Somalia Logistics Cluster

Lessons Learned Mission Report

03 – 08 December 2012

Nairobi, KENYA
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1. BACKGROUND

1.1 Context

From 02 – 08 December 2012, the Global Logistics Cluster Support Cell (GLCSC) deployed a team to Nairobi to assess the situation on the ground and, through a series of interviews with key partners, gather feedback on the strengths and weaknesses of the Logistics Cluster Somalia Operation begun in response to the 2011 famine and carried on through December 2012.

The assessment team consisted of Amelia Stewart (GLCSC Information Management Officer), Roberto Marazzani (GLCSC Logistics Officer seconded from Save the Children), and Giorgio Figus (UNICEF Logistics Specialist).

The Assessment Team interviewed representatives from INGOs, UN Agencies and Private Sector Enterprises (See Annex 1) in order to receive their feedback on the Operation and to assess their needs regarding the future of the Somalia Logistics Cluster.

Key Dates of Somalia Logistics Cluster Operation July 2011 – December 2012
1.1.1 Situation in Somalia

The failed 2010 Deyr rains and the poor performance of the 2011 April-June Gu rains caused widespread crop failure and also resulted in a lack of adequate pastureland across much of the Horn of Africa, including in Somalia. This, coupled with the protracted conflict affecting the majority of southern Somalia, which has historically limited humanitarian access, created urgent needs for life-saving and life-sustaining relief items such as food, water, and shelter to support an affected population of almost 4 million.

On 20th July 2011, the UN declared a famine in 5 areas of southern Somalia (Lower Shabelle, Bakool, Middle Shabelle, Modagishu & Afgoye) resulting in a need for a scale-up of humanitarian operations due to worsening drought conditions. Access constraints, a result of the complicated security situation, limited the ability of the humanitarian community to respond quickly. The harsh conditions and limited availability of aid also contributed to a massive displacement of people who sought relief at refugee camps in Ethiopia and Kenya, and drove the displacement of significant numbers of people within Somalia.

At the time the first Concept of Operations was written (August 2011), the size of the most severely affected population in Somalia, those with the greatest hunger needs, was estimated at 3.7 million people; 2.2 million of which were located in areas of the south where there was limited humanitarian access.

The security constraints of operating in and Somalia greatly impacted the humanitarian community’s ability to respond to the needs of the affected population. At the onset of the crisis WFP had already been banned by Al-Shabab (AS) from operating in the areas it controlled for over two years, and on 28 November 2011 Al-Shabab issued a public decree stating that 16 humanitarian organisations (6 UN agencies, 9 INGOs and 1 NNGO), were also to be barred from “operating in Somalia”. The partners of these organisations also received strong warnings not to work with them, or distribute on behalf them, and were not able to supply AS controlled areas with relief items. The AS notice of relief items from certain organisations being banned, put an additional strain on relief pipelines (especially UNICEF supplies, which had a rather large pipeline in several sectors to this area). AS also warned that re-packing (without the logo) of banned organisations relief supplies would not be accepted. ICRC and Save the Children were banned in 2012.
1.1.2 Planned Logistics Cluster Response

The Logistics Cluster provided Coordination and Information Management services from August 2011, and operational logistics services from October 2011. The Logistics Cluster operational logistics services concluded in July 2012, when operations were handed over to WFP logistics.

The Logistics Cluster Concept of Operations (ConOps)

The initial Concept of Operations (ConOps), published on 18 August 2011, evaluated the gaps and needs within Somalia and in the surrounding areas as:

- Lack of access to affected areas due to internal conflict, which had resulted in a lack of basic services or a cohesive leadership structure.
- Insufficient/inaccessible storage capacity for relief items in Somalia and affected neighbouring areas of Kenya and Ethiopia.
- Need for coordination and information sharing between various humanitarian actors in order to mitigate duplication of efforts and to maximise the use of available logistics assets.

The primary ConOps outlined the activities and the services the Logistics Cluster would provide to the humanitarian community. All specified services would be provided at no cost to the user:

1. Logistics Coordination & Information Management

- A Logistics Cluster coordination cell for Somalia was to be established in Nairobi, Kenya, with a dedicated Logistics Cluster Coordinator; the role of the Logistics Cluster Coordinator was to facilitate the overall response strategy, including optimising the use of logistics assets aiming to ensure an uninterrupted supply of life saving relief items to the affected population.
- The cell would include dedicated information management capacity, including GIS / mapping services with the aim of coordinating logistics operations and supporting decision making to improve the efficiency of the logistics response.
- Additionally, the Logistics Cluster planned to disseminate vital information through the Horn of Africa – Somalia Famine webpage at: [http://www.logcluster.org/ops/som11a](http://www.logcluster.org/ops/som11a).

2. Logistics Cluster Services

- Warehousing and Staging Grounds
  - The Logistics Cluster would make a transit warehouse available to the Humanitarian Community in Mogadishu Port at no cost to user, with 5,000 m² capacity.
  - The Logistics Cluster planned to provide 20 Mobile Storage Units (10 X 32 m each) to be allocated as per requirements in different areas inside Somalia or in neighbouring countries to facilitate cross-border operations.
  - The Logistics Cluster prepared to set up staging areas at specific locations to act as consolidation points for humanitarian cargo. In common staging areas, services were to include handling, consolidation, tracking, and loading (free on truck to the users).

- Sea Transport

The Logistics Cluster projected that sea transport could be offered to the Humanitarian Community for two logistics corridors in the region:
A vessel would be contracted on a time-charter basis for the transportation of relief items from Mombasa Port in Kenya to Mogadishu Port in Somalia for the humanitarian community. This was to operate at no cost to the end user and to offer two rotations a month, providing a predictable and reliable service.

Due to the unpredictable security situation in the region, the vessel would have an international naval escort to ensure safe passage to and from Mogadishu, Somalia.

A second vessel was to operate out of Djibouti Port and would service Bossaso and Berbera in Somalia. This service was to operate on a space available and first-come-first-serve basis and also to be offered at no cost to the end user.

- Tactical Airlift

The Logistics Cluster planned the use of tactical airlifts from Kenya to strategic areas within Somalia for the delivery of relief items, pending the identification of a viable delivery point, or points. The hypothesis was that, as more areas of southern Somalia opened for humanitarian access, it would then be possible to rapidly transport essential items such as medicines and supplementary food by air, to fill the gap while viable road deliveries were set up.

1.2 Operational Overview

This section provides a summary of the operational reality in light of the planned activities stated in the ConOps; some activities that were planned for (listed below) were not implemented due to the changing situation on the ground. This is in line with the Logistics Cluster’s standard method of operation; the Concept of Operations is a live document and the activities are adapted and revised as the situation unfolds and further assessment results become available; this includes the possible provision of additional logistics common services as required by the humanitarian community.

1.2.1 Coordination and Information Management

The first Logistics Cluster Coordination Meeting dedicated to discussion of the emerging crisis was held on 22nd July 2011. The Somalia Logistics Cluster had at that point been active since 2006; up until the augmentation of the Somalia Logistics Cluster in July 2011, a WFP Logistics Officer had been responsible for managing the coordination aspects of the Logistics Cluster and had been holding meetings with partner organisations. However, due to the scale of the crisis, the Logistics Cluster deployed a dedicated Coordinator in August 2011 and a dedicated Information Management Officer to the cell in Nairobi, Kenya. A dedicated Somalia Operation Page was also created on the Logistics Cluster Website on 11th August 2011, where all public information relating to the Somalia Logistics Cluster Operation was available.
1.2.2 Logistics Cluster Services

Tactical Airlifts

The WFP Special Operation\(^1\) (SO) documents and primary ConOps specified that tactical Airlifts would be one of the common services provided to partners; this was intended to provide vital temporary assistance, enabling affected populations to cope until larger amounts of aid could be delivered by road. In Meeting Minutes from 19 August 2011, the Logistics Cluster stated that they planned to fund 30-40 small cargo tactical airlifts of SMT capacity (to transport drugs, medicines, supplementary food) to access remote areas as and when they became accessible.

Although there was a budget for airlifts in the SO 200344, this was not deemed a priority due to the limited funds available; therefore all air operations, transporting both passengers and cargo, was dealt with directly by UNHAS. In October 2011, the Logistics Cluster Coordinator met with the User Group in order to prioritise activities and shipping services were given a higher priority. The Logistics Cluster did, however, facilitate contact with UNHAS and private flight operators for organisations to arrange/pay for airlifts themselves.

Warehousing

The ConOps, in August 2011, stated that 20 Mobile Storage Units (MSUs) would be made available to partners. Due to lack of demand, only five MSUs were used; these five MSUs reached Mogadishu, Somalia, on 29 March 2012 and were brought in as contingency stock to support the Somalia Response Plan.

The Logistics Cluster initially planned to provide warehouse space of 5,000m\(^2\) in Mogadishu Port via one of the Logistics Emergency Team (LET) partners, but this never materialised as the Somali Port Authorities had consigned this warehouse to another organisation. By the time the formalities had been organised the User group deemed that Logistics Cluster partners in Mogadishu did not see the same level of need and that there was sufficient storage outside of the Port.

Due to a need voiced by partners, the Logistics Cluster made available five MSUs in April 2012; it was however made clear to partners that there was an option of procuring more should the need arise. At the time this report was drafted, only two out of the five MSUs, available for inter-agency storage, have been leased. The organisations leasing the MSUs were responsible for transporting the MSUs to their final destinations, and installing and managing the units themselves. The Logistics Cluster has been providing technical guidance via information management products available at www.logcluster.org.

Shipping service

To address a lack of commercially reliable and regular sea transport from the Kenyan port of Mombasa to Mogadishu, Somalia due to the risk of piracy, the Somalia Logistics Cluster, together with the Somalia Country Office Logistics Unit evaluated the operational needs and provided a detailed recommendation to WFP Shipping, who was then able to charter a merchant vessel capable of accommodating the needs of humanitarian organisations participating in the response. This arrangement also allowed for the coordination of naval protection via the European Union Naval Force (EU-NavFor). As per the ConOps and the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for the shipping service, the Logistics Cluster committed to:

- Coordinate shipping via a vessel contracted on a time charter basis, for the transportation of life-saving relief items from Mombasa Port in Kenya to Mogadishu Port in Somalia for the humanitarian community (Later expanded to include Berbera and Bossaso Ports).
- Make this service available at no cost to the end user.

\(^1\) The project category used by WFP to manage funding for Logistics Cluster activities
However, as this service was offered through WFP as part of its responsibility as provider of last resort, it was never intended to replace the logistics capacities of the organisations, but rather to supplement them through the provision of a specific service that was commercially unavailable. As such, the service was offered for a limited period of time until 01 July 2012. Although the Free Shipping Service was planned for in the ConOps of August 2011, the first voyage with Logistics Cluster cargo did not depart until October 2011. This was due to a number of reasons, including:

- Many organisations were already using WFP’s cost-recovery shipping service, or had their own means of transport into Somalia;
- The process of getting the time-chartered vessel on track proved lengthy due to insurance and security issues;
- Strategic airlifts were available into Mogadishu (the need for the Shipping Service increased when the possibility of airlifts decreased);
- The need for massive procurement of relief items grew much larger in October – most organisations had managed up to October 2011 with local procurement or using their own stocks;
- As the situation stabilised, the Shipping became the preferred and cheaper option;

The service was accommodated primarily through use of the time charter MV Caroline Scan (capacity of 6,000 m$^3$), but on three occasions Logistics Cluster cargo was shipped via a different vessel: the MV Sunrise in October 2011 carried 140 MT (1,197 m$^3$); the MV Nawal Ali in December 2011 carried 329 MT (585 m$^3$), and the MV Golden Bridge in March of 2012 carried 175 MT (442 m$^3$). The MV Caroline Scan performed seven rotations carrying Logistics Cluster Cargo (One each in October, November, January, March, April, May, and June), and moved a total of 1,814 MT (7,485 m$^3$). The majority of this cargo was carried from Mombasa to Mogadishu, but small amounts of cargo were also delivered to Bossaso (5.93 MT/47.8 m$^3$) and Berbera (2.813 MT/16.6 m$^3$).
1.3.1 Funding

The original funding amount required to support the activities listed in SO 200344 was estimated to be US$ 4 852 229, to provide for the operation from 22 August 2011 to 21 February 2012. However, this was increased to US$ 7 082 485 when the activities of the Emergency Telecommunications Cluster were included in the SO. Finally, SO 200344: Logistics & Emergency Telecommunications Cluster Augmentation in Response to the Humanitarian Situation in Somalia was approved to cover the period from 25 August 2011 to 25 February 2012 with a value of US$ 7 082 485 (The SO was 32% funded, as of October 2012).

On 26 February 2012 there was a budget revision to adjust the value of the SO down by US$ 1 294 and extend the lifespan of the project until 21 December 2012. The explanation for budget revision was as follows:

a) Reduction in Other Direct Operational Costs (ODOC) due to a completion of Emergency Telecoms Cluster (ETC) activities and scale down of common storage needs in Mogadishu (US$ -679,932)

b) Increase in DSC due to extension in time to cover staff costs (US$ +678,723)

Donations for the Somalia operation to-date are laid out in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RESOURCE SITUATION</th>
<th>20 November 2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recipient Country:</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project No.:</td>
<td>200344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Title:</td>
<td>Single Country Special Operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Title:</td>
<td>Logistics &amp; Emergency Telecommunications Cluster Augmentation in Response to the Humanitarian Situation in Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Duration From:</td>
<td>25 August 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To: 31 December 2012</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Requirements</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Dollars</td>
<td>7,081,191</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Resource Level (in US$) | Share of Requirements (%)
------------------------|------------------------
Confirmed               |                        |
GERMANY                 | 666,667                | 9.41                   |
U.S.A.                  | 1,500,000              | 21.18                  |
MULTILATERAL            | 160,500                | 2.27                   |

Total Received: 2,327,167
% Against Appeal: 32.9%
Shortfall: 4,754,024
% Shortfall: 67.1%
1.4.1 Staffing

The first dedicated Logistics Cluster Coordinator deployed to support the response to the 2011 crisis was Baptiste Burgaud (WFP Logistics Officer) who arrived in Nairobi in July 2011 to assist with the transition of the Logistics Cluster from a WFP-led Logistics Sector to a Logistics Cluster supported by dedicated staff. Baptiste Burgaud took up the position of Logistics Cluster Coordinator in August 2011. Successive Logistics Cluster Coordinators were John Myraunet (Cluster Coordinator from October 2011 – July 2012), Cameron Birge (Who filled in for John Myraunet in January 2012), and Faheem Araie (Cluster Coordinator from August 2012 until December 2012); all three coordinators worked under WFP contracts for the duration of their time in Nairobi. Hamza Mohmand (WFP Information Management Officer) was deployed from August 2011 until the operation scaled-down in December 2012. Sean Price (WFP Information Management Officer) filled in for Hamza Mohmand in July of 2012. For the duration of the Logistics Cluster-WFP Shipping operation, Michael Larkins (WFP Shipping Officer) was deployed to Mombasa port, and worked in support of the Logistics Cluster.

In August 2011, the Logistics Cluster, in response to partners’ requests, attempted to facilitate the deployment of a WFP Logistics Officer of Kenyan-Somali descent to Mogadishu to act as the focal point for the Logistics Cluster inside Somalia. Due to internal HR issues, this never materialised.
2. THE OPERATION

2.1 Coordination

2.1.1 Findings

The representatives from UN agencies, INGOs and Private Partners, interviewed by the Assessment Team participated in the Somalia Logistics Cluster Operation at different stages due to a variety of factors; these ranged from lack of awareness concerning the role and responsibility of the Logistics Cluster (A different entity to WFP although linked to WFP) to the availability of services and their relationship to the needs of the various organisations (Some organisations only used the coordination services provided by the Logistics Cluster, while others relied on the shipping service to support the implementation of their in-country programmes).

In terms of coordination between the Logistics Cluster and participants, a contrast was noted in terms of both quantity and quality of information disseminated between when the Logistics Cluster was active before July 2011, and when the Logistics Cluster was augmented under the SO 200344 (post-July 2011). It was felt by all those interviewed who had been participating in the Logistics Cluster Somalia response during this transition, that the coordination and management of the cell was smoother and information was more readily shared with partners post-July 2011. It was emphasised that internal communication issues was experienced by the WFP Somalia Country Office and the dedicated Logistics Cluster Coordinator, at the time of Logistics Cluster augmentation in July 2011. It was felt that the WFP Country Office did not view the Logistics Cluster as a priority at the time of augmentation and thus internal processes on increasing Logistics Cluster capacity were impeded.

Positive feedback was received from every interviewee on the performance of the Logistics Cluster Coordinators from July 2011; participants saw no disadvantage in the turn-over of three Cluster Coordinators between July 2011 and December 2012 due to the continued high level of aptitude they displayed.

In operational terms, the Assessment Team found that the drafting of the ConOps in August 2011, and the redrafting in February 2012, included all the organisations that were participating Logistics Cluster partners at the time. The Logistics Cluster shared their findings with all participants and asked for their input before publishing; participants generally felt that it would have been beneficial to have discussed the ConOps in the forum of the coordination meeting before it was published, but that their feedback via email was well reflected in the final drafts.

Communication, regarding the Logistics Cluster facilitated Shipping Service was deemed a weakness of the Somalia Logistics Cluster Operation. Partners’ complaints were based on the constant change of the shipping schedule, and the late notice of these changes to organisations with cargo waiting at Mombasa Port for placement on the vessel. The frequent delays and subsequent changes to the schedule were attributed by WFP Shipping Offers familiar with the operation to the unpredictable operations in Mogadishu port (Mostly related to time waiting to berth, and time required to off-load). It should also be noted that while the shipping schedules were not directly controlled by the Logistics Cluster, as the MV Caroline Scan was managed by WFP, the nature of the problems that caused the delays (Stevedore strikes and issues with the Kenyan Port Authorities) were beyond the control of WFP. Partners reported that many problems were experienced with their Clearing and Forwarding (C&F) Agents; C&F Agents in turn reported that often organisations failed to get cargo packaged appropriately and to the port in a timely manner as per the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). This further contributed to the delays.

In November 2011 the Logistics Cluster organised a workshop and port visit in partnership with WFP with six organisations in attendance. Participants attended meetings hosted by WFP Shipping, reviewed procedures and paid a visit to the MV Caroline Scan. Additional shipping trainings at Mombasa Port were planned but...
numerous factors, such as difficulty obtaining UNDSS security clearance and last minute loading schedules for the vessel, meant that they never materialised.

2.1.2 Recommendations

A week-long Shipping Workshop was conducted on 23 November 2012. Although this recent Shipping Workshop received positive feedback from all participants, complaints were voiced on the tardiness of this workshop specifying that it should have been conducted at least before the free-to-user shipping service started in October 2011. A Shipping training had been conducted in November 2011 at Mombasa Port; however, the lack of frequent trainings was cited as a crucial gap in the Logistics Cluster Somalia Operation. Participants stated the types of trainings required would be:

- Regular trainings for NGOs and C&F Agents on the shipping procedures and processes at Mombasa Port.
- Ad-hoc trainings on the methodology and role of the Logistics Cluster to educate those organisations who began to participate in coordination meetings and use services later in the operation.
- A practical training at Mombasa Port as well as classroom training.

In terms of information sharing, participants felt that more information on customs was needed; it was recommended that the Logistics Cluster invite all C&F Agents to the coordination meetings and try to have more regular participation from OCHA.

As operating in Somalia was delicate and complex due to security issues, it was recommended that there be more interaction with management levels of key partners of the Logistics Cluster; an NGO suggested that there should be more regular coordination between UNDSS and participating organisations, in the form of a working group.

All the humanitarian organisations interviewed informed the Assessment Team that they were scaling-up operations in Somalia with a view to be wholly based in Mogadishu, rather than in Nairobi, by 2014; it was requested that due to this scale-up, that the Logistics Cluster continue to provide coordination services with a focal-point in Mogadishu.

It was unanimously stated by all humanitarian organisations interviewed that a greater emphasis needs to be placed on ensuring that the Somalia Logistics Cluster Cell is independently staffed, moving forward into 2013. Requests were made for the role of Logistics Cluster Coordinator to remain filled by a dedicated Logistics Officer recommended/selected by the GLCSC. It was felt that this would guarantee that adequate time could be dedicated to support the coordination requirements associated with an “active” Logistics Cluster..
2.2 Information Management

2.2.1 Findings

The GLCSC deployed a dedicated Information Management (IM) Officer to the Somalia Logistics Cluster Operation from August 2011 until the scale-down of the Logistics Cluster response in December 2012. All those interviewed who had interacted with the IM Officer during the Operation informed the Assessment Team that he was highly approachable, readily available, and adept; disseminating detailed and relevant information in a timely manner.

The IM Officer and the Logistics Cluster Coordinator would send a Weekly Update Report to the GLCSC each Thursday with input for the Global Logistics Cluster Weekly Update; Somalia and Kenya Ports updates were included in each week’s report and were well received by participating organisations. Many of the interviewees cited the weekly Ports Updates and also the Snapshots of the various Ports as crucial to their operational planning; the Meeting Minutes were described as key for those who were unable to attend the Coordination meetings.

The Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for the Common Shipping Service from Mombasa to Mogadishu was a crucial information management product for the Logistics Cluster Operation. The SOPs acted as guidance for all partners using the free-to-user shipping service. The C&F Agents interviewed and WFP Shipping personnel in Nairobi and Mombasa, found the SOPs comprehensible, detailed and easily applicable. The C&F Agents requested to be included in all Logistics Cluster meetings and to have access to any information shared on the situation on the ground in Somalia.

A number of the organisations interviewed stated that there was a lack of information on road access inside Somalia. Due to the complex security situation in Somalia, it was a constant challenge for the Logistics Cluster Cell to collect the data needed for the Physical Road Conditions Maps of Somalia; thus the maps were updated and published in an ad-hoc manner (The Map was updated twice in July 2011; once in October 2011; three times in November 2011; and in 2012 there was a gap in the updates of 3 months, between January and April). Some partners suggested that having a UNDSS representative at the Coordination meetings would have been beneficial. It was reported that UNDSS attended the first Logistics Cluster meetings in the first three months of the augmentation, yet after this their communication to partners was done through the security updates via e-mail.

The Assessment Team was informed, when interviewing a critical Donor for the Somalia Operation, that more analysis of the information shared by the Logistics Cluster was needed; it was stated that there was a lack of analysis on the cost-efficiency of the Logistics Cluster operational services as well as a general lack of transparency of the funding for the Somalia Operation. These two issues were constantly addressed by the Donor and a UN Agency participating in the Coordination Meetings. The transparency of information on funding for the Somalia Logistics Cluster was not easily obtainable as the Special Operation (SO) is part of the WFP financial reporting system which is based on agreements with Donors and thus is not available to the public. The value of contributions made to the Somalia Operation is available to all at www.wfp.org.

2.2.2 Recommendations

Partners stated that the process of transporting their cargo via the Common Shipping Service would have been smoother had the SOPs had a section on Customs Clearance in Somalia. It was emphasised that the Logistics Cluster should reinforce the need for organisations to share the SOPs with the C&F Agents in order to ensure smooth operations at the Ports.
In terms of information products, it was recommended that the Logistics Cluster provide partners:

- A matrix of contact details and rates of inland transporters operating inside Somalia;
- Fuel rates for transporters operating inside Somalia;
- A market survey for commercial shipping companies serving all accessible ports in Somalia;
- More frequent information on cargo consolidation;
- Customs clearance guidelines as part of the SOPs.

Partners stated that a major gap in information from the Logistics Cluster was the fact that the Logistics Capacity Assessment (LCA) of Somalia was last updated in 2006. It was strongly recommended that this be updated in the near future.

2.3 Service Provision

2.3.1 Shipping

Findings

The free-to-user Common Shipping Service, from Mombasa to Mogadishu, was an essential part of the Logistics Cluster Somalia operation; through the Logistics Cluster’s partnership with WFP, a space of 6,000 m$^3$ was made available on the time-chartered vessel MV Caroline Scan and a service of one rotation a month was provided to humanitarian organisations operating in Somalia, at no cost to user. For more detailed information on the specific users of this service, and the amount of cargo transported from October 2011 until July 2012 when the vessel moved to cost-recovery, please refer to the Shipping Report (Annex 4).

The Donor interviewed by the assessment team felt that the Logistics Cluster Shipping Service proved successful and was a valuable use of the allocated funding. The Shipping Service was widely used, although due to various constraints, some organisations with a budget for air transport, used this method of transporting their cargo – one UN Agency stated that they in the month it took to transport relief items by sea, it was possible to do fifty airlifts into Somalia. One INGO withdrew from using the free-to-user Shipping Service in February 2012 due to the length of time of one rotation and as they needed to transport Non-Food Items such as medical supplies, which could not be sent as loose cargo via sea.

For those partners who regularly used the Shipping Service, it was found that partners, although satisfied with the routing of Mombasa to Mogadishu, felt that it would have improved their operations inside Somalia, had the vessel also sailed to the Northern Corridor; in response request to serve Djibouti Port, participants were informed by the Logistics Cluster that due to the vessel being contracted by WFP, the Ports it served were at WFP’s discretion, thus calling at Djibouti was not offered as a destination for Logistics Cluster participants.

Many partners stated that they had hoped that the free-to-user shipping service would service Bosaso and Berbera as well as Mogadishu; the Logistics Cluster would frequently inform participants that the MV Caroline Scan would service Bosaso then send a cancellation e-mail last minute, stating that only Mogadishu Port would be served. The Donor Agency that the Assessment Team interviewed, stated that services into the North of Somalia was not a funding priority for them; it was clearly understood that there were many issues and challenges in the North, but as famine was declared in the South of Somalia, this was seen as the priority in terms of funding.

In July 2012, the shipping service moved back to cost-recovery (as it was pre- October 2011) and coordination between WFP and partners was facilitated by the Logistics Cluster. It currently costs organisations 200 USD per
cubic metre. It was reported that rates range from USD 130-150 for commercial carriers sailing the same route. On the whole, organisations interviewed were satisfied with the cost-recovery service; a UN Agency criticised WFP, stating that before the free-to-user shipping service was made available, WFP charged 120 USD per cubic metre for humanitarian cargo. The reason for this rise in price per cubic metre, is that the Shipping Service is provided via a time-chartered vessel, which although is more expensive, it is much more reliable. As of 3rd December, during the Assessment Mission in Nairobi, participants informed the Team that the November cost-recovery voyage had been postponed as WFP had conducted an Assessment of Kismayo; some organisations interviewed voiced their disappointment that the transportation of their cargo had been postponed although it had been paid for.

All humanitarian organisations the Team interviewed, who were familiar with the Shipping Service, free-to-user and cost-recovery, confirmed the need for more regular and timely schedules, serving more Ports in and around Somalia.

**Recommendations**

The lack of transparency of the cost of space on board the vessel was cited as a gap; It was strongly suggested that the Logistics Cluster previously inform participants in advance, when offering a free service such as the Shipping Service, of the potential cost of space per cubic metre when it move to cost-recovery in order that they are able to adequately budget for future movements.

In terms of locations not served by the vessel, participants recommended that the Logistics Cluster provide regular a service to partners to Berbara, Bosaso to assist with their operations nearer these locations Somalia, particularly as movement via road from Mogadishu to the north of Somalia is greatly restricted. It was suggested that the Logistics Cluster facilitate sea transport to Kismayo since the Port is becoming increasingly more accessible and WFP recently conducted a Port Assessment there.

It was recommended that the Logistics Cluster facilitate the sharing of the WFP Kismayo Port Assessment as well as any other Port Assessments of partners in the future.

The C&F Agents interviewed, recommended that the Logistics Cluster provide them with a sailing schedule highlighting the major ports in Somalia and the estimated length of time to reach them from Mombasa, with a quote on the rates for space on board, for distribution to their clients.

**2.3.2 Warehousing**

**Findings**

Two plans for warehousing provided by the Logistics Cluster were stated in the first draft of the ConOps of the Somalia Operation. These were:

1. A transit warehouse in Mogadishu Port at no cost, with 5,000 m² capacity.
2. Mobile Storage Units (10 X 32 m each) to be allocated as per requirements in different areas inside Somalia or in neighbouring countries to facilitate cross-border operations.

The transit warehouse in Mogadishu Port never materialised but it was planned that the Logistics Cluster’s Private Partner, Agility, would lease them their warehouse in the Port. The previous Logistics Cluster Coordinators that the Team interviewed explained that there were numerous issues with Mogadishu’s Port
Authorities. In 2011 there were three large warehouses in Mogadishu Port; one was rented by WFP, one by the Turkish Red Crescent and by Agility. The Port Authorities rented the warehouse allocated to Agility to the Turkish Red Crescent and after much consideration by the Logistics Cluster on whether to have an interagency warehouse in the WFP compound in Mogadishu, it was decided that this was too much of a security risk for all involved. However, it was reported by the partners interviewed that the Logistics Cluster did not inform participants of the issues with the Agility warehouse until a few months later, by which time organisations had made their own arrangements. Save the Children was requested to rent some space to the Logistics Cluster for partners’ use, but this was not possible due to security constraints.

A further point presented by participants is that having a Logistics Cluster warehouse requires a budget for staff and for security. The Logistics Cluster did provide five Mobile Storage Units (MSUs) free of charge, from April 2012, for organisations operating out of Mogadishu Port. Two of the MSUs are leased to Save the Children; Save the Children are using them to store nutrition supplies and gave positive feedback on the monetary saving made from using two Logistics Cluster MSUs.

Almost all participants interviewed stated that it would have been beneficial to their operations if a warehouse had been provided at Mombasa Port for cargo consolidation, although this was not seen as a major gap due to the established large capacity of warehousing at the Port. It was felt the need became evident due to the unpredictable schedule of the vessel and the constant delays of completing the clearing process at Mogadishu Port. A consolidation warehouse would have helped organisations to organise their cargo for loading in a more efficient manner, especially for smaller organisations with a limited logistics capacity, and to avoid extra charges at the Port for waiting cargo when the shipping schedules were unreliable.

**Recommendations**

The need for a warehouse in the Port of Mombasa was cited as a significant gap due to delays in the loading process and a reported loss of cargo due to damage and misplacement. Organisations recommended that if the Logistics Cluster would not provide a warehouse in Mombasa Port, it would be valuable to rent space in another warehouse for inter-agency use.

As there were reports of insufficient storage in Mogadishu Port, and although the Logistics Cluster recommended partners identify and contract storage individually, it would have been beneficial to partners if the Logistics Cluster had provided a small storage space in the Port itself for transit goods which could then be taken off the vessel and handed over to the consignee within 1-2 days.

An INGO recommended that the remaining three MSUs would be best erected in Mogadishu airport for inter-agency use, as it would assist NGOs who, unlike UN Agencies, have a smaller presence in Mogadishu.

Participants stated that although the five MSUs provided were indeed free of charge that they had to assemble the warehouses themselves perhaps discouraged many smaller NGOs from using them. It was suggested that the Logistics Cluster, if there sufficient capacity in the Coordination Cell, should offer more frequent trainings on MSU assemblage to assist those organisations with a limited capacity.
2.3.3 Air Transport

Findings

Airlifts were included in the SO and the original ConOps, yet they never materialised due to a lack of requests from partners and the major issue that the destinations for these airlifts in Somalia were not authorised by UNDSS.

A UN Agency informed the group that they requested the use of air transport to move Non-Food Items (NFIs) from Kenya to Somalia, but never received as response from the Logistics Cluster as to why they were no longer planning to provide the airlifts.

The interviewed Donor Agency stated that, had the Logistics Cluster provided strategic airlifts from Kenya into Somalia, the Agency would not have wished to contribute funding. This is due to a number of reasons, including the large cost involved and particularly as the management and the liability involved in providing this service, in the context of Somalia, would be beyond the role that the Logistics Cluster is expected to fulfil.

Recommendations

It was recommended that the Logistics Cluster collaborate with UNHAS in order to provide an air transport service into and within Somalia; this would be especially beneficial to organisations transporting cold chain supplies.

Participants suggested that it would have been beneficial to have an inland road transport service; it was suggested that an NGO contract trucking companies on behalf of the Logistics Cluster for the rest of the humanitarian community, but due to the complex security situation in Somalia, especially considering issues like constant illegal checkpoints between locations, this was deemed unsafe as a transport option.

3. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

3.1 Conclusion

In conclusion, the Assessment Team found the Somalia Logistics Cluster Operation to have gained overall positive feedback; the mixture of personnel interviewed contributed a rounded and varied perspective on the Somalia Operation. It was noted that due to the complex political and security situation in Somalia, and the challenges of gaining access to affected areas, the majority of personnel interviewed in Nairobi had never physically been in South Central Somalia. This additional layer of complexity to the Somalia Operation emphasises the necessary intricacy of a Logistics Cluster Operation.

3.2 Recommendations

The Assessment team received invaluable feedback on the Logistics Cluster Somalia Operation and concluded the major areas for improvement as follows:

Coordination
• An increase in trainings provided by the Logistics Cluster in a timelier manner. These trainings need to be for Clearing and Forwarding Agents and for WFP national staff on the methodology of the Logistics Cluster, as well as for humanitarian organisations on the operational logistics services provided; in the case of the Somalia operation, more Shipping Workshops and Mobile Storage Unit (MSU) assemblage trainings.

• More information on Customs procedures needs to be shared with participants and to try and include OCHA representatives at the Logistics Cluster Coordination meetings on Customs Clearing procedures as often as possible.

• As operating in Somalia was delicate and complex due to security issues, it was recommended that there be more interaction with management levels of key partners of the Logistics Cluster and a working group created with UNDSS.

• To ensure that the role of the Logistics Cluster Coordinator for Somalia continues to be filled by a dedicated Logistics Cluster Officer, recommended/selected by the GLCSC, confirming the Logistics Cluster’s impartiality from WFP Somalia.

Information Management

• An increase in information products for internal dissemination such as contact details and rates of transporters operating inside Somalia and a market survey for commercial shipping companies serving all accessible ports in Somalia.

• An urgent update of the Logistics Capacity Assessment (LCA) of Somalia – it was last updated in 2006.

Services

• An increase in the number of Ports served in Somalia via the Shipping Service and a more regular sailing schedule.

• More transparency regarding the cost of space on board the vessel, so organisations can budget for when the vessel moves to cost-recovery.

• The set-up of an inter-agency warehouse in Mombasa Port for cargo consolidation and in Mogadishu Port for ease of distribution.

• To be more active with extra Mobile Storage Units (MSUs) – in this case, erect the extra three somewhere like Mogadishu Airport for inter-agency use.

• Collaboration with UNHAS to provide air transport services.
## ANNEXES

### ANNEX 1

#### List of Interviewees

<table>
<thead>
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#### WFP and Logistics Cluster Personnel

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#### Invited for Interview but Unable to Participate

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ANNEX 2

Concept of Operations

Horn of Africa Drought - Somalia Famine Response

Nairobi, Kenya, 18 August 2011

**Concept of Operations**

**Background**

Severe drought in east Africa has impacted populations in Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia, and Uganda who no longer have access to sufficient food, water, or shelter. The size of the affected population in Somalia is now estimated at 3.7 million people with the greatest hunger needs, 2.2 million of which are located in areas of the south where humanitarian access is very limited.

Additionally, access constraints that are a direct result of the complicated security situation have impacted efforts to assess the needs of the affected populations and limited the ability of the humanitarian community to quickly and effectively scale up operations in response to the crisis. The harsh conditions and limited availability of aid is also driving a massive displacement of people who are seeking relief at refugee camps in Ethiopia and Kenya, as well as a large number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) within Somalia.

**Gaps and Needs**

Given the evolving famine situation in Somalia and the scaling up of humanitarian interventions, there is an identified need to support the movement of life-saving humanitarian cargo from Kenya and Ethiopia into Somalia. While access to portions of Somalia remains difficult, pre-positioning of cargo in northern Kenya, south-eastern Ethiopia and Mogadishu, Somalia is needed before onward movement to affected regions.

- The main obstacle to relief efforts is access to affected areas due to a protracted internal conflict with anti-governmental elements, which have left the country without basic services or a cohesive leadership structure.
- Lack of commercially reliable and regular sea transport from the Kenyan port of Mombasa to Mogadishu, Somalia due to the risk of piracy.
- Insufficient/inaccessible storage capacity for relief items in Somalia and affected neighbouring areas of Kenya and Ethiopia.
- There is a need for coordination and information sharing between the various actors in order to mitigate any duplication of efforts and maximize the use of available logistics assets.

**The Objectives and Planned Activities**

The Logistics Cluster activities aim to provide the humanitarian community with the logistics capabilities and coordination mechanisms to deliver life-saving relief assistance to the populations in Somalia’s drought affected regions. Based on the initial logistics gaps and bottlenecks identified, the activities of the Logistics Cluster will include:

1. **Logistics Coordination and Information Management**

   - A Logistics Cluster coordination cell for Somalia has been established in Nairobi, Kenya, with a dedicated Logistics Cluster Coordinator to facilitate the overall response strategy, including optimizing
the use of logistics assets aiming to ensure an uninterrupted supply of life saving relief items to the affected population. The Logistics Cluster will liaise closely with the other organisations and facilitate regular Logistics Cluster meetings and publish records of decisions taken on behalf of the Humanitarian Community.

- The Logistics Cluster will have dedicated information management capacity, including GIS / mapping services with the aim of coordinating logistics operations and supporting decision making to improve the efficiency of the logistics response. Within this capacity, the Logistics Cluster will consolidate information on the overall logistics situation from the humanitarian community and local authorities, identifying logistics gaps and bottlenecks. Additionally, the Logistics Cluster will disseminate vital information through the Horn of Africa – Somalia Famine page at: http://www.logcluster.org/ops/som11a.

2. Logistics Cluster Services

Warehousing and Staging Grounds

- The Logistics Cluster will make a transit warehouse available to the Humanitarian Community in Mogadishu Port at no cost, with 5,000 m² capacity.
- The Logistics Cluster will make available to the humanitarian community 20 Mobile Storage Units (10 X 32 m each) to be allocated as per requirements in different areas inside Somalia or in neighboring countries to facilitate cross-border operations.
- The Logistics Cluster will stand ready to set up staging areas at specific locations decided with participating organizations, to act as consolidation points for humanitarian cargo.
- In common staging areas, services will include handling, consolidation, tracking, and loading services (free on truck) to the users.
- All cargo transported and stored will be handled as per the priorities set by the Humanitarian Country Team. All specified services will be provided at no cost to humanitarian organizations.

Sea Transport

- The Logistics Cluster will offer sea transport to the Humanitarian Community for two logistics corridors in the region.
- A vessel will be contracted on a time charter basis for the transportation of life-saving relief items from Mombasa Port in Kenya to Mogadishu Port in Somalia for the humanitarian community. This will operate at no cost to the end user and will offer two rotations a month, providing a predictable and reliable service.
- Due to the unpredictable security situation in the region, the vessel will have an international naval escort to ensure safe passage to and from Mogadishu, Somalia.
- A second vessel will operate out of Djibouti Port and will service Bossaso and Berbera in Somalia. This service will operate on space available and first come first serve basis and it will also be at no cost to the end user.

Tactical Airlift

- The Logistics Cluster will make available to the Humanitarian Community the use of tactical airlifts from Kenya to strategic areas within Somalia for the delivery of life-saving relief items, pending the identification of a viable delivery point. As more areas open, it will be possible to rapidly transport essential items such as medicines and supplementary food by air, before road deliveries are set up.

This Concept of Operations is a live document and the activities will be adapted and revised as the situation unfolds and further assessment results become available, including the possible provision of additional logistics common services as required by the humanitarian community.
Nairobi, Kenya 20 April 2012

Concept of Operations

Background

Severe drought in east Africa in 2011 impacted populations in Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia, and Uganda, leading to displacements and lack of access to sufficient food, water, or shelter, with parts of Somalia moving into famine. Although a recent study (FSNAU/FEWS NET – 3rd February 2012) concluded that famine outcomes no longer exist in Southern Somalia, nearly a third of the population remain in crisis, unable to fully meet essential food and non-food needs. As per a recent FEWSNET report (6th April), the Gu rainy season 2012 is expected to be below average. The potential low harvests could lead to a further increase in food insecurity.

Additionally, access constraints that are a direct result of the complicated security situation have impacted efforts to assess the needs of the affected populations and limited the ability of the humanitarian community to quickly and effectively scale up operations in response to the crisis. In the end of November 2011 16 UN agencies/INGOs were banned by groups controlling major parts of Southern Somalia from implementing their humanitarian programmes, with an additional INGO and ICRC being added to the list of banned organizations in 2012. The harsh conditions and limited availability of aid has led to a massive displacement of people who have sought relief at refugee camps in Ethiopia and Kenya, as well as a large number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) within Somalia. Armed conflict persists between anti-government militias on the one side and forces from the Government, African Union (AU) and neighbouring countries on the other side. In addition there are local clan conflicts within Somalia.

Gaps and Needs

- The main obstacle to relief efforts is access to affected areas due to a protracted internal conflict with anti-governmental elements, which have left the country without basic services or a cohesive leadership structure.
- Lack of commercially reliable and regular sea transport from the Kenyan port of Mombasa to Mogadishu, Somalia due to the risk of piracy.
- Insufficient/inaccessible storage capacity for relief items in Somalia and affected neighbouring areas of Kenya and Ethiopia.
- There is a need for coordination and information sharing between the various actors in order to mitigate any duplication of efforts and maximize the use of available logistics assets.

The Objectives and Planned Activities

The Logistics Cluster activities aim to provide the humanitarian community with the logistics capabilities and coordination mechanisms to deliver life-saving relief assistance to the populations in Somalia’s drought affected regions. Based on the review of logistics gaps and bottlenecks identified, the activities of the Logistics Cluster will include:

3. Logistics Coordination and Information Management
A Logistics Cluster coordination cell for Somalia in Nairobi, Kenya, with a dedicated Logistics Cluster Coordinator to facilitate the overall response strategy, including optimizing the use of logistics assets aiming to ensure an uninterrupted supply of life saving relief items to the affected population. The Logistics Cluster will liaise closely with the other organisations and facilitate regular Logistics Cluster meetings and publish records of decisions taken on behalf of the Humanitarian Community.

The Logistics Cluster will have dedicated information management capacity, including GIS / mapping services with the aim of coordinating logistics operations and supporting decision making to improve the efficiency of the logistics response. Within this capacity, the Logistics Cluster will consolidate information on the overall logistics situation from the humanitarian community and local authorities, identifying logistics gaps and bottlenecks. Additionally, the Logistics Cluster will disseminate vital information through the Horn of Africa – Somalia Famine page at: http://www.logcluster.org/ops/som11a.

4. Logistics Cluster Services

Warehousing and Staging Grounds

- The Logistics Cluster will make available to the humanitarian community Mobile Storage Units (MSUs) to be allocated as per requirements in different areas inside Somalia or in neighbouring countries to facilitate cross-border operations. Five MSUs (10 X 32 m each) have already been pre-positioned in Mogadishu and further MSUs will be pre-positioned in other locations.
- The MSUs will be made available on a lease basis, free of charge. The organizations leasing the MSUs will be responsible for installing and managing the units themselves.
- Should the situation change and need arise, the Logistics Cluster will stand ready to set up staging areas at specific locations decided with participating organizations, to act as consolidation points for humanitarian cargo. In common staging areas, services will include handling, tracking, and loading services to the users.

Sea Transport

- The Logistics Cluster will offer sea transport to the Humanitarian Community into and between ports in Somalia.
- A vessel has been contracted on a time charter basis for the transportation of life-saving relief items from Mombasa Port in Kenya to Mogadishu Port in Somalia for the humanitarian community. This will operate at no cost to the end user until 1 July 2012 and will offer one rotation a month, providing a predictable and reliable service.
- Due to the unpredictable security situation in the region, the vessel will have international naval protection to ensure safe passage to and from Mogadishu, Somalia.
This Concept of Operations is a live document and the activities will be adapted and revised as the situation unfolds and further assessment results become available, including the possible provision of additional logistics common services as required by the humanitarian community.
ANNEX 3

Special Operation
Version 1

Countries: Somalia
Type of project: Special Operation
Title: Logistics Cluster Augmentation in Response to the Humanitarian Situation in Somalia
Total cost (US$): US$ 4,852,229
Duration: 6 months August 22nd 2011 – February 21st 2012

Executive Summary

Due to worsening drought conditions in the Horn of Africa the United Nations has declared a famine in 5 areas of southern Somalia. An estimated 3.7 million people in Somalia are in need of urgent life-saving and life-sustaining food, water and shelter. The humanitarian community has scaled up its response, while at the same time access to southern Somalia has improved with the withdrawal of Al Shabab from 90 to 95 per cent of Mogadishu.

In order to meet the needs of those affected in southern Somalia the humanitarian community needs logistics support. Therefore this Special Operation plans to provide the following services: 1) augmented logistics capacity in the form of sea transport, warehousing and tactical airlifts, and 2) enhanced logistics coordination and information management.

Project Background

1. Severe drought in East Africa has impacted populations in Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia, and Uganda who no longer have access to sufficient food, water, or shelter. The failed 2010 Deyr rains and poor performance of the 2011 April-June Gu rains, has caused widespread crop failure and a lack of adequate pastureland across Somalia. This, coupled with the protracted intra-state conflict affecting the majority of southern Somalia, which has historically limited humanitarian access, has resulted in an estimated 3.7 million Somalis urgently in need of life saving and life sustaining relief items such as food, water, and shelter.

2. On 20th July, the United Nations, based on the findings of nutrition and mortality assessments in southern and central Somalia, declared famine in two areas of southern Somalia. On 3 August, the famine threshold

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2 According to the Integrated Phase Classification, the following three conditions must exist as a minimum requirement for “famine” – and these outcomes must affect at least 20 percent of an area’s population: i) Food access far below 2,100 kilocalories of food per day; ii) Acute malnutrition in more than 30 percent of children; and iii) Crude Mortality Rate exceeds 2 per 10,000 people every day. Additional criteria can include epidemic illness; access to less than four liters of water every day; large-scale displacement of people; civil strife; and complete loss of assets and source of income
was passed in three new areas of southern Somalia. The harsh conditions and limited availability of aid has also driven a massive displacement of people, internally in Somalia and externally seeking relief at refugee camps in Ethiopia and Kenya. In response, the humanitarian community is scaling up its operations and mobilizing resources to respond to the food, water, and shelter needs of the affected population inside Somalia. The recent withdrawal of Al-Shabab rebel fighters from Mogadishu and perceived weaknesses within the movement are opening up opportunities for improved access to parts of southern Somalia for humanitarian actors.

Project Justification

3. As the humanitarian community is expanding its relief response, substantial amounts of life-saving relief items are needed in Somalia. In order to ensure that these life-saving and life-sustaining supplies reach the most vulnerable people affected by the crisis in a timely and efficient manner, immediate logistical augmentation, coordination and support is required.

4. The high rates of piracy and lawlessness in the waters off of Somalia have restricted the movements of regular cargo by ship into the port of Mogadishu as a result a lot of cargo has been airlifted in response to the crisis. However, with the large quantities of humanitarian cargo needed in Somalia, the humanitarian community requires a more reliable, predictable and cost-effective alternative to airlifting cargo. Through chartering a vessel with naval protection, the World Food Programme (WFP) will promote the delivery of large quantities of humanitarian cargo while lowering the overall costs of the humanitarian community’s response.

5. Warehousing is also a problem, as limited facilities exist in the port of Mogadishu, in remote areas inside South Somalia and on the border areas of northern Kenya and southeastern Ethiopia close to Somalia. The lack of adequate warehousing has hampered the movements of life-saving humanitarian cargo into the worst affected areas.

6. Throughout this project WFP will closely cooperate with other cluster participants, particularly the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) for the provision of common services in refugee and IDP locations.

7. As a preparedness measure, tactical cargo airlifts from Kenya to locations within Somalia will be made available. These will be utilized to deliver initial amounts of life-saving aid to newly accessible areas while surface deliveries of larger amounts of aid are arranged.

Project Objectives

8. Through this Special Operation, WFP aims to provide the humanitarian community with adequate logistics capabilities and coordination mechanisms to deliver relief aid to the beneficiaries. Based on the current gaps and bottlenecks identified, WFP’s objectives will include:
   • To support and augment the logistic capacity of the humanitarian community to undertake cross-border operations.
   • To provide enhanced coordination and a timely and efficient emergency logistics response.
   • To provide essential logistics common services required to support the delivery of life-saving humanitarian assistance to famine affected populations.

Implementation

9. This Special Operation will have duration of six months. The operation will be adapted and revised as the situation unfolds and further assessment results become available, including the possible provision of additional equipment and logistics common services as required.

10. During the initial response phase, the following activities will be carried out by WFP in its role as lead of the Logistics Cluster.

   a) Logistics Coordination and Information Management.
      • Reinforcement of the Logistics Cluster Cell in Nairobi, Kenya with a Logistics Cluster Officer and an Information Management Officer to assist in the coordination of the logistics response. Additional
Cluster Officers would be deployed to transit hubs in border areas of Northern Kenya and Eastern Ethiopia if those hubs prove to be viable options in the Somalia supply chain.

- Organize regular Logistics Coordination Meetings, in order to optimize the logistics resources available locally and regionally, fill gaps and avoid duplication.
- Information management with a suite of regularly produced information products shared via a dedicated web platform and mailing lists, including logistics infrastructure Geographic Information System (GIS), mapping tools and products. Additionally, due to the complex and evolving nature of the Horn of Africa Crisis and the sensitivities involved with gaining access to famine affected populations, timely and efficient information dissemination is paramount. Humanitarian responders have expressed a need to enhance the Logistics Cluster’s Somalia page in order to allow for greater and more rapid coordination and planning, as well as for a more nuanced and sensitive portal of humanitarian activities.

b) Logistics common services

- **Sea transportation**: In order to ensure that increased volumes of humanitarian cargo reach the affected population urgently in need of assistance; WFP, in its role as the lead of the Logistics Cluster will enhance the transport capacity for the movement of humanitarian cargo into Somalia.
  - WFP will charter a vessel which will move humanitarian cargo from Mombasa, Kenya to Mogadishu, Somalia. This vessel will perform two rotations a month, providing a predictable and reliable service. To ensure the safety of the crew on board and the cargo the vessel will be escorted by naval vessel/s. Currently WFP is moving food aid on another chartered vessel between the port in Djibouti to the Somalia ports in Bossaso and Berbera. Space on that vessel will also be made available and offered to the humanitarian community. The above services will be offered at no cost to humanitarian organizations.
  - Tactical Airlifts will be contracted by WFP ex-Kenya using light cargo aircrafts capable of accessing remote airfields in South Central Somalia in order to deliver immediate life saving relief items to famine affected populations as soon as access is secured. This will provide vital assistance enabling affected populations to cope until larger amounts of aid can be delivered by road.
  - **Warehousing Capacity and Staging ground**: WFP will be offering a transit storage facility at its 5,000 m2 warehouse in the port of Mogadishu. WFP will also preposition a contingency stock of 20 Mobile Storage Units (10 X 32 m each) to augment storage capacity in different areas inside Somalia or in neighboring countries to facilitate cross-border operations. As access improves, WFP will stand ready to set up common staging areas at specific locations decided with participating organizations, to act as consolidation points for humanitarian cargo or to make this extra capacity available to humanitarian actors operating in areas with restricted access in South Somalia. Storage services will be provided at no cost to the humanitarian community.
  - These Logistics services will include handling, liner service and will be free on truck to the users. These services will allow the prepositioning of cargo close to the affected regions in Somalia that can be rapidly moved when needed. In the long term as logistics hubs are set up in Somalia these services will provide a critical link in an expanding logistics pipeline, while promoting a more efficient and coordinated humanitarian response.

11. The Country Director of the Somalia Country Office will be the fund manager for this Special Operation and the Somalia Finance Officer will be the Allotment Manager. The Country Office will appoint a Logistics Project Manager and ODI will appoint an ETC Project Manager who will be responsible for the implementation of the activities stated in the project.


- Contextual risks: Humanitarian agencies at risk of violence and insecurity. Resurgence of Al Shabab
- Programmatic Risks: Restriction on physical access, and threats of piracy.
- Instructional Risks: Reputations risks on providing common services on behalf of over agencies and the dependency that it might create.

13. This Special Operation will come to an end when the famine situation has been brought under control and/or humanitarian organizations are able to access the affected population without needing the assistance of these activities.

**Project Cost and Benefits**

14. The total costs of the project will be US$ 4,852,229
15. This Special Operation will enable the humanitarian community to move larger quantities of humanitarian relief items into Somalia in a more reliable and predictable way, as well as facilitate communication and coordination, while preventing overlap in the response.

16. Due to the fact that services under that Special Operation will be offered to humanitarian partners at no cost to humanitarian agencies the cost savings made by partners will allow additional investment in projects to the affected population. Coordination services will also help prevent overlap in response and identify any potential gaps.

Monitoring & Evaluation

17. Lessons Learned Mission: the Logistics Cluster will conduct a detailed lessons learned mission in order to ensure that best practices highlighted during the operation are compiled and carried over to future operations. This will ultimately allow for a faster, better tailored and more cost effective response mechanism for future emergencies.

18. Key Performance Indicators for this Special Operation will be:
   - Number of agencies and organizations using the Logistics coordination services (Target: 50)
   - Number of bulletins, maps, and other logistics information produced and shared (Target: 60)
   - Total storage space made available (Target: 10,000 sqm)
   - Monthly space made available for humanitarian community cargo on chartered vessel (M2/MT. Target: 1,600MT)
   - Monthly space made available for humanitarian through airlift (Target: 20 MT)

RECOMMENDATION

This Special Operation covering the period from August 15th 2011 to February 15th 2012 at a total cost to WFP of US$ 4,852,229 is recommended for approval by the Deputy Executive Director and COO, under the Executive Director’s delegated authority, or Executive Director with the budget provided.

APPROVAL

Josette Sheeran
Executive Director

or

Amir Abdulla
Deputy Executive Director and Chief Operating Officer

Annexes:

Project budget plan (not to be posted on WFP website)  
http://docustore.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/forms/wfp204879.xls

Summary of Logical Framework (best practice – not compulsory)  
http://docustore.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/forms/wfp022350.doc

Project Statistics (not to be posted on WFP website)  

List of acronyms (if necessary)  
Map (if available)
Executive Summary

Due to worsening drought conditions in the Horn of Africa the United Nations has declared a famine in 5 areas of southern Somalia. An estimated 3.7 million people in Somalia are in need of urgent life-saving and life-sustaining food, water and shelter. The humanitarian community has scaled up its response, while at the same time access to southern Somalia has improved with the withdrawal of Al-Shabaab from 90 to 95 per cent of Mogadishu.

In order to meet the needs of those affected in southern Somalia the humanitarian community needs logistics support and emergency security and data telecommunications. Therefore this Special Operation plans to provide the following services: 1.) augmented logistics capacity in the form of sea transport, warehousing and tactical airlifts, 2.) enhanced logistics coordination and information management, 3.) emergency security telecommunication and data communication services, 4.) coordination and information management of telecommunications and data services.

Project Background

19. Severe drought in East Africa has impacted populations in Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia, and Uganda who now no longer have access to sufficient food, water, or shelter. The failed 2010 Deyr rains and poor performance of the 2011 April-June Gu rains, has caused widespread crop failure and a lack of adequate pastureland across Somalia. This, coupled with the protracted intra-state conflict affecting the majority of southern Somalia, which has historically limited humanitarian access, has resulted in an estimated 3.7 million Somalis urgently in need of life saving and life sustaining relief items such as food, water, and shelter.

20. On the 20th July, the United Nations, based on the findings of nutrition and mortality assessments in southern and central Somalia, declared famine3 in two areas of southern Somalia. On 3 August, the famine threshold was passed in three new areas of southern Somalia. The harsh conditions and limited availability of aid has also driven a massive displacement of people, internally in Somalia and externally seeking relief at refugee camps in Ethiopia and Kenya. In response the humanitarian community is scaling up its operations and mobilizing resources to respond to the food, water, and shelter needs of the affected population inside Somalia. The recent withdrawal of Al-Shabab rebel fighters from Mogadishu and

---

3 According to the Integrated Phase Classification, the following three conditions must exist as a minimum requirement for “famine” – and these outcomes must affect at least 20 per cent of an area’s population: i) Food access far below 2,100 kilocalories of food per day; ii) Acute malnutrition in more than 30 per cent of children; and iii) Crude Mortality Rate exceeds 2 per 10,000 people every day. Additional criteria can include epidemic illness; access to less than four litres of water every day; large-scale displacement of people; civil strife; and complete loss of assets and source of income.
perceived weaknesses within the movement are opening up opportunities for improved access to parts of southern Somalia for humanitarian actors.

**Project Justification**

21. As the humanitarian community is expanding its relief response, substantial amounts of life-saving relief items are needed in Somalia. In order to ensure that these life-saving and life-sustaining supplies reach the most vulnerable people affected by the crisis in a timely and efficient manner, immediate logistical augmentation, coordination and support is required.

22. The high rates of piracy and lawlessness in the waters off of Somalia have restricted the movements of regular cargo by ship into the port of Mogadishu and much cargo has been airlifted so far in response to the crisis. However, with the large quantities of humanitarian cargo needed in Somalia, the humanitarian community requires a more reliable, predictable and cost-effective alternative to airlifting cargo. Through chartering a vessel, with naval protection, the World Food Programme (WFP) will promote the delivery of large quantities of humanitarian cargo while lowering the overall costs of the humanitarian community’s response.

23. Warehousing is also a problem as limited facilities exist in the port of Mogadishu, in remote areas within South Sudan and on the border areas of northern Kenya and southeastern Ethiopia close to Somalia. The lack of adequate warehousing has hampered the movements of life-saving humanitarian cargo into the worst affected areas.

24. As a preparedness measure, tactical cargo airlifts from Kenya to locations within Somalia will be made available. These will be utilized to deliver initial amounts of life-saving aid to newly accessible areas while surface deliveries of larger amounts of aid are arranged.

25.

26. Given the magnitude of the impending crisis, including the almost complete lack of information and communications technology (ICT) infrastructure (voice, data, internet and electrical) in the impacted area, WFP urgently needs to augment humanitarian emergency telecommunications capacity to ensure sufficient capacity and staff are in place to meet the needs of the humanitarian community as and when access improves throughout the country.

27. As security in Somalia is expected to remain a major concern, and as the humanitarian situation is expected to worsen, it is essential to provide security and vital security telecommunications facilities to allow staff to work in the field.

28. Throughout this project WFP will closely cooperate with other cluster participants, particularly the Office for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) for the provision of common services in refugee and IDP locations.

**Project Objectives**

29. Through this Special Operation, WFP aims to provide the humanitarian community with adequate logistics and ICT capabilities and coordination mechanisms to deliver relief aid to the beneficiaries. Based on the current gaps and bottlenecks identified, WFP’s objectives will include:

   - To support and augment the logistic capacity of the humanitarian community to undertake cross-border operations.
   - To provide enhanced coordination and a timely and efficient emergency logistics response.
   - To provide essential logistics, telecommunications and common services required to support the delivery of live-saving humanitarian assistance to famine affected populations.
   - To provide cost effective common inter-agency security and data communications networks and service.

**Implementation**
30. This Special Operation will have a duration of six months. The operation will be adapted and revised as the situation unfolds and further assessment results become available, including the possible provision of additional equipment and logistics common services as required.

31. During the initial response phase, the following activities will be carried out by WFP in its role as lead of the Logistics and Emergency Telecommunications Clusters.

a) Logistics coordination and information management.

- Reinforcement of the Logistics Cluster Cell in Nairobi, Kenya with a Logistics Cluster Officer and an Information Management Officer to assist in the coordination of the logistics response. Additional Cluster Officers would be deployed to transit hubs in border areas of Northern Kenya and Eastern Ethiopia if those hubs prove to be viable options in the Somalia supply chain.

- Organize regular Logistics Coordination Meetings, in order to optimize the logistics resources available locally and regionally, fill gaps and avoid duplication.

- Information management with a suite of regularly produced information products shared via a dedicated web platform and mailing lists, including logistics infrastructure Geographic Information System (GIS)/mapping tools and products. Additionally, due to the complex and evolving nature of the Horn of Africa Crisis and the sensitivities involved with gaining access to famine affect populations, timely and efficient information dissemination is paramount. Humanitarian responders have expressed a need to enhance the Logistics Cluster’s Somalia page in order to allow for greater and more rapid coordination and planning, as well as for a more nuanced and sensitive portal of humanitarian activities.

b) Logistics common services

- **Sea transportation**: In order to ensure that increased volumes of humanitarian cargo reach the affected population urgently in need of assistance; WFP, in its role as the lead of the Logistics Cluster will enhance the transport capacity for the movement of humanitarian cargo into Somalia.

- WFP will charter a vessel which will move humanitarian cargo from Mombasa, Kenya to Mogadishu, Somalia. This vessel will perform two rotations a month, providing a predictable and reliable service. To ensure the safety of the crew on board and the cargo the vessel will be escorted by naval vessel/s. Currently WFP is moving food aid on another chartered vessel between the port in Djibouti to the Somalia ports in Bossaso and Berbera. Space on that vessel will also be made available and offered to the humanitarian community. The above services will be offered at no cost to humanitarian organizations.

- Tactical Airlift will be contracted by WFP ex-Kenya using light cargo aircrafts capable of accessing remote airfields in South Central Somalia in order to deliver immediate lifesaving relief items to famine affected populations as soon as access is secured. This will provide vital assistance enabling affected populations to cope until larger amounts of aid can be delivered by road.

- **Warehousing Capacity and Staging ground**: WFP will be offering a transit storage facility at its 5,000 m2 warehouse in the port of Mogadishu. WFP will also preposition a contingency stock of 20 Mobile Storage Units (10 X 32 m each) to augment storage capacity in different areas inside Somalia or in neighboring countries to facilitate cross-border operations. As access improves, WFP will stand ready to set up common staging areas at specific locations decided with participating organizations, to act as consolidation points for humanitarian cargo or to make this extra capacity available to humanitarian actors operating in areas with restricted access in South Somalia. Storage services will be provided at no cost to the humanitarian community.

- These Logistics services will include handling, liner service and will be free on truck to the users.

- These services will allow the prepositioning of cargo close to the affected regions in Somalia that can be rapidly moved when needed. In the long term as logistics hubs are set up in Somalia these services will provide a critical link in an expanding logistics pipeline, while promoting a more efficient and coordinated humanitarian response.

C) Emergency telecommunications coordination, information management and common services.

- Establishment of a local ETC coordination group (with representatives from UN, NGO and other humanitarian actors) covering the impacted countries to ensure inter-agency cooperation in ICT.

- Coordination of regulatory requirements with the respective government authorities.

- Establishment and operation of information management (IM) platform to serve the ETC community.

- Collection and dissemination of updated information related to availability of ICT capacity, services provision per location and contact details to support staff throughout the duration of the operation.
• Establishment and operation of emergency telecommunications and data connectivity services in four common operational areas.
• A dedicated NGO coordinator will be deployed with the objective of ensuring the common ICT requirements of the NGO community are met.
• Training of UN/NGO staff in efficient and appropriate use of telecommunications equipment and services.

32. The Country Director of the Somalia Country Office will be the fund manager for this Special Operation and the Somalia Finance Officer will be the Allotment Manager. The Country Office will appoint a Logistics Project Manager and ODI will appoint an ETC Coordinator who will be responsible for the implementation of the activities stated in the project.

33. Potential risks to relief efforts include access to affected areas due to a protracted internal conflict with anti-governmental elements, which have left the country without basic services or a cohesive leadership structure.

34. This Special Operation will come to an end when the famine situation has been brought under control and/or humanitarian organizations are able to access the affected population without needing the assistance of these activities.

Project Cost and Benefits

35. The total costs of the project will be US$ 7,082,485
36. This Special Operation will enable the humanitarian community to move larger quantities of humanitarian relief items into Somalia in a more reliable and predictable way, as well as facilitate communication and coordination, while preventing overlap in the response.
37. Due to the fact that services under that Special Operation will be offered to humanitarian partners at no cost to humanitarian agencies the cost savings made by partners will allow additional investment in projects to the affected population. Coordination services will also help prevent overlap in response and identify any potential gaps.

Monitoring & Evaluation

38. Lessons Learned Mission: the Logistics Cluster will conduct a detailed lessons learned mission in order to ensure that best practices highlighted during the operation are compiled and carried over to future operations. This will ultimately allow for a faster, better tailored and more cost effective response mechanisms for future emergencies

Key Performance Indicators for this Special Operation will be:

39. Logistics
• Total storage space made available (Target:10,000 sqm).
• Monthly space made available for humanitarian community cargo on chartered vessel. (M2/MT. Target: 1,000MT)
• Monthly space made available for cluster participants through airlift. (Target:20 MT)
• No. of bulletins, maps and other Logistics information produced and shared
• Use of inter-agency coordination and information related services provided (website, reports, surveys, maps, assessments)
• No. of agencies and organizations using storage facilities
• No. of bulletins, maps and other Logistics information produced and shared

40. Emergency Telecommunications: The ETC Coordinator will regularly monitor project activities against the original objectives and adjust if required based on the situation on the ground.
• Number of common operational areas covered by common security and data telecommunication networks. (Target: 4)
• Number of humanitarian organizations provided access to the security telecommunications network. (Target: 20)
• Number of UN/NGO staff members trained on security telecommunications systems. (Target: 300)
• ETC information management collaboration platform established, operational and information regularly updated throughout the emergency.

RECOMMENDATION

This Special Operation covering the period from August 25th 2011 to February 25th 2012 at a total cost to WFP of US$ 7,082,485 is recommended for approval by the Executive Director with the budget provided.

APPROVAL

……………………………
Josette Sheeran
Executive Director

Annexes:

Project budget plan (not to be posted on WFP website)
http://docustore.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/forms/wfp204879.xls

Summary of Logical Framework (best practice – not compulsory)
http://docustore.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/forms/wfp022350.doc

Project Statistics (not to be posted on WFP website)
BUDGET REVISION OF SO FOR THE APPROVAL OF REGIONAL DIRECTOR

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APPROVAL

- Regional Director

PROJECT 200344

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TYPE OF REVISION

- Additional DSC
- Additional ODOC
- Extension in time
- Change in project orientation
- Other – Reduction of ODOC

NATURE OF REVISION:

- Change in budget by US$ -1,294
- ODOC: US$ -679,932
- DSC: US$ +678,723
- ISC: US$ -85
Explanation:
Reduction in ODOC due to completion of Emergency Telecoms Cluster (ETC) activities and scale down of common storage needs in Mogadishu.
Increase in DSC due to extension in time to cover staff costs.

JUSTIFICATION FOR THE REVISION:

1. This Special Operation was launched in August 2011 in response to the drought in Somalia and following a declaration of famine in 5 areas of Southern Somalia. Although a recent study by the Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU) and the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) downgraded areas from famine to emergency, the situation is still critical. A ban by Al-Shabab of 16 UN agencies and INGOs, and the ICRC in Southern Somalia has had further negative effects on the humanitarian situation. The Logistics Cluster strategy for 2012 was endorsed by cluster participants in a meeting on 17th February 2012 (http://www.logcluster.org/ops/som11a/meeting-minutes-somalia-120217/view), including the need for further coordination and common logistics services.

Coordination and Information Management

2. Since the beginning of the emergency, weekly Logistics Cluster meetings have been taking place with participation from 38 different organizations (Starting 2012, meetings are held ever fortnight). In addition, the Logistics Cluster has actively participated in Inter Cluster coordination meetings, and distributed information products (sit.rep, snapshots on logistics infrastructure etc) to the wider humanitarian community. During the rainy season (deyr rains) the Logistics Cluster also provided updated road accessibility maps to cluster participants. It is expected that overall coordination efforts are needed until the end of 2012. And an update of the Logistics Capacity Assessment for Somalia will be required

Common Service – Shipping

3. Since the beginning of the operation five vessels have been used by the Logistics Cluster to transport inter-agency humanitarian cargo from Mombasa to Mogadishu. So far over 1,200 mt have been transported for 13 organizations (8 NGOs and 5 UN agencies). Cargo has included: food aid, nutrition items, WASH items, Education material, Shelter items and office support equipment. The Logistics Cluster participants have requested a continuation of this critical European Union Naval Force Somalia (EUNAVFOR) protected common transport service until July 2012. In terms of sustainability and as agreed with the cluster participants, the Logistics Cluster is planning to end this service mid 2012, however, a bilateral shipping service on full cost-recovery will be offered by WFP after the close of the free service. A training component will be added to build agency/organization capacity in port operations. With the ban by Al-Shabab of organizations in the South, and adverse road condition leading into the Southern area, the Logistics Cluster is also -jointly with WFP- offering the option of free shipping to the northern ports of Berbera and Bosaso.

Common Service – Storage

4. The discussion with relevant authorities for storage space in Mogadishu port has met with some delays. After space was allocated to the cluster, it was recommended by the Logistics Cluster User Group for common services, and endorsed by the Logistics Cluster meeting, that this component was no longer needed as storage is no longer considered a crucial gap. There is still a contingency component in this operation’s budget for the establishment of supplementary storage in other geographic areas, and mobile storage units are being made available for loan to humanitarian organizations free of charge in areas where storage is not available. Additional purchase of mobile storage units is also planned for in 2012.

ETC

5. The vast majority of the Emergency Telecoms Cluster activities will be completed within the original time period and budget of the Special operation, and hence, not carried forward. The only exception is budget needed for a small training component.

Other
6. There has been ad-hoc requests for air-lifts of cargo, however all requests have been resolved through alternative means, or through organizations arranging their own cargo airlifts. The existing Humanitarian Air Service in Support of Relief Operations in Somalia (WFP SO 10681.0) also caters for light cargo movement to Somalia. Should the situation change dramatically an additional budget revision will be considered to cater for any increased demand, and only a small contingency retained in the project.

**Recommendation**

7. This Budget Revision covering extending the project up to 31st December 2012 with a reduction in cost to WFP of US$ 1,294 is recommended for approval by the Regional Director with the budget provided.

**DISTRIBUTION:**

DED Director, ODL  
Chief, ODLT Director, ODX  
Chief, RMBP, ODXR, ODXP Regional Director Director, ERD  
Country Director Programme Officer, RMBP RB Programme  
Advisor Programming Assistant, RMBP RB Programme  
OD Registry Assistant  
Director, ODI (ICT operations only) Liaison Officer, ODN
ANNEX 4

Common Shipping Service – Operational Review

SOMALIA COMMON SHIPPING SERVICE

Mombasa to Mogadishu – October 2011 to July 2012

(Report Compiled from August to December 2012)
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1. The Logistics Cluster Operation

1.1 Summary
In August 2011, assessments conducted by the Somalia Logistics Cluster in response to the Horn of Africa famine identified a critical gap in the humanitarian supply chain. Insecurity due to piracy along the coast of Somalia had the potential to severely impact all humanitarian operations by limiting the ability to move large amounts of cargo by sea into Mogadishu, and the quantity of relief items needed to address the crisis made sustained airlifts impractical. As a result it was decided to implement a common shipping service to ensure that a reliable and predictable transport option was available to the humanitarian community. After a study by the Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU/FEWS NET) in February 2012 concluded that famine outcomes no longer existed in Southern Somalia, Logistics Cluster participants agreed to continue the free shipping service until July 2012, after which a WFP bilateral cost recovery service would take its place.

1.2 Background: The Horn of Africa Famine
Severe drought in the summer of 2011 impacted populations in Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia, and Uganda. In August the size of the affected population in Somalia was estimated at 3.7 million people, with the greatest hunger needs located in areas of the south where humanitarian access was limited. Additionally, access constraints that were a direct result of the complicated security situation limited the ability of the humanitarian community to quickly and effectively scale up operations in response to the crisis. The harsh conditions and limited availability of aid also drove a massive displacement of people, who sought relief at refugee camps in Ethiopia and Kenya.

1.3 Response: The Logistics Cluster Intervention
The evolving famine situation in Somalia and the scaling up of humanitarian interventions, led the Logistics Cluster to identify a need to support the movement of life-saving humanitarian cargo from Kenya and Ethiopia into Somalia. While access to portions of Somalia remained difficult, pre-positioning of cargo in northern Kenya, south-eastern Ethiopia and Mogadishu, Somalia was needed
before onward movement to affected regions. After additional consultations with actors in the region it was decided to focus the efforts of the Logistics Cluster response on Somalia, as sufficient logistics capacity was available commercially in both Kenya and Ethiopia. With these goals in mind, and in acknowledgement of the limitations on humanitarian operations resulting from the security situation the Logistics Cluster intervention was designed to (1) Provide coordination and information management capacity within the humanitarian logistics community responding to the situation in Somalia. (2) Provide access to storage facilities where insufficient capacity existed. (3) Establish a reliable shipping service out of Mombasa into Somalia that would be available at no-cost-to-users.

1.4 Operations: The Common Shipping Service

To address a lack of commercially available, reliable and regular sea transport, from the Kenyan port of Mombasa to Mogadishu, Somalia the Somalia Logistics Cluster, together with the WFP Somalia Country Office Logistics Unit evaluated the operational needs and provided a detailed recommendation to WFP Shipping, who was then able to charter a merchant vessel capable of accommodating the needs of humanitarian organisations participating in the response. This arrangement also allowed for the coordination of naval protection via the European Union Naval Force (EU-NavFor). As per the Concept of Operations (ConOps) and the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for the shipping service, the Logistics Cluster committed to:

- Coordinate shipping via a vessel, contracted on a time charter basis, for the transportation of life-saving relief items from Mombasa Port in Kenya to Mogadishu Port in Somalia for the humanitarian community (Later expanded to include Berbera and Bossaso Ports).
- Make this service available at no cost to the end user.

However, as this service was offered through WFP as part of its responsibility as provider of last resort, it was never intended to replace the logistics capacities of the organisations, but rather to supplement them through the provision of a specific service that was commercially unavailable. As such, the service was offered for a limited period of time until 01 July 2012.
2. The Common Shipping Service

2.1 Overview

The Logistics Cluster free-to-user common shipping service from Mombasa began in October 2011, and took the place of a cost-recovery service that had been run by WFP since 2007. The final voyage departed Mombasa in June 2012, and in July the WFP cost-recovery service resumed. Over the nine months the service was available 22 organisations (17 NGO, 5 UN) shipped 2,460 metric tonnes of cargo, accounting for more than 9,700 cubic metres of stowage.

The service was accommodated primarily through use of the time charter MV Caroline Scan, but on three occasions Logistics Cluster cargo was shipped via a different vessel: the MV Sunrise in October 2011 carried 140 MT (1,197 m^3); the MV Nawal Ali in December 2011 carried 329 MT (585 m^3), and the MV Golden Bridge in March of 2012 carried 175 MT (442 m^3). The MV Caroline Scan performed seven rotations carrying Logistics Cluster Cargo (One each in October, November, January, March, April, May, and June), and moved a total of 1,814 MT (7,485 m^3). The majority of this cargo was carried from Mombasa to Mogadishu, but small amounts of cargo were also delivered to Bossaso (5.93 MT/47.8 m^3) and Berbera (2.813 MT/16.6 m^3).

A variety of cargo was moved through the Logistics Cluster in support of humanitarian operations in Somalia; a survey of partners who used the shipping service, conducted in August of 2012, showed that the primary programmatic areas of focus for the organisations included Health, Nutrition, WASH, Protection, and Education. In terms of cargo moved to support programme activities food represented the greatest tonnage (1,142 MT) with the majority, approximately 883.4 MT, shipped during the first three months; however, shelter materials accounted for the largest share of volume moved (3,599 m^3) with the largest shipments, 680 m^3 and 1,778.1 m^3, sent in January and April respectively. Overall in terms of tonnage transported Food represented 46%, Shelter 30%, and WASH 12%; in terms of volume transported Shelter represented 37%, WASH 30%, and Food 18%. As is visible from figures 2a and 2b, in the early stages of the shipping operation Food accounted for the majority of both tonnage and volume, while larger quantities of Shelter and WASH items were moved in the later stages.

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4 Detailed figures for Cargo Movement are contained in ANNEX I
5 Complete Survey results are contained in ANNEX II
2.2 Cost

2.2.1 - Overall Cost for the Shipping Service

The overall resource requirement for this operation was stated at $7,081,191, of which 32.9% was funded; according to the break-down of contributions listed below. This amount covered the shipping costs, staff costs, and MSU purchase costs as part of the operation’s Other Direct Operational Costs and Direct Support Costs.

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</table>

Total Funding Received: US$ 2,327,167

The overall cost to the Logistics Cluster for the shipping service stood at US$ 2,056,182.69: against the total tonnage shipped of 2,460mt (9,711 cubic meters), the per-unit cost for materials shipped is as follows: US$ 836 per metric tonne/US$ 212 per cubic meter. The total cost for the shipping service was derived from the value of Purchase Orders [US$ 1,350,243], as well as reimbursement to the Logistics Cluster operation from the WFP Somalia EMOP LTSH [US$ 705,940]. This reimbursement was made to reconcile payments made for the shipping service according to the cost sharing agreement outlined below; the financial flexibility highlighted by this arrangement was a key benefit to the Logistics Cluster operation, facilitated by the close partnership with WFP as Lead Agency.

2.2.2 - WFP / Logistics Cluster Cost Sharing Agreement

The shipping operation was based around the use of a time charter, as opposed to voyage charter vessel. In principle, the available capacity was to be shared between the Logistics Cluster and WFP Somalia Logistics. This lead to the fabrication of an SOP for the invoicing splits between WFP and the Logistics Cluster, the basic premise of which was that:

- Whenever the time charter vessel was only partially utilised, the cost allocation between WFP and the Logistics Cluster would reflect an 80-20 split, respectively.
- Whenever the time charter vessel was fully utilised, the cost allocation would be based on the actual cargo split (i.e. If the vessel loaded at full capacity held 5000 Mt of WFP Food and 500 Mt of Cluster cargo, then the cost breakdown should be 90% paid by WFP, and 10% paid by the Logistics Cluster).
- Whenever a voyage chartered vessel was utilised, the cost allocation would reflect the actual cargo split.

2.3 Key Advantages & Challenges

The shipping service offered through the Logistics Cluster offered many advantages to the users not available through other means. The most obvious being the ability to reliably transport large quantities of cargo into Mogadishu to support operations; filling the identified supply chain gap. However, in the interests of improving future service provision, more detailed discussions with both partners who used the service and the WFP shipping officers who were responsible for implementing the service were undertaken. Individual characteristics of the service that provided important benefits to the users, as well as specific challenges faced in using the service were examined. Discussions with partners in the Logistics Cluster Coordination Meetings in Nairobi led to the development of a User Survey that was conducted in August 2012.

The results of the survey have been used to rate the advantages and challenges that were identified in the meetings as major elements of the service, requiring additional explanation. In discussing the

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6 Complete Survey results are contained in ANNEX II
challenges, the survey collected feedback both from partners who used the service and also from the Clearing and Forwarding (C&F) Agents who acted on behalf the partners in Mombasa Port. The results presented in the “Main Challenges” section are separated into these two categories, as the questions asked were different to reflect the different operational perspectives.

**Key Advantages** *(From most to least important)*

1. **FLEXIBILITY; the ability of the Logistics Cluster to adjust the schedule of the vessel (or to coordinate the chartering of additional vessels) and accommodate additional ports of loading and discharge.**

   This was the most significant benefit of the service, according to the partners surveyed, and is attributable to two key elements: (1) the use of a time-chartered vessel; (2) the use of WFP Shipping as a service provider. The use of a time-chartered, as opposed to a voyage-chartered vessel allowed for the Shipping Officers, in coordination with the Somalia Country Office Logistics Unit and the Logistics Cluster Coordinator to task the vessel as required. That the service was provided through WFP Shipping allowed for additional vessels to be chartered, due to the capacity of the WFP Shipping operation in East Africa, to meet the needs of partners.

   These two elements combined created a reliable service, that was also flexible enough to be adapted to changes in operational requirements. Additional ports of discharge (Berbera, Bossaso, or Djibouti) were available, but not often required; and, on two occasions cargo was carried back from Mogadishu to Mombasa, at the request of a partner organisation. Vessels besides the MV Caroline Scan were chartered on three separate occasions to accommodate Logistics Cluster cargo, either to provide additional capacity, accommodate cargo not ready for loading at the original time of departure, or to ensure that the promise of one rotation per month from Mombasa to Mogadishu was kept.

2. **SPEED; the improved transit time of cargo due to reduced time at sea.**

   The use of the MV Caroline Scan, a modern, well maintained vessel provided many operational advantages; the one identified by the users as being of key importance was the speed. The vessel itself is capable of maintaining 13.5 knots at sea. As a result the transit time from Mombasa to Mogadishu averaged two days. While some delays were experienced due to berthing, loading/discharge, and customs clearances the time at sea was the most consistent element of the operation.

3. **PREDICTABILITY; the capacity to ensure that the vessel was able to travel to all discharge ports without incident.**

   The Cluster was able to provide a safe pipeline for relief cargo, through careful coordination with the European Union Naval Force (EU-NavFor). At the beginning of the operation this was accomplished by travelling in convoy. However, unlike many of the spot charters, the MV Caroline Scan as a modern multi-purpose vessel has relatively good accommodation for AVPD (Autonomous Vessel Protection Detachment); this allowed for the shift away from naval escorts to the use of an AVPD unit stationed on the vessel, providing a great deal of flexibility in scheduling.

4. **IMPROVED CARGO HANDLING; the ability of the vessel to accommodate various types of cargo, and deliver that cargo in good condition.**

   Another operational benefit derived from the use of the MV Caroline Scan was the ability of the vessel to accommodate a wide range of cargo, and different packaging. Cluster cargo is typically varied, including anything from delicate medical items, to fertilizer, to vehicles, to construction materials. These are often not easily stowed together, with high risk of damages and losses. The MV Caroline Scan can accommodate these requirements well as she has fully retractable pontoon-type deck separations. This means that the ship can be configured as one full open hold, a vessel with two decks, or a vessel with four separate compartments. This is also ideal for the separation of cargo and ensuring that specific cargo (e.g. vegetable oil) is
secure and does not spill onto bagged cargo. In addition, the modern hold design makes loading/discharge faster and leads to less cargo damage.

Main Challenges – Participating Organisations (From most to least severe)

1. **COORDINATING THE DELIVERY OF CARGO FOR LOADING; ensuring cargo was delivered to the vessel to be loaded on schedule**
   The step of bringing the cargo quay-side for loading was seen as the biggest challenge for organisations utilising the service. C&F Agents were sometimes unable to complete their customs requirements on time, leading to occasional delays in delivering the cargo quay-side for loading onto the vessel. Non-seaworthy packaging, incorrect information on the Cargo Movement Requests (CMRs), and late transport of cargo to the port by C&F Agents were the most frequent challenges faced. When cargo was not delivered quay-side on time additional costs were incurred.

2. **GENERAL COORDINATION; coordinating/communicating with all parties involved in the transport of cargo.**
   Coordination and communication with the various parties involved was seen as the second biggest challenge. At the port, C&F Agents had to liaise with the Kenya Port Authority (KPA) for customs clearance and entry procedures, and with the WFP Mombasa team to coordinate the delivery of cargo quay-side at the agreed time. The need to improve communications, particularly between the WFP Mombasa operation and the C&F Agents acting on behalf of the various organisations was highlighted.

3. **COORDINATING THE DISCHARGE/COLLECTION OF CARGO; coordinating with consignees in the discharge ports to ensure cargo was collected from the vessel in a timely way.**
   Coordination at the port of discharge (Mogadishu/Berbera/Bossaso) was seen as less of a challenge than loading at Mombasa Port. There was room for improvement related to communication between the consignees, WFP Mogadishu, WFP Berbera, WFP Bossaso, and the Logistics Cluster.

4. **PACKAGING; ensuring cargo was delivered in appropriate condition to be loaded.**
   Packaging of cargo was an additional challenge, and in several cases cargo was delivered to the vessel in packaging that was inappropriate for the conditions: loose boxes, poor quality containers, or items with no packaging to speak of. Additionally improper or in some cases no labelling created confusion during loading and discharge. Finally, frequently cargo was not palletised, leading to difficulties in loading.

5. **BOOKING CARGO; booking cargo through the Logistics Cluster for transport on the vessel.**
   The Cluster received CMRs before each sailing, reviewed them, and requested clarification from clients on cargo details etc. It was noted that cargo should be booked well ahead of the arrival of the vessel for loading. In some cases late bookings led to loading delays, change of stowage plans, the incurring of additional costs, and a general perception of being uncoordinated. However, this process was not seen as a major challenge faced by the participating organisations.

Main Challenges – Clearing and Forwarding Agents (From most to least severe)

1. **LOADING; scheduling delivery of cargo to the vessel to be loaded.**
   C&F Agents reported that they faced difficulties completing the customs requirements on time, and thus were unable to bring their cargo quay-side at the required loading time. It was also reported that one of the contributing factors to this difficulty was the late delivery of cargo from Nairobi to Mombasa; organised to minimize storage charges in Mombasa. Port congestion in 2011 and early 2012 also added to delays for C&F Agents as their trucks remained in queues for hours in the port, unable to reach the dock with their cargo.
2. **CUSTOMS; clearing cargo through customs.**
Failing to complete customs requirements for their clients’ cargo meant that the C&F Agents were unable to bring cargo quay-side in the allotted time. This was seen as a major problem with new or inexperienced C&F Agents in particular. Bringing the cargo at the last minute (for lower storage costs in Mombasa) was also a major delaying factor. Furthermore, regular breakdowns in the online Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA) customs system negatively impacted the ability of C&F Agents to bring their cargo into the port.

3. **COORDINATION; communications with organisations involved in the Shipping Service.**
Coordination and communications with organizations involved in the shipping service was not seen by the C&F Agents as representing a significant challenge. This involved communications between C&F Agents and their clients, WFP Mombasa, and the Kenya Port Authority (KPA). C&F Agents were informed in advance by the WFP Mombasa team of the planned loading dates. However, in practise, some C&F Agents did not respond to communications until very little time remained until the loading date.

4. **PACKAGING; packaging cargo correctly for transport on the vessel.**
Packaging of cargo was not recognised as a major challenge by C&F Agents. However, from the WFP operations side it seems clear that better packaging was required in several cases. Better consolidation of cargo would have allowed easier loading (e.g. Pallets, slings) and in some cases, higher quality packaging would have aided transport by sea.
3. Additional Comments

3.1 The Logistics Cluster ConOps

The survey feedback from participant organisations included comments related to the provision of additional services (i.e. Transport to Hargeisa or overland delivery to areas under Al Shabab embargo); these comments are directed more towards a re-evaluation of the ConOps, and all express a desire for the Logistics Cluster to coordinate (And in some cases a belief that it is WFP’s responsibility to provide) additional services. As this report has been dedicated to reviewing the Common Shipping Service, these points were not considered above; however, these positions do indicate a critical gap in participant understanding of the Cluster Approach, and specifically the Logistics Cluster’s service portfolio. Central to both is the acknowledgement that the Logistics Cluster is not a mechanism for replacing the logistics capacity of our partners, or for providing services where commercial options exist.

The Logistics Cluster is empowered to act only where a gap in the humanitarian supply chain has been identified due to a lack of capacity, and where intervention is funded and minimum safety standards can be met. There are several reasons for this, but primary among them are: (1) the inability of any single organisation to provide comprehensive logistics solutions to all responding humanitarian organisations due to limited resources; (2) the IASC guidance on Humanitarian Reform, and subsequent UNOCHA guidance repeatedly identify the elimination of “duplication of efforts” in the various sectors, in order to increase efficiency, as key objectives of the Cluster Approach\(^7\); (3) the need to provide predictability and transparency to donors\(^8\).

In the case of Somalia it was the feeling of the Logistics Cluster that sufficient commercial services existed inside Somalia to support the requirements of the humanitarian community, and that where constraints did exist the were related to insecurity as opposed to a lack of capacity. Under these circumstances, additional intervention by the Logistics Cluster, or coordination of additional services provided by WFP seemed unnecessary. However, the concerns expressed by participants in the Somalia operation do highlight important questions for the Logistics Cluster to address in the near future. As NGOs with relatively few staff, and extremely limited [or no] logistics capacity, become more involved with the Logistics Cluster through the use of common services, what role in terms of support should the Logistics Cluster play? With the stated objective of not seeking to replace existing logistics capacity within participant organisations, how should the Logistics Cluster address the needs of organisations with no logistics capacity?

3.2 Insurance

It was highlighted in the user survey that at least one organisation was unable to use the common shipping service due to the absence of insurance. It is a standard clause in the Service Level Agreements used by WFP for cost-recovery services, and for the SOPs used by the Logistics Cluster to coordinate service provision that the service provider assumes no responsibility for losses or damage.

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\(^7\) In this case duplicating commercially available services (C&F Agents are available in Kenya to assist organisations with their logistics requirements, transporters are available inside Somalia to deliver cargo from various entry points to final delivery points, etc.), or replacing the logistics capacity of responding organisations (Many of the organisations involved have well established supply chains supporting their activities in Somalia).

\(^8\) Logistics Cluster operations must be clearly justified in terms of the IASC and OCHA guidance, limited in scope, and well defined in terms of what types of Gaps and Needs can reliably be addressed through the Cluster mechanism in each and every emergency.
4. Conclusions & Recommendations

The Logistics Cluster Common Shipping Service continued from October 2011 to July 2012, performing rotations between Mombasa and Mogadishu approximately once per month. The service received largely positive feedback; the user survey conducted in August 2012 indicated that 100% of the respondents who had used the service felt it was appropriate to the emergency, and 42% of the respondents who had used the service rated it as “Excellent” overall (42% scored the service as “Good” and 17% as “Very Good”). Throughout the duration of the service, a period of 9 months, 2 surveys were conducted and regular feedback from participants was solicited at the Cluster Meetings. This has provided the Logistics Cluster with consistent and fairly detailed information concerning our stakeholders’ impressions of the service and the operation in general.

The major lesson learned from the operation, and the common thread in the most significant challenges identified by participating organisations, C&F Agents, and the WFP Shipping Officers in Mombasa relates to coordinating the delivery of cargo for loading in Mombasa. Incorrect information on CMRs, difficulty completing customs requirements leading to delivery quayside, and poor packaging all contributed to problems in loading the vessel. This was particularly frustrating, as these delays impacted the ability of the schedule to be properly planned and communicated to partners.

From an operations standpoint, the difficulty in coordination related to communications between the participating organisations and their C&F Agents, an aspect of the operation that the Logistics Cluster had very little visibility on. The Logistics Cluster frequently sent CMRs to the WFP Shipping Officers in Mombasa, only to learn that the cargo ultimately delivered by the C&F Agents was not accurately described on the submitted forms. Furthermore, the Logistics Cluster repeatedly communicated to the partners in Nairobi the packaging requirements, but cargo continued to arrive quayside in packaging that was not sea-worthy. Finally, scheduling cargo for delivery to the vessel to be loaded was unreliable, with C&F Agents frequently late or delayed due to problems with paperwork or customs documentation.

From the perspective of participating organisations the coordination problem had to do with the C&F Agents, who sometimes were unable to complete customs paperwork on time, and operations at Mombasa Port. Also, concerning cargo details, some organisations used Mombasa as a trans-shipment point for cargo they did not directly have access to. As a result they relied on procurement personnel or the C&F Agent to provide the details necessary to complete the CMR. This frequently led to poor information, incorrect information, and incomplete information being supplied to WFP Shipping. Some organisations did address these issues directly, by having the responsible party within the organisation travel to Mombasa to meet in person with the WFP Shipping Officers, WFP Port Captain, and their C&F Agent. Overall this experience was positive, and clear improvements in the process were seen as a result of these interactions.

From the perspective of the C&F Agents, the difficulties in coordination related to scheduling the delivery of cargo to the port to be loaded. Specifically, at least one C&F Agent felt that the booking of cargo by the Logistics Cluster and WFP was inconsistent with the capacity of the vessel, leading to delays. They also reported difficulties in completing customs requirements, late delivery of cargo from Nairobi to Mombasa, and congestion at the port (in late 2011 and early 2012) as significant limitations on their ability to bring their cargo quayside. C&F Agents also identified problems with Kenya Ports Authority (KPA) and Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA) systems as leading to substantial delays.

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9 The survey was completed by 14 humanitarian organisations (1 NGO, 10 INGOs, and 3 UN Agencies) and 6 C&F Agents. Of the humanitarian organisations 12 had participated in the service and 2 had not. In all 22 organisations transported cargo via the common shipping service, meaning that 54% of the organisations who used the service to transport cargo provided feedback.

10 Complete Survey results are contained in ANNEX II
With the coordination delivery of cargo quay-side seen as the major challenge (especially in the initial months of the operation), the Logistics Cluster amended the Shipping SOPs in early 2012, and included a dead-freight charge as a financial penalty for organizations that failed to bring the cargo on time for loading. This, together with closer follow-up, had a positive effect during the remaining months, with fewer challenges faced in getting the cargo to the port on time. Inserting this clause into the SOPs created a financial obligation on the participant organisations to ensure that their C&F Agents performed as required. The Cluster also made sure to keep all stakeholders in the loop prior to loading, enabling the WFP Mombasa team and participant organizations to follow up with the C&F Agents at each stage of the process. This resulted in a marked improvement during 2012 voyages.

In general, the identified problems in coordinating delivery of cargo to the vessel in Mombasa for loading have led to the formulation of two key recommendations:

I. **Cargo Consolidation** – to address problems with scheduling delivery of cargo to the vessel, poor visibility on the actual cargo stemming from incorrect information on the CMR, and last minute delays in customs clearance.

II. **Shipping Training** (on Location) – to address gaps in knowledge within the participating organisations, and communications difficulties between all parties involved.

### 4.1 Cargo Consolidation

As highlighted above, one of the main challenges identified by stakeholders in the shipping operation was delivering cargo to the port ship-side, on time for loading; and, several factors contributed to the difficulties experienced by C&F Agents and WFP Shipping in Mombasa. If there were a single consolidation point for all booked cargo, either in the port beyond the customs points (in an optimal situation) or even outside the bonded area, the loading of the shipments would have been easier to coordinate. First, this option would provide greater visibility of cargo including dimensions, packaging, and total volume and weight. WFP Shipping would subsequently be in a much better position to plan loading, correct errors, and ensure that any problems could be addressed prior to the arrival of the vessel. Second, the actual delivery of cargo quay-side could be coordinated via a single transporter, reducing congestion within the port resulting from multiple transporters hired by a variety of organisations and C&F Agents all trying to access the vessel; all of whom have been subject to a range of delays.

Concerning a recommendation as far as consolidation within a bonded area, there are multiple issues to consider. Depending on the type of cargo and the organization, the Port Authority would have different limits for the length of time the cargo could be stored ‘in transit’ at the consolidation point before it was loaded onto the vessel. Delays at this stage would lead to additional costs, which must figure into the estimate of the overall cost (As this option should be considered as a mitigating action against delays).

### 4.2 Training on Shipping Procedures

To address issues stemming from a lack of understanding of the requirements for shipping cargo on a modern merchant vessel, the Logistics Cluster IM Officer reported that the participating organisations performed more efficiently after the Shipping Workshop held in November 2011. This allowed them to understand the functions of various actors (including the Logistics Cluster, KPA, their C&F Agent, and the WFP Mombasa Office), and facilitated improved understanding of the bookings process and how loading and discharge takes place on the ground in Mombasa Port. However, some problems were persistent; this may be attributed to a high degree of staff turn-over, and participation of new organisations in the shipping service (In this case people whom had not attended the workshop).

It is recommended that training be provided to organisations wishing to access a common shipping service on-site, at the beginning of the operation (And possibly again, after a 3-6 month period).
Additionally, in the interest of addressing these problems in a more pro-active way (particularly the difficulty of staff turn-over and new organisations joining the service) it may be important to require organisations to identify a focal point for shipping; this person, together with their C&F Agent, may be required to meet with the WFP Shipping Office providing the service to be given an introduction to the shipping operation on-site at the port. While this may involve some additional costs, in terms of both travel and time, it would help to address the coordination and communications problems observed by the Somalia Logistics Cluster.
ANNEXES

I. 2011 to 2012 - Somalia Logistics Cluster - Cargo Dispatched

Total MT Shipped: 2460.61
Total Volume Shipped m³: 9710.95

Total MT Shipped by Month

UN 37%
INGO 63%

Total m³ Shipped by Month

UN 24%
INGO 76%

Total MT Shipped by Commodity Type

AGRICULTURE - Tools 62.74
CAMP MANAGEMENT - Equipment 36.41
COMMUNICATIONS - VHF Equipment 0.10
EDUCATION - Equipment 7.00
FOOD - Cereals 0.00
FOOD - Dairy 37.88
FOOD - Mixed 10.00
FOOD - Oil & Fat 184.81
FOOD - Other 0.00
FOOD - Supplementary 20.21
FOOD - Therapeutic 83.34
HEALTH - Hospital Equipment 0.35
HEALTH - Kits 2.64
HEALTH - Pharmaceuticals 16.93
LOGISTICS - Fuel 0.20
LOGISTICS - Power Supply 15.85
LOGISTICS - Transport 5.36
LOGISTICS - Warehousing 14.15
Office Equipment & Supplies 18.05
Other 92.10
SHELTER - Household Equipment 373.18
SHELTER - Plastic Sheet 290.50
SHELTER - Tents 82.68
WASH - General 118.72
WASH - Hygiene 121.25
WASH - Sanitation 42.75
WASH - Water 17.65

Total MT Received by Organisation

ACO 114.85
ADRA 5.20
CESVI 8.71
Concrt Worldwide 112.17
Doctors Worldwide Turkey 82.03
DRC 17.14
FAO 61.39
HURA 7.60
INTEROS 26.13
Islamic Relief 14.15
Logistics Cluster 5.45
MERLIN 31.39
NRC 381.55
Oxfam 17.97
Relief International 1.99
Save Somali Women & SOWELPA, CERPELA 139.32
UNICEF 21.00
UNICEF 318.61
UNICEF 0.35
UNDP 29.10
UNRICEF 10.80
II. User Survey Results

1. Your organisation's type:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>Local NGO</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>International NGO</td>
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<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN agency</td>
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<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
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<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial Enterprise</td>
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<td>30%</td>
</tr>
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</table>

BEGINNING OF SURVEY QUESTIONS ANSWERED ONLY BY HUMANITARIAN ORGANISATIONS

2. In which field does your organisation mainly work:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Health</td>
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<tr>
<td>WASH</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shelter</td>
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<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
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<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Logistics</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
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<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp Management</td>
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<td>0%</td>
</tr>
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<td>Protection</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early Recovery</td>
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<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Telecommunication</td>
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<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other, please specify:</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) All the above apart from</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>telecommunications</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2) Health, WASH, Nutrition,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education, food, child</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>protection and logistics.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Health, Shelter, Logistics,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection, Education</td>
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<td></td>
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3. Please identify the Logistics Cluster activities your organisation participated in. (Please select all that apply)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<tr>
<td>Communications with Logistics Cluster staff</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attended Logistics Cluster Meeting(s)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Used Logistics Cluster IM Product(s)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participated in Logistics Cluster Common Services (Sea Transport)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other, please specify</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
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4. Please circle the total length of time your organisation has been participating in Logistics Cluster activities in this operation:

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<th>Duration</th>
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<th>Percentage</th>
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<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 months</td>
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<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other:</td>
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<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) Since 2008</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Over 6 months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) 11 months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) 12 months +</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) 8 months.</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6) over one year
7) one year
8) since last three years
9) We have been participating in the Somalia Logistics Cluster since 2007
10) A year
11) Over six month

5. How would you describe your level of utilisation/participation in the Logistics Cluster? Top number is the count of respondents selecting the option. Bottom number is per cent of the total respondents selecting the option.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Communications with Logistics Cluster staff:</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Rarely</th>
<th>Occasionally</th>
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<td>7%</td>
<td>0%</td>
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<td>50%</td>
<td>14%</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attended Logistics Cluster Meeting(s):</th>
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<th>Rarely</th>
<th>Occasionally</th>
<th>Regularly</th>
<th>Frequently</th>
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<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Used Information Management (IM) Products available on the website (e.g. Maps, Minutes, Situation Reports, etc):</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Rarely</th>
<th>Occasionally</th>
<th>Regularly</th>
<th>Frequently</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participated in the Logistics Cluster Common Service (Sea Transport):</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Rarely</th>
<th>Occasionally</th>
<th>Regularly</th>
<th>Frequently</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participated in the Logistics Cluster Common Service (Sea transport) to Somalia?</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Rarely</th>
<th>Occasionally</th>
<th>Regularly</th>
<th>Frequently</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

BEGGING OF SURVEY QUESTIONS ANSWERED ONLY BY ORGANISATIONS THAT PARTICIPATED IN THE SHIPPING SERVICE

7. How did your organisation participate in the Common Service?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ship Cargo</th>
<th>Received Cargo</th>
<th>Shipped and Received Cargo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. How would you rate this service overall?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Un satisfactory</th>
<th>Poor</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Good</th>
<th>Very Good</th>
<th>Excellent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9. Did you find the implementation of the Common Service appropriate to the emergency?

Yes                                                                 No
12                                                             0
100%                                                           0%

10. Please rank the following from the most serious challenge your organisation faced in using the Common Service, to the challenge that had the least impact on your operations. (ie The most serious challenge should be at the top of the list, with the least serious challenge at the bottom) Top number is the count of respondents selecting the option. Bottom number is per cent of the total respondents selecting the option.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Greatest Impact</th>
<th>Least Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Booking cargo through the Logistics Cluster for transport on the vessel.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensuring cargo was delivered to the vessel to be loaded on schedule.</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensuring cargo was delivered in appropriate</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Somalia Logistics Cluster – Lessons Learned Mission
03 – 08 December 2012

**Somalia Common Shipping Service – Lessons Learned**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>condition to be loaded.</th>
<th>8%</th>
<th>25%</th>
<th>25%</th>
<th>17%</th>
<th>25%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coordinating with consignees in the discharge ports to ensure cargo was collected from the vessel in a timely manner.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinating/Communicating with all parties involved in the transport of cargo.</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Greatest Impact**

| Flexibility: the ability of the Logistics Cluster to adjust the schedule of the vessel (or to coordinate the chartering of additional vessels) and accommodate additional ports of loading and discharge. | 5   | 3   | 3   | 1   |
|                                                                                                  | 42% | 25% | 25% | 8%  |
| Improved Cargo Handling: the ability of the vessel to accommodate various types of cargo, and deliver that cargo in good condition. | 2   | 1   | 3   | 6   |
|                                                                                                  | 17% | 8%  | 25% | 50% |
| Predictability: the capacity to ensure that the vessel was able to travel to all discharge ports without incident. | 2   | 3   | 3   | 4   |
|                                                                                                  | 17% | 25% | 25% | 33% |
| Speed: the improved transit time of cargo due to reduced time at sea. | 3   | 5   | 3   | 1   |
|                                                                                                  | 25% | 42% | 25% | 8%  |

**Least Impact**

| 11. Please rank the following, from the greatest benefit your organisation received during your use of the Common Service, to the benefit that had the smallest impact on your operations. (i.e. the greatest benefit should be at the top of the list, with the smallest benefit at the bottom) Top number is the count of respondents selecting the option. Bottom number is per cent of the total respondents selecting the option |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flexibility: the ability of the Logistics Cluster to adjust the schedule of the vessel (or to coordinate the chartering of additional vessels) and accommodate additional ports of loading and discharge. | 5   | 3   | 3   | 1   |
| Improved Cargo Handling: the ability of the vessel to accommodate various types of cargo, and deliver that cargo in good condition. | 2   | 1   | 3   | 6   |
| Predictability: the capacity to ensure that the vessel was able to travel to all discharge ports without incident. | 2   | 3   | 3   | 4   |
| Speed: the improved transit time of cargo due to reduced time at sea. | 3   | 5   | 3   | 1   |
| 12. Do you think the Logistics Cluster was successful in the operation? | Yes | 12  | 100% |
| 13. In future operations, would you and/or your organisation wish to participate as part of the Logistics Cluster? | Yes | 12  | 100% |
| 14. Please detail any other aspects of Logistics Cluster Common Service that you feel needs to be improved, or any other additional comments: | 1) The handling of missing items - recourse should be provided and/or operating procedures. More information given to users on WFP handlers at all the ports. |
| | 2) Training to cluster members on vital aspects of shipping, some organisations fail to appreciate the importance of correct paperwork and coordination, by providing training this would signify a commitment and organisations would have little excuse to create problems that affect the overall operation. |
| | 3) WISH WFP COULD HAVE A CENTRALISED WAREHOUSE TO CONSOLIDATE CARGO, SAY IN MOMBASA. |
| | 4) The use of UNHAS needs to cater more on the emergency rather than on profit based since most of our Somalia based employees tend to have emergency on weekends when the manifest for the week has been closed. So we are left with no option but just wait either on commercial service or till working day for UNHAS flights. Anyways kuddoo for the good work. |
| | 5) Warehousing at Ports: It would be of great benefit if the common cluster service
would consider provision of warehouse facilities at the various ports of operation. This would enable organizations increase the volume of cargo that they dispatch. Currently organizations are restricted to shipping volumes that they know they can handle and distribute on ground. Inland Distribution: It would be of benefit of the common cluster service would consider additional services such as movement of cargo by road inland. This would provide organizations with a cheaper and more safer way of transportation of goods to the consignees/beneficiaries.

6) I would say that maybe we should have transit warehousing or storage facilities at the port, to cater for additional cargo or items that are taking long to be received maybe due to the consignee or clearing agent delaying

BEGINNING OF SURVEY QUESTIONS ANSWERED BY ORGANISATIONS WHO DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE COMMON SHIPPING SERVICE

15. Why did you not use the service?
Did not need to ship cargo to Mogadishu/Berbera/Bossaso 1 50%
Unable to form a complete supply chain due to a lack of Road Transport, Storage, Etc. 0 0%
Other, please specify
   1) Legal content of the SRA is not compliant with our own regulation 1 50%

16. Do you think the Logistics Cluster was successful in the operation?
Yes - The logistic cluster helped for many organization reach their needy beneficiary on time and without delay 1 50%
No - Absence of propose insurance coverage and WFP not taking responsibility for the Cargo delivery is seen as a major handicap. 1 50%

17. In future operations, would you and/or your organisation wish to participate as part of the Logistics Cluster?
Yes 2 100%
We want to participate as a part of logistic cluster partner, in order to be able to delivery our planned aid cargo to Mogadishu, and possibly Hargeisa
No 0 0%

18. Please detail any other aspects of Logistics Cluster Common Service that you feel needs to be improved, or any other additional comments:
1) Coordination with UNDSS on securing supply routes should be intensified. It is not acceptable that the UNCT takes decision to authorize operations in some sectors under Al Shabab embargo. We have to find the way forward and coordinate with UNDSS closer in order to achieve supply deliveries to such areas.
2) The logistic cluster works hard, but still there are a number of gaps that needs to be filled immediately; these are the should make call for logistic tender for its serious members, and organize work shop trainings on logistics and other update logistic management tools and techniques to boost effective cluster participation and overall cluster member ownership.

BEGINNING OF SURVEY QUESTIONS ANSWERED ONLY BY CLEARING AND FORWARDING AGENTS

19. How would you rate your experience with this operation overall?
Unsatisfactory 0 0%
20. Did you find the implementation of the Shipping Service effective?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Poor</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Good</th>
<th>Very Good</th>
<th>Excellent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As clearing agents we should be getting copies of the bill of lading at the end of each export shipment. For example you sometime wonder why Seaforth Shipping who sometimes are the appointed agent of WFP cluster vessels won’t issue copy bill of lading to the clearing agent until one goes to WFP personal requesting for the same copy. The reason given here is that they were instructed by WFP not to issue same copies to the clearing agent who acts on behalf of their clients. Remember it is the clearing agent who makes application for shipping orders and on behalf of his client who is shipping relief cargo via WFP cluster vessels and therefore deserves to be given copies of the bill of lading. We should not be tortured by again going seeking the copies of the bill of lading from WFP which we can get them directly from Seaforth shipping and the other appointed shipping agents.

21. How would you rate the following activities? Top number is the count of respondents selecting the option. Bottom number is per cent of the total respondents selecting the option.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Unsatisfactory</th>
<th>Poor</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Good</th>
<th>Excellent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coordination with Client organisation:</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination with WFP:</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delivery of cargo to Mombasa Port:</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

22. Please rank the following, from the most serious difficulty your organisation faced while participating in the Shipping Service, to the factor that had the smallest impact on your operation. (ie The most serious difficulty should be at the top of the list, with the least serious difficulty at the bottom) Top number is the count of respondents selecting the option. Bottom number is per cent of the total respondents selecting the option.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Difficulty</th>
<th>Greatest Impact</th>
<th>Least Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Communications with organisations involved in the Shipping Service.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scheduling delivery of cargo to the vessel to be loaded.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clearing cargo through customs.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Packaging cargo correctly for transport on the vessel.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

23. Did you face any other significant challenges while participating in the Shipping Service?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Poor</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Good</th>
<th>Very Good</th>
<th>Excellent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1) Signing of delivery notes once the supplies are received by WFP operator.
2) Like delivering cargo at quayside and then WFP at last minute telling you that the vessel is fully loaded and therefore cannot load any more cargo. Then you ask yourself why was
the cargo in the first place booked? Finally you will hear WFP telling you to return cargo at their BP1 SHED, either cargo will remain under-load on truck or off-loaded at their warehouse if it suits accommodation to wait for another vessel.

3) Main challenge faced especially when road deliveries were done was to recover the customs truck documentation (i.e. T812 from WFP offices especially crossings into Somalia from border points Liboi and Mandera).

4) Uncertain vessel schedule

| No   | 2   | 33% |

24. Overall, do you think that the shipping operation in Mombasa Port was successful?

| Yes  | 6   | 100% |
| No   | 0   | 0%   |

25. Please detail any other aspects of Shipping Service that you feel needs to be improved, or any other additional comments:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) At the moment I am fully satisfied since you always understand when I call you and even give me more time. I will always be grateful to WFP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) My feeling is WFP should plan well on the cargo loading plan and know the vessel holding capacity to avoid cargo being either shut out or off-loaded from the vessel reason given is that the vessel will not load any more cargo. Surprisingly enough is that this cargo was scheduled in the CMR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) For small loose cargo WFP should allow first delivery at the warehouse, and then deliver at the q-side when loading is ready.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) With customs systems tracking all loadings done - it is important for WFP Somalia office to assist the clearing agent in recovering the customs documents (T812) after trucks cross the borders especially Mandera and Liboi. This is used to cancel our bond and avoid penalties for late cancellation and demands by customs to pay penalties and duties for documents not submitted. At the moment the response level and assistance is low.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Communicating vessel schedule well within reasonable time to prompt for timely documentation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>