) produced a full report and this summary report encompassing key lessons and specific recommendations.

2. Interviews at headquarter level were held with the following stakeholders:

WFP Rome	Geneva
OEDE OTL OEDB HR UNJLC Core Unit OTL ALITE Air Safety Liaison RB Dakar	OCHA

3. In the field interviews were held in Monrovia, Abidjan, and Dakar with UNJLC staff, UN staff, Coalition and other military, representatives of NGOs, national and international organisations benefiting from UNJLC activities and with staff involved in the preparations for UNJLC Liberia. Stakeholders interviewed included:

WFP	UN Agencies	UNJLC	Donors	Military
CD Liberia (OIC) RC Abidjan RB Dakar Log Unit Liberia Admin Liberia Finance Liberia WFP Air Services FITTEST CMCoord	HC UNDP OCHA UNHCR UNICEF FAO UNSECoord OCHA – HIC Road Task Force	UNJLC Liberia AirOps Customs Fuel	USAID OFDA	UNMIL – Fuel UNMIL – J-LOC HOC **NGOs** INTERSOS IRC OXFAM ZOA Refugee Care

[1] Royal Haskoning (RH) from The Netherlands carried out this review in February and March 2004. WFP provided oversight through its Office of Evaluation (OEDE) in close co-operation with Surface Transport Service (OTL) and UNJLC.

2 HISTORY OF UNJLC LIBERIA

4. The IASC – WG activated the UNJLC Liberia in accordance with the Activation Protocol on August 13, 2003 for an initial period of 3 months. Consultation with UN agencies and NGOs for this activation took less then two weeks. Preparation work was undertaken by the Core Unit, who also prepared the WFP SO for funding this operation.

5. The mission for UNJLC Liberia was to complement and co-ordinate the logistics capabilities of co-operating humanitarian agencies during the crisis. In principle, each participating agency would continue to operate its own transport assets, but would jointly plan the use of the limited transport infrastructure. Tasks for UNJLC were included in four project components:

- Central Co-ordination Platform to identify and resolve logistics bottlenecks for humanitarian logistics operations in the region.
- Logistics Information Platform.
- Air Movement and Co-ordination Platform.
- Civil – Military Co-ordination Platform.

6. UNJLC staff were amongst the first UN staff returning to Monrovia and were mobilised in Monrovia within a few days after activation. The UNJLC office was located in the WFP building and was opened on August 20, 2003. One of their first tasks was the distribution of diesel fuel to UN agencies and to an electricity and water company to bridge the gap with commercial fuel supply. Right from the start of the operation UNJLC staff co-ordinated the inter-agency logistics in close co-operation with the peacekeeping forces ECOMIL and later UNMIL to avoid congestion on Liberian infrastructure. The weekly Joint Logistic Meetings proved very useful in this respect.

7. Subsequently, UNJLC was involved in a number of assessments for transport infrastructure (airports, sea ports, and warehouses), transport companies, and cargo handling equipment. In addition, UNJLC eased the passage of humanitarian cargoes and staff at entry points into Liberia, negotiated fee exemptions, and achieved reductions in cargo handling and storage charges. Results were published in hard copy reports and also disseminated via e-mail and the web-site. The UNJLC weekly bulletins provided the humanitarian community with up-to-date logistics information.

8. By the end of October 2003 UNJLC presented its first Progress Report to the UNCT. As there was a pressing need for continuing the co-ordination of inter-agency logistics (UN agencies were not yet able to move up-country), the UNCT decided that the UNJLC operation had to be extended. Air movement and co-ordination was transferred to WFP. A new task was the establishment of a logistics co-ordination movement control centre as part of HOC. Subsequently, the SO was extended in time till end of March 2003.

9. The UNJLC exit strategy was regularly updated and discussed with the HC and on the UNCT meeting of February 24, 2004 it was agreed that UNJLC would terminate its deployment by the end of March 2004. However, UNJLC would still provide a Logistic Planning Officer and assistant till the end of June 2004, who would report directly to the HC. The UNJLC Core Unit would oversee and co-ordinate the phasing out and closure of UNJLC Liberia.

3 CHARACTERISTICS AND MAJOR ACHIEVEMENTS OF UNJLC LIBERIA

UNJLC Characteristics

10. A new challenge for the UNJLC Liberia operation was the co-ordination of humanitarian inter-agency logistics with those of the peacekeeping force. UNMIL had to mobilise some 15,000 troops within about 6 months and their impact on the Liberian infrastructure was considerable and hence the apparent need for co-ordination by UNJLC. The creation of the Humanitarian Operations Centre (refer para 83) proved effective in this respect.

Major Achievements

11. Throughout the whole Liberia operation, UNJLC consulted with UN agencies, NGOs, local authorities, and military on their specific needs for logistics co-ordination and information. They chaired the well attended weekly Joint Logistics Meetings and subsequently compiled the weekly bulletins. The logistics maps prepared by the UNJLC were highly appreciated by all stakeholders as well as the various technical logistics reports. Agencies provided feedback on the logistics maps, which were then reflected in later editions. UNJLC staff were praised for their co-operative, forthcoming and problem solving attitude.

12. UNJLC conducted, often in association with other UN agencies and NGOs, a number of technical and logistics assessments for the transport infrastructure and system in Liberia, such as for Richard International Airport, Freeport of Monrovia, road and bridges assessment, warehouses, trucking companies, and heavy construction equipment.

13. The distribution of diesel fuel to UN agencies was extremely successful in getting the humanitarian operations moving in Liberia. Subsequently, UNJLC mapped the fuel stations in Monrovia, made an assessment of the fuel facilities up-country, and published actual fuel prices in their weekly bulletins. In November 2003 the fuel expert made a detailed analysis of the impact of UNMIL on the fuel situation in Liberia and for the humanitarian community and prepared recommendations for future improvements. This study was very useful for UNMIL in drafting a long-term fuel supply contract as well as for the humanitarian community in assessing their fuel needs and determining their strategy.

14. UNJLC analysed the basic procedures related to customs and immigration and compiled the Customs and Immigration Guide, which was updated after the instalment of the new transitional government. In January 2004 UNJLC completed the Customs and Immigration Study indicating areas for international assistance on capacity building for the short and medium term, a document highly appreciated by the donor community.

15. UNJLC secured the reactivation of UN privileges and immunities related to immigration and negotiated reduced fees and charges at the sea and air ports as well as border crossing points for humanitarian transports.

16. Last but not least, UNJLC established a vital operational link via CMCoord with the peacekeeping forces UNMIL in Liberia, thereby de-conflicting humanitarian and military logistics operations. They also mediated on the use of MCDA for humanitarian needs.

4 FINDINGS, LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1 General Key Issues

Activation Process

17. The activation for UNJLC Liberia was in full compliance with its protocol. Subsequent to the telephone conference on July 31, 2003 on common humanitarian services for Liberia, the consultation process for an UNJLC commenced resulting in its formal activation by the IASC – WG on August 13, 2003. UNJLC was activated for an initial period of 3 months with its mission to complement and co-ordinate the logistics capabilities of co-operating humanitarian agencies during the crisis.

18. However, consultation with WFP at Regional and Country Office levels on the establishment of a UNJLC operation (as well as for other common services for Liberia) was reported to be poor, resulting in a slow acceptance of UNJLC in the first phases of its implementation. It is to be noted that a quick activation and consultation process was needed in view of the swift process of the peace talks taking place in Accra, Ghana regarding Liberia at that time.

Recommendations

19. As common services are becoming more and more a standard feature in complex emergencies, WFP should make its position clear on the activation and decision making process of those services that are under its custodianship, including timely consultations with the field (prior to inter-agency discussions) to define the need and scope for an UNJLC operation. This will increase the acceptance and effectiveness for UNJLC once activated.

20. Similarly as concluded for Iraq, UNJLC should, to the extent possible, remain a non-operational centre focusing on co-ordinating inter-agency logistics. Only if there is a clear request from the major UN agencies and users should the UNJLC be involved in pre-defined operational tasks.

21. All UN agencies should continue to promote internally the UNJLC (once activated) at HQ as well as field level to increase awareness, acceptance, and support for UNJLC.

Value-added of the UNJLC Liberia Operation

22. UNJLC Liberia has proven its value added benefit to the humanitarian response effort by:

- Providing fuel to UN agencies and NGOs in the first weeks after re-entry.
- Providing logistics maps throughout the whole period.
- Undertaking infrastructure assessments for airports, sea ports, and roads.
- Arranging customs and priority procedures for entry of humanitarian goods.
- Negotiating reduced charges and fees for cargo handling and storage.
- Providing reports on immigration and customs as well as fuel.

23. For WFP there was less value added from UNJLC related to the West Africa Regional PRRO project, although the UNJLC assisted in streamlining and de-conflicting the flow of humanitarian cargoes through, for instance, fuel, custom, Freeport of Monrovia and road assessments (often in close co-operation with WFP). In this respect, UNJLC took a burden away by addressing non-WFP logistics issues, which otherwise would have been addressed to WFP. A number of stakeholders reported that the benefit for small organisations and NGOs was more direct.

Recommendations

24. The duration of UNJLC operations should be short and focussed on the onset and first phases of emergency situations as this provides the greatest value added impact to humanitarian response operations.

25. UNJLC should develop a catalogue of their services and products to profile their value added benefit to UN agencies and NGOs. Highlighting the top five services / products would further assist stakeholders in better positioning the UNJLC. In any case UNJLC should avoid duplicating work done by others.

Extension Procedure

26. UNJLC reported regularly to the UNCT on their activities, which proved useful to all parties and ensured their engagement in the UNJLC operation. At the end of October 2003 UNJLC submitted their first Progress Report to the UNCT. At that time the mobilisation of the UNMIL peacekeeping forces was in full progress, but UN agencies were not yet allowed to move up-country. In view of the pressing need for co-ordinating inter-agency logistics, the UNCT recommended UNJLC to extend their stay. Subsequently, the SO for UNJLC Liberia was extended in time till end March 2004 with an adjustment of its Terms of Reference.

Recommendations

27. UNJLC should continue reporting regularly to the UNCT to ensure their full engagement in a UNJLC operation. Extensions of UNJLC operations can be decided upon by the UNCT and / or HC based on present needs for co-ordination of inter-agency logistics.

Capacity Building and Exit Strategy

28. Capacity building of local government authorities in Liberia was hampered by the new transitional government frequently replacing staff in the first months of their operations. In addition, government staff could not always participate in up-country logistics assessments for political reasons. Nevertheless, Freeport staff were trained on--the-job in port management and operation capabilities, as were CAA staff in making assessments of airfield strips up-country.

29. The UNJLC exit strategy identified UN agencies and other parties capable of taking over co-ordination tasks from UNJLC with an anticipated exit time path. UNJLC frequently updated this strategy in close consultation with the HC and UNCT based on the developing situation in Liberia. On February 24, 2004 the UNCT decided that the UNJLC would exit by end March 2004, with the exception that one Logistic Planning Officer (reporting to the HC) be retained with assistant and driver till end June 2004.

Recommendations
30. The UNJLC should scale down their operations and exit as soon as other UN agencies have established themselves in the crisis area and are ready to take-over inter-agency logistics co-ordination from UNJLC. Exit operations of UNJLC should be done in close consultation with and approval of the UNCT or HC.

Role of UNJLC Core Unit

31. For this UNJLC operation, the Core Unit in Rome functioned as originally envisaged, whereas in the Afghanistan operation the Core Unit was non-existent and in the Iraq operation this unit was just taking shape when the crisis hit. The Core Unit co-ordinated the design and start-up for the UNJLC Liberia operations, formulated the SO project document, and was later actively involved in general strategy support and information management. Throughout the whole operation they managed the contents of the web-site (www.unjlc.org) and uploaded UNJLC reports and weekly bulletins. Further, they continuously updated, printed and disseminated logistics maps for Liberia.

32. Some stakeholders indicated that the UNJLC should be more pro-active in publicising its Activation Protocol, concept, services and products at HQ as well as field level to increase the impact of UNJLC. Further, it was reported that UNJLC should develop brief Standard Operating Procedures – SOPs for new UNJLC operations and staff, thereby benefiting better from recent UNJLC experiences. The Field Operations Manual is experienced as being a long and hardly accessible checklist.

Recommendations
33. The Core Unit is well suited to cover strategic issues and to provide support functions such as information management and mapping. In addition, they should be more pro-active in publicising its Activation Protocol, concept, services and products of UNJLC.

34. The Core Unit, as a continuing factor for UNJLC in periods between emergency crises, should develop SOPs for new UNJLC operations and staff based on experiences gained. UNJLC staff should be properly de-briefed for this purpose.

Financing and Spending Mechanism and Procedures

35. UNJLC Liberia was included in SO 10303 with a budget of about US $ 800,000 (funded by USAID and DFID). The single SO concept again proved its added value. Fund management was clearly defined with a direct link to WFP Rome. Most of the budget costs are related to personnel; there were no particular problems in assigning priorities for other expenses such as vehicles, ICT, facilities and other equipment.

Recommendation
36. UNJLC should continue be funded through dedicated SOs for cost transparency and setting priorities for allocation of funds by the Project Manager.

Staffing Arrangement, Management Structure, and Reporting Chain

37. A total of 12 international staff and 6 national staff were employed throughout the UNJLC Liberia operation with a peak of 8 internationals (including two assignments for HOC – refer para 83) in November 2003. Staff were recruited by UNJLC or seconded by WFP and DFID (refer diagram below), the latter under the WFP Stand-by Agreement – SBA.



38. The management structure for this operation was simple and straightforward, with the Chief UNJLC reporting directly to the HC. An important achievement for the institutionalisation of the UNJLC concept was the fact that the operation was managed without the direct involvement of its originator (a major concern as expressed in the UNJLC Afghanistan operation).

Recommendations

39. UNJLC should, where appropriate, continue to make use of the WFP Stand-by Agreements (SBA) as they are a good and efficient resource for quickly mobilising staff for UNJLC operations. UNJLC should carefully trim their staffing to actual requirements for co-ordinating inter-agency logistics and should ensure the recruitment of sufficient senior staff with logistics experience from the out-set of their operations. In recruiting staff, UNJLC should be cautious not to undermine other agency operational capacities, including WFP.

Roles and Responsibilities of WFP Offices in Support Functions

40. WFP will shortly establish the Human Resource Consultancy Unit as a centralised system for contracting and administering international consultants, including international UNJLC staff. This will ensure that UNJLC staff are properly contracted and covered whilst moving from one operation to another. A focal point for international UNJLC staff within the Core Unit will ensure a smooth liaison with WFP HQ based administration and finance units.

41. UNJLC Liberia was supported by the WFP CO for administrative and financial matters. However, the capacity of the CO staff was reported to be poor resulting in delays in salary payments for local staff and in procuring necessary items for the UNJLC operation. The recruitment of local UNJLC logistics assistants liaising with the CO staff improved procedures to certain extent.

Recommendations
42. The UNJLC Core Unit should continue to provide a liaison officer for international UNJLC staff for admin and finance purposes.

43. UNJLC could employ local logistics assistants as liaison with WFP CO on administrative and financial issues to facilitate the support process. In addition, UNJLC should ensure that local vendors and suppliers meet WFP vetting requirements.

4.2 Central Co-ordination Platform

UNJLC's Role in Identifying and Eliminating Logistics Bottlenecks

44. Logistics bottlenecks for the humanitarian community have been identified in meetings with the UNCT, agency logistics staff, and at the weekly logistic meetings chaired by UNJLC. UNJLC, often in close co-operation with other agencies and NGOs, undertook various assessments for transport infrastructure in Liberia (such as airports, sea ports, warehouses, roads, trucking fleet, fuel, logistics hubs up-country) as input for eliminating bottlenecks. For instance, at Freeport, UNJLC in collaboration with the port staff set the priorities for handling vessels and maintained estimated arrival schedules for vessels.

45. Logistic information has been compiled in maps (highly appreciated by all parties interviewed), reports, and weekly bulletins. Agency feedback was encouraged on the information products (particularly for the maps) to make them more responsive to user requirements. Dissemination was done via hard copy reports, e-mail, and the web-site. Consultants noted that the UNJLC web-site was also used at field level to collect information. In addition, agency and NGO staff frequently visited the UNJLC office for a personal update. Stakeholders reported that information provided by the UNJLC strongly assisted them in their own logistics planning.

Recommendations
46. UNJLC should continue distributing logistics maps, reports, and weekly bulletins to e-mail subscribers at HQ as well as field level.

UNJLC's Advisory Role in Importing and Exporting Procedures (Customs)

47. Immediately after mobilisation, UNJLC commenced with analysing the basic procedures related to customs and immigration and subsequently compiled a Customs and Immigration Guide, which was then updated after the instalment of the new transitional government. In addition, they secured the reactivation of UN privileges and immunities related to immigration. Also, UNJLC negotiated reduced fees and charges at the sea and air ports as well as border crossing points for humanitarian transports.

48. In January 2004, a UNJLC custom and immigration expert (seconded by DFID) completed the Customs and Immigration Study to confirm the findings of the UNJLC and to indicate areas where international assistance is needed for capacity building in Liberia on the short and medium term. This document is highly appreciated by the donor community as it enables them to identify specific project funding opportunities.

49. The custom interventions by UNJLC were valuable to UN agencies and NGOs given the transitional environment in Liberia at that time with no formal government in place for a while and then a transitional government with frequent change of officials and procedures.

Recommendations
50. UNJLC should continue conducting custom and border crossing assessments to achieve simplified and transparent border crossings for the humanitarian community as well as to provide an early warning to (new) governments and donors on required capacity building.

UNJLC's Role in the Fuel Sector

51. In August 2003 UNJLC, with the approval of the SRSG, distributed diesel (from the WFP chartered vessel) to the humanitarian community and also to an electricity and water company in Monrovia to bridge the gap with the commercial fuel supply. Further, they surveyed the fuel storage and fuel road tankers capacity in the country and mapped fuel stations in Monrovia. The weekly bulletins reported on actual fuel prices.

52. An external UNJLC fuel expert conducted the Liberia Fuel Study in November 2003 to determine the impact that the UN Mission (particularly UNMIL) may have on the fuel economy and fuel prices. The study further addressed infrastructural requirements, environmental issues, and the feasibility of co-ordinating the fuel policy within the humanitarian community. The report was very useful to for instance UNMIL for their fuel supply strategy.

53. Later, UNJLC co-ordinated the fuel requirements of UN agencies and NGOs with UNMIL in an attempt to include the humanitarian fuel needs in the new long-term fuel contract for UNMIL to benefit from lower fuel prices.

Recommendations
54. UNJLC should arrange for a fuel survey as early as possible in emergency crises to determine what best benefits the whole humanitarian community. Fuel studies should be undertaken by an expert with on-the-ground expertise.

55. UNJLC is well positioned to co-ordinate the integrated fuel requirements of the humanitarian community with those of peace-keeping operations to facilitate the creation of greater purchasing power for fuel contracts, thereby saving considerably on donor money.

UNJLC's Role in Technical Areas

56. UNJLC, in association with GTZ, carried out a survey of commercial transport companies in Monrovia with contact details, breakdown on fleet composition and transport prices. Later, UNJLC completed a bus survey on request of the International Organisation on Migration – IOM.

57. Upon request of the HC, UNJLC and HIC completed an extensive road survey project for the key supply routes for the humanitarian community in Liberia in December 2003 – January 2004. For security reasons UN staff could not be employed for site surveys up-country. As NGO staff and UNMIL officers were not available either, the surveys were successfully made by local logging companies using standard assessment

forms, an important tool for future UNJLC operations. Data analyses and compilation was done by HIC (UNJLC seconded two national staff for data processing). The survey indicates (urgent) repair works together with cost estimates.

58. The survey facilitates the planning of road repair activities of the UNMIL engineering brigades as the UNJLC-led Road Task Force (RTF) was able to prioritise road repair requirements from a humanitarian perspective. Results of this assessment were presented at the RTF meeting in February 2004 attended by UN agencies, NGOs, UNMIL, and a few donors. The meeting agreed that UNJLC and HIC would recommend the SRSG to ensure urgent implementation in view of humanitarian needs up-country.

Recommendations
59. UNJLC is well positioned to co-ordinate road transport and assessments survey projects. In this respect they should explore ways of matching required repair projects with the donor community to accelerate a timely implementation.

Degree of Integration of UNJLC Liberia into the UN Structure
60. Stakeholders reported that the UNJLC was well integrated into the UN structure in Liberia, including the peace keeping operation UNMIL. UNJLC attended co-ordination meetings, was represented in the HOC, and frequently visited the agencies, NGOs and local authorities to understand their needs vis-à-vis co-ordinating (inter-agency) logistics. The “walk-with-the-people” attitude was very productive in their networking. Although UNJLC was located in the WFP office, stakeholders did not express concern about the independent position of UNJLC.

Recommendations
61. UNJLC should continue working closely with the HC, humanitarian and peacekeeping community to ensure its integration into the overall UN structure and mission in emergency crises.

4.3 Logistics Information Platform

Assessment of Information Requirements
62. During the whole operation UNJLC staff attended UNCT meetings and visited HOAs and agency staff to inventory the requirements for logistics information, with priority settings discussed with the UNCT. Agencies and NGOs were not always able to indicate their precise requirements and UNJLC had to make their own assessments. Stakeholders stated that the UNJLC is looking far ahead of potential logistics bottlenecks and is taking timely action.

63. Tailor-made services included the compilation of contact details for the new transitional government of Liberia, identifying sources for cash for payment of salaries, and listing communication equipment and facilities up-country.

Recommendations
64. UNJLC field staff should continue assessing needs for logistics information from UN agencies and NGOs right from the out-set of their mobilisation to ensure that their services and logistics information remain field demand-driven.

Design of Logistics Information System

65. Logistics information for the humanitarian community was initially collected and analysed by the Rome based Core Unit until full employment of UNJLC field staff. Dissemination of information was done by the Core Unit via the web-site, mailing lists, and by sending hard copies of logistic maps (operational information maps and specific diagrams) to the field for onward distribution. Hard copies of UNJLC reports and weekly bulletins were also distributed by UNJLC field staff.

66. The design for the UNJLC Liberia web-site was based on the UNJLC Iraq site. The Contents Based Management system was further enhanced to facilitate quick and easy access and the upload of information. Further attention is needed for linking the UNJLC web-site to other partners and by showing logos of associated parties. The UNJLC web-site is now a properly functioning mainstay of UNJLC deployments.

Recommendations

67. UNJLC Core Unit should continue consulting with the field staff to refine information needs for the web-site and reports. Due recognition to other contributing parties is needed by, for instance, showing logos on the UNJLC web-site and reports.

Co-operation with HIC

68. HIC arrived at the same time as UNJLC in Liberia in August 2003, to commence compiling information for the humanitarian community and local authorities. UNJLC received map information from HIC to be used in the further compilation of logistics maps. Printing of these maps in the field was delayed due to the late arrival of HIC equipment in Monrovia. As reported above, the road assessment was a successful joint undertaking by UNJLC and HIC. Further, HIC housed an internet café for the humanitarian community, which is frequently visited by NGOs.

Recommendations

69. A continuing effort on de-lineation between UNJLC and HIC services is needed to prevent duplication of efforts thereby expanding on recent UNJLC experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq. Co-locating both units, wherever possible, will strongly contribute to an effective co-operation.

4.4 Civil Military Co-ordination Platform

Liaison and Interface with Military

70. The SCR 1509 of September 19, 2003 established the military peacekeeping force UNMIL to support the implementation of the cease-fire agreement and peace process, and to protect UN staff, facilities and civilians, as well as to assist in the national security reform process. A total of 15,000 troops had to be mobilised in Liberia in about 6 months.

71. The UNJLC CMCoord officer had frequent contacts with UNMIL to avoid congestion of humanitarian and military transports on Liberian infrastructure and transport corridors. With the establishment of the HOC, this interface became easier as both parties were represented.

MCDA

72. OCHA CMCoord developed general guidelines on the interaction between humanitarian organisations and military forces operating in Liberia. The use of MCDA for humanitarian purposes is included in these guidelines, which were prepared in close consultation with UNJLC CMCoord. Requests for using MCDA were dealt with by UNJLC, OCHA, and UNMIL in the HOC and when approved were subsequently closely monitored.

73. Based on experiences gained in Iraq, the OCHA CMCoord officers in Liberia addressed the policy related issues of civil – military relations, whilst the UNJLC CMCoord officers focussed on operational level issues.

Co-operation with HC and OCHA CMCoord Officers

74. The co-ordination on logistics related issues (e.g. escorts) and military issues took place in the daily (later bi-weekly) meetings with the HC and OCHA CMCoord officers in addition to the frequent consultations between UNJLC CMCoord and UNMIL CIMIC officers.

Recommendations

75. In case peacekeeping forces are present in an emergency crisis, UNJLC should continue to closely communicate civil – military logistics issues with them to prevent congestion and optimise the use of MCDA, with adherence to most recent UN guidelines.

76. It is recommended to formalise civil – military relations, whereby OCHA should focus its attention on policy related issues, whilst UNJLC should deal with operational level issues.

4.5 Air Movement Co-ordination Platform

Use of Air Space and Airfields

77. UNJLC assisted in reaching agreements on the use of air space and airfields in Liberia for humanitarian air transport, including for WFP Humanitarian Air Service. UNJLC eased the passage of cargoes and passengers at the airports and negotiated reduced fees and handling charges. UNJLC conducted several assessments for Monrovian airports (Roberts International Airport, Spriggs Payne Airport) and airstrips up-country. The latter was done in close co-operation with UNMIL and CAA, with transfer of all assessment results to CAA.

78. The Civil Aviation Office (CAO) of UNMIL developed Search and Rescue (SAR) and medevac procedures upon their arrival in Liberia. UNJLC consistently tried to include UN agencies into these procedures, but there is no formal MOU yet.

Transition to Long-term Air Traffic Control

79. The needs and requirements for long-term air space management and air traffic control were identified by UNJLC in close collaboration with CAA staff. After their mobilisation, UNMIL took over the air management and control tasks, which will be transferred to the local authorities at a later stage.

Co-ordination of Airlifts (Regional and Strategic)

80. Although in the revised CAP for Liberia a proposal was included for UNHAS, it was later decided that common air services would be provided by WFP Humanitarian Air Services and included in the regional air operations as they already had a plane operating in West Africa (there was also a plane operated by UNHCR). UNJLC liaised with UNMIL and UNHCR to optimise humanitarian air operations (de-confliction).

Planning and Prioritisation of Air Cargo Loads and Flight Scheduling

81. In the initial stage UNJLC took flight bookings for passengers, prepared manifests, and assisted in requests for air cargo bookings from UN agencies and NGOs, working in close consultation with WFP air operations staff. Later the Air Planning Officer was transferred to WFP to ease co-ordination of air operations. The UNJLC ToR again included the scheduling of air operations (planes), which is the sole responsibility of WFP as the ultimate responsible party.

Recommendations

82. UNJLC should discuss their co-ordinating role for air operations (passengers and cargo) for future UNJLC operations in detail with WFP, who have become responsible for all non-peacekeeping UN flight operations for passengers as per January 01, 2004. [A formal meeting to address this issue is now scheduled for May 27, 2004].

4.6 Logistics Co-ordination and Movement Control Centre

Humanitarian Operations Centre – HOC

83. The acting HC introduced in September 2003 the HOC as an umbrella location where NGOs, agencies and other parties could meet (initially on a daily basis) to exchange information. Later, the HOC was formalised as a co-ordination centre (official opening on November 15, 2003) to form a "one-stop-shop" for the humanitarian community.

84. HOC represented the following parties:

- OCHA – CMCoord
- UNMIL – CIMIC
- UNJLC – Logistics Co-ordination and Movement Control Centre (LOCOMOCC)
- Liberian Government – LRRCC
- National NGO liaison
- UNSECoord
- HIC

UNSECoord and HIC staff could not be accommodated in the HOC office.

LOCOMOCC

85. UNJLC provided the LOCOMOCC and recruited the national NGO liaison staff members for the HOC. The use of a NGO co-ordinator was a successful continuation from UNJLC Iraq. Then, in collaboration with these HOC members, UN agencies, NGOs and local authorities, UNJLC complemented and co-ordinated logistics capabilities, provided rapid response assistance to the humanitarian community as requested, and facilitated the exchange of logistics information as needed through LOCOMOCC.

86. During this review the Consultants noted a lot of confusion in the field between the respective roles of UNJLC, LOCOMOCC, and HOC. Some stakeholders said there was duplication of activities, whilst others just went to either party to address questions or collect information.

Recommendations

87. *In future operational environments in which an UNJLC is deployed alongside a peacekeeping operation, the UNJLC is well placed to provide an operational interface with the Joint Logistics Operations Centre (JLOC) of DPKO, which is the standard logistics facility used with DPKO missions.*

88. *In cases where HOCs are used to facilitate humanitarian logistics operations, and if a UNJLC is deployed, then the respective roles of the HOC and UNJLC must be clearly publicised. Further, when peacekeeping operations are deployed, then the JLOC should be represented in any HOC which may be formed to create a real "one-stop-shop" for the humanitarian community on logistics information.*

4.7 UNJLC Support to WFP Emergency Operations

Implementation of West Africa Regional PRRO

89. WFP did not experience direct benefits from UNJLC during the implementation of the West Africa Regional PRRO operation, as they were well equipped to complete this operation on their own. However, WFP recognised that UNJLC activities produced indirect benefits to WFP as the UNJLC co-ordinated NFI related logistics requirements for other UN agencies and NGOs as well as those of UNMIL.

Collaboration between UNJLC and WFP Staff

90. In Liberia there was a strong collaboration between WFP logistics and UNJLC staff throughout the whole assignment of UNJLC and there was a combined understanding on the need for co-ordinating inter-agency logistics issues after the crisis. However, co-operation on administration and finance aspects was less effective (refer para 41).

LIST OF ACRONYMS

Acronym	*Description*
ALITE	Augmented Logistics Intervention Team for Emergencies
CAA	Civil Aviation Authority
CAO	Civil Aviation Office (UNMIL)
CAP	Consolidated Appeal Process
CD	Country Director
CIMIC	Civil Military Co-ordination (military environment)
CMCoord	Civil Military Co-ordination (humanitarian environment)
CMS	Content Management System
CO	Country Office
DFID	Department For International Development (UK)
DPKO	Department of Peace Keeping Operations
EC	European Commission
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
FI	Food Item
FITTEST	Fast Information Technology and Telecommunications Emergency and Support Team
FOM	Field Operations Manual
GIS	Geographic Information Systems
GTZ	Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (German Technical Assistance Agency)
HC	Humanitarian Co-ordinator
HIC	Humanitarian Information Centre
HOA	Head of Agency
HOC	Humanitarian Operations Centre
HQ	Head Quarter
IASC – WG	Inter Agency Standing Committee – Working Group
ICT	International Communication Technology
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IOM	International Organisation of Migration
IP	Implementing Partner
IRC	International Rescue Committee
J-LOC	Joint Logistics Information Centre (DPKO)
LOCOMOCC	Logistics Co-ordination and Movement Control Centre
LRRCC	Liberian Refugee Repatriation and Resettlement Commission
MCDA	Military and Civil Defence Assets
MoU	Memorandum Of Understanding
NFI	Non Food Item
NFR	Note For the Record
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
OCHA	Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OEDB	Office of Budget
OEDE	Office of Evaluation
OFDA	Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
OIC	Officer In Charge
OXFAM	Oxford Committee for Famine Relief
OTL	Transport, Preparedness and Response Division – Logistics Service
PRRO	Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation

Acronym	Description
RB	Regional Bureau
RC	Regional Co-ordinator
RH	Royal Haskoning
RTF	Road Task Force
SBA	Stand-By Agreement
SCR	Security Council Resolution
SO	Special Operations
SOP	Standard / Standing Operating Procedures
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary General
ToR	Terms of Reference
UNCT	UN Country Team
UNDP	UN Development Programme
UNHAS	UN Humanitarian Air Services
UNHCR	UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	UN Children's Fund
UNJLC	United Nations Joint Logistic Centre
UNMIL	UN Mission In Liberia
UNSECoord	Office of the UN Security Co-ordinator
USAID	US Agency for International Development
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation
ZOA Refugee Care	Zuid Oost Azië (South East Asia) Refugee Care

APPENDIX A - PROGRESS ON OUTSTANDING RECOMMENDATIONS FROM UNJLC AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ

UNJLC Afghanistan	UNJLC Iraq	UNJLC Liberia
• UNJLC should be involved in the planning and assessment phase of upcoming emergencies right from the beginning to increase its efficiency.	• UNJLC Iraq was involved in the preparation phase before the crisis and was therefore well established at the start of the actual operations in March 2003.	• Preparation time for UNJLC Liberia was very short with insufficient time for necessary consultation with WFP in the region.
• UNJLC should have a short pre-set duration at first phases of emergency crises focusing on de-conflicting and de-bottlenecking of logistics. Continuation into a next phase needs careful consideration.	• UNJLC Iraq was active from March till September 2003, with some activities extended till December 2003 with clear approval of the HCI.	• UNJLC Liberia had short and pre-set duration, with extensions timely discussed and agreed upon with the UNCT.
• In defining the functions for UNJLC, replication of tasks and services provided by other UN agencies, specifically of WFP, operating in the same emergency area should be prevented.	• Compared to UNJLC Afghanistan this was improved, although still some work done by UNJLC was perceived by other agencies as duplication.	• UNJLC had frequent consultations with other agencies and UNCT to determine required inter-agency services and actions for UNJLC Liberia.
• For each UNJLC operation it should specifically be decided whether UNJLC should be co-ordinating only or whether they should also carry out operational tasks.	• Although UNJLC Iraq was non-operational, some operational tasks were executed (e.g. tactical fuel supply for UN cars). Nevertheless, UNJLC seems best accepted if they remain non-operational.	• UNJLC is best accepted if they remain non-operational. Specific short-term operations should only be undertaken by UNJLC upon specific request of the HC or UNCT (e.g. fuel distribution).
• UNJLC should only make priority listings for air cargo transport and should not do tasking and scheduling of aircraft. In addition, the relationship between UNJLC and UNHAS should be defined in detail.	• This aspect still needs improvement as in first UNJLC Iraq stages they conducted scheduling of aircraft. The UNJLC – UNHAS link will be better established in view of new WFP mandate to co-ordinate non-peacekeeping air operations for UN.	• UNJLC should discuss their co-ordinating role for air operations (PAX and cargo) for future operations in detail with WFP, who have become responsible for all non-peacekeeping UN flight operations for passengers (per January 01, 2004).

UNJLC Afghanistan	UNJLC Iraq	UNJLC Liberia
• UNJLC should consult with UN agencies and NGOs in the field on their specific requirements for information. This consultation should address needs on sectoral studies (e.g. transport surveys).	• Initial initiatives were undertaken to carry out a market assessment of the logistic information needs of the UN agencies. However, this activity was abandoned and requires completion.	• UNJLC staff in the field frequently updated needs for inter-agency logistics information. Needs for infrastructure assessments were approved by UN agencies (HC or UNCT). Strongly demand-driven.
	• UNJLC should properly recognise the sources used in the UNJLC web-site, bulletins, and reports (e.g. by showing logos of UN agencies / NGOs).	• Still needs better implementation.
• UNJLC should continue to co-ordinate with military on de-conflicting requirements for air space on behalf of the humanitarian community, and should remain involved in the consultation of CMCoord operational level activities.	• UNJLC should conduct a study as to how they can best liaise with military HQ's (such as RAMCC) for operational de-conflicting as military forces have the tendency to considerably tighten security. Co-operation and consultation with military is essential for humanitarian aid supply.	• UNJLC co-ordinated inter-agency logistics transport needs for the humanitarian community with the peacekeeping force UNMIL.
• UNJLC should endeavour to maintain its independent position vis-à-vis WFP to strengthen its neutral position in the inter-agency logistics with the donor, UN and NGO community.	• UNJLC is now recognised as being an independent and neutral co-ordinating body. Therefore, UNJLC should focus its attention on a better communication with their custodian WFP.	• UNJLC is well accepted now in UN and NGO humanitarian community. Communication with WFP logistics field staff was very good.
• UNJLC should market their position as the key call centre for co-ordinating inter-agency logistics at headquarter and field level to increase under-standing and acceptance of the UNJLC concept.	• Marketing of the UNJLC concept is still needed despite a number of training courses held since UNJLC Afghanistan. In addition, UN agencies should be encouraged to market UNJLC internally.	• Promoting UNJLC could be enhanced by presenting a catalogue of potential services and products. The HOC caused a lot of confusion in the field and better de-lineation with UNJLC is needed.

UNJLC Afghanistan	UNJLC Iraq	UNJLC Liberia
• UNJLC should be included in one separate WFP SO project rather than in a multi-purpose SO as used for Afghanistan to increase transparency in UNJLC functions, available budgets, expenditures, and tracking of donations.	• The separate SO concept has been implemented with success and contributed considerably to transparency.	• UNJLC Liberia showed a continued success with the separate dedicated SO.
• Strong leadership and communicative skills are needed to represent UNJLC at the highest UN and government levels and this must be assured for the future.	• UNJLC should appoint one full-time person as Chief UNJLC as alternating this position between more than one individual undermines a single-line of command. When a Chief and Operational Co-ordinator are deployed their relative roles should be properly explained to the participating agencies.	• UNJLC Liberia leadership (and staff) was highly appreciated in the field for their initiatives in identifying and solving logistics bottlenecks. Operation was undertaken without direct involvement of the initiator of its concept.
	• The specific relationship between UNJLC and WFP on support services (administration, finance, and human resources) should be described in a separate agreement (NFR or MoU) for each UNJLC project.	• Relationship was included in NFR for UNJLC Liberia. Liaison officer in the Core Unit for international staff proved its value. Communications with CO staff needs streamlining.