Truck delivering MSUs in Southern Nations, Nationalities and People’s Regions (SNNPR) on behalf of the Government of Ethiopia.
-- Logistics Cluster

January 2018
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This document outlines the most important findings and recommendations of a Lessons Learned exercise conducted during the month of March 2017. The exercise included a desk review, a visit to Ethiopia, and interviews with 18 stakeholders from the Government of Ethiopia (GoE), partners, donors and Logistics Cluster staff.

Starting in the second half of 2015, Ethiopia suffered a severe drought, stemming from the El Niño weather phenomena. Between 24 March 2016 and 31 March 2017, the Logistics Cluster was activated to support the drought response that was mainly characterized as food assistance response (86.5 percent of the resources, 1.28 billion USD). At the peak of the crisis in April 2016, 10.2 million people were targeted with life-saving food assistance, and an additional 7.9 million people benefited from the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP), bringing the total food assistance beneficiary population to 18.1 million people. The international and national response was substantial, with the GoE allocating over USD 735 million to the response and coordinating the overall operation.

While other humanitarian clusters, such as the WASH Cluster and Protection Cluster, have been active on an ongoing basis in the country and did not require a specific activation, the Logistics Cluster activation took place about a year after the El Niño alert was given, due to the slow-onset of this emergency and due to discussions with the government on the scale and requirements of the response.

Shortly after activation, a supply chain gaps analysis was conducted by the Logistics Cluster team, in consultation with local partners. This analysis identified logistics constraints and proposed a list of potential solutions to address them. The constraints identified were:

1. Congestion at the port of Djibouti;
2. Limited availability of transporters and inadequate contracting procedures;
3. Limited availability of adequate storage capacity;
4. Delays in distribution;
5. Customs delays;
6. Lack of logistics supply chain coordination;
7. Lack of timely and useful information sharing.

The Logistics Cluster gaps analysis found that existing GoE structures and resources for the management of emergency coordination and information sharing were overwhelmed by the needs of the response. To support the GoE and the humanitarian community in reaching the beneficiaries, the Logistics Cluster set up a response focused on the following:

1. Facilitate regular meetings with key representatives to identify logistics bottlenecks and agree on mitigating activities;
2. Deploy dedicated staff to support the coordination of efforts and the collection and dissemination of crucial logistics information for operational planning;
3. Support the augmentation of facilities and resources to ensure available and reliable internet connectivity and technical resources, including computers;
4. Support the augmentation of the Ethiopia Emergency Operations Centre (EOC), to enhance its function as a central body for coordination and information sharing in the event of an emergency.

El Niño is the name given to a periodic heating up of the surface of the tropical Pacific Ocean that releases heat into the atmosphere and influences global weather patterns.
The Logistics Cluster response was relevant and helped support the humanitarian community in reaching beneficiaries with much needed assistance. However, an earlier activation of the Cluster could have potentially prevented some of the supply chain bottlenecks, and could have helped reach beneficiaries faster.

When the Logistics Cluster was activated, the gaps analysis that was conducted proved to be an excellent tool for identifying requirements, and also a simple baseline against which to measure activities and output. It also helped to create transparency, to create a common understanding of the situation, and to build trust between partners. It was highlighted as a best practice, giving the Logistics Cluster operation a strong foundation for its work and helping to ensure the relevance of its activities.

Active participation in Logistics Cluster activities in Ethiopia was limited to key food assistance partners. The Logistics Cluster team created a new reporting tool for the overall national food supply chain, and trained staff from all key food assistance partners on using the tool. This tool provided visibility throughout the supply chain, and proved quite effective in both guiding decision-making and in aligning partners in order to effectively reduce supply chain lead time.

Information management products, such as infographics and the Ethiopia and Djibouti shipping snapshots, were extremely helpful for decision-making and for coordination between partners. While a dedicated operation webpage was not available for most of the operation, the Logistics Cluster developed dedicated mailing lists and information reached stakeholders and actors on the ground consistently.

Service facilitation in Ethiopia was slightly different from usual Logistics Cluster operations. Rather than transport and storage, it focused mainly on building the capacity of the GoE and of the key food assistance partners. Nearly 1,000 logistics staff and operators were deployed throughout the national supply chain. This was done initially through the GoE, and later through an outsourced Ethiopian Human Resources (HR) company. 125 Mobile Storage Units (MSUs) were set up mainly in final distribution points, although only 50 percent of the units were used for storage by the end of 2016.

The deactivation of the Logistics Cluster took place on 31 March 2017, approximately 12 months after activation. The exit strategy developed by the Logistics Cluster bears special importance because weather-related shocks of varying intensity level occur in Ethiopia almost every year. The exit strategy focused on the establishment of a supply chain capacity building project that builds on the existing support provided by WFP to the National Disaster Risk Management Commission (NDRMC), and incorporating the main elements of the Logistics Cluster’s work into it.

Key to the overall success of the Logistics Cluster response was the close working relationship and support the Logistics Cluster received from the GoE and its various agencies. Access to decision makers within strategically relevant GoE departments at the federal level, and humanitarian agencies was unparalleled. This could not have been achieved without the close working relationship and support the Logistics Cluster enjoyed from partner organisations including WFP, CRS, OCHA, USAID and others.

1.1 Findings

The Logistics Cluster response was relevant and helped support the humanitarian community in reaching beneficiaries with much needed assistance. However, an earlier activation of the Cluster could have potentially prevented some of the supply chain bottlenecks, and could have helped reach beneficiaries faster.

When the Logistics Cluster was activated, the gaps analysis that was conducted proved to be an excellent tool for identifying requirements, and also a simple baseline against which to measure activities and output. It also helped to create transparency, to create a common understanding of the situation, and to build trust between partners. It was highlighted as a best practice, giving the Logistics Cluster operation a strong foundation for its work and helping to ensure the relevance of its activities.
Experts specialized in logistics fields were positioned within main GoE supply chain agencies such as the NDRMC, the Road Transport Authority (RTA), and the Ethiopian Maritime Affairs Authority (EMAA).
## 1.2. Main Recommendations

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<th>Main Recommendation</th>
<th>Key Recommendations</th>
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| 1 | **Activation** | Proactively promote timely and appropriate activation or alternative way of operation in slow-onset emergencies | 1. Ensure a global early warning system is closely followed and adhered to, to ensure early engagement and deployment of a Logistics Cluster team.  
2. Explore the benefits of establishing a national logistics cluster working group, which could be augmented during periods of heightened needs.  
3. Proactively approach key partners and actors on the ground to advocate for early activation or enhanced coordination in slow-onset emergencies.  
4. Consider using gaps analysis in complicated and large scale emergencies as a standard practice.  
5. Ensure the gaps analysis clearly states which gaps are within or outside the scope of Logistics Cluster operations.  
6. Create a workshop for partners on the Logistics Cluster’s scope of work, and on expectations from the cluster team and from partners. |
| 2 | **Coordination** | Manage expectations with donors and target audience | 1. Liaise with partners regularly on scoping the cluster’s work and their participation. Ensure clear messaging about the scope of the Logistics Cluster’s work throughout the operation.  
2. Manage relations and expectations with donors outside of and separately from coordination meetings. |
| 3 | **Information management** | Share tools developed for national supply chain transparency and reporting with other global operations | 1. Tools developed for reporting on overall national food supply chain can be replicated and used in other operations.  
2. The regular dissemination of information management products through dedicated mailing lists proved to be beneficial, and could be used in other operations to promote usage of products by diverse partners.  
3. Infographics and tools used in this operation, such as vessel arrival information, and port congestion dashboards shared through the Djibouti and Ethiopia shipping snapshots, could be used as templates and best practices for other operations. |
| 4 | **Common Logistics Services** | Develop clear agreements with partners on resources, detailing roles and responsibilities | 1. The placement of logistics experts in key strategic government offices within the supply chain created a strong positive impact on the supply chain and could be considered for other operations.  
2. Involve partners with field presence in the needs assessment process.  
3. Create detailed and clear contracts with partners and receiving communities, stipulating the roles and responsibilities of each party with regards to the resource given to the community.  
4. Ensure clear and rigorous expectation management with downstream partners before handing over the resource to the community (in this case specifically, the MSUs).  
5. Ensure a clear accountability system is available after the closure of the general response, so that available MSUs can also be potentially used in future operations in Ethiopia. |
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<td>Staff augmentation</td>
<td>1. Consider staff augmentation for government partners as an activity in other operations.</td>
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<td>2. Create guidelines for using outsourcing HR companies either for Logistics Cluster or partner staff augmentation in the future.</td>
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<td>3. Consider including companies that specialize in HR or HR for Logistics in Logistics Capacity Assessments (LCAs).</td>
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<td>4. Ensure sustainability of staffing within partner organisations, understanding budgeting cycle for partner and ensuring personnel are included in partner financial planning.</td>
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<td>5. Staff augmentation needs a robust exit strategy to ensure continuity.</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Global Logistics Cluster Support Cell</td>
<td>1. Ensure deployment of personnel that know the context of the operation and the actors in slow-onset and intricate emergency settings as much as possible.</td>
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<td>2. Retain staff for longer periods of time in emergencies, avoiding where possible the move from surge capacity to second and third wave deployments.</td>
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<td>3. Continue working with standby partners using bundled packages of staffing.</td>
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<td>4. Create a roster of available WFP local staff from different country operations that can be deployed and operate the WFP internal systems for the Logistics Cluster such as Finance, HR and logistics systems.</td>
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<td>5. Create a clear process for proactive engagement with operations on an ongoing basis, whether there is a specific requirement for that or not.</td>
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<td>6. Ensure visits by or communication with Global Logistics Cluster (GLC) management in all operations to ensure issues requiring management support are addressed and surge staff feeling like their work is valued and seen.</td>
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INTRODUCTION

2.1. Mission Objective

Starting in the second half of 2015, Ethiopia suffered a severe drought, correlating with the global El Niño weather phenomena, causing an estimated 18.1 million people in need of food assistance. Between 24 March 2016 and 31 March 2017, the Logistics Cluster operated a team in Ethiopia to support the drought response.

In March 2017, a Lessons Learned exercise was commissioned to draw learnings from the Logistics Cluster response to the Ethiopia drought, and to assess the support role provided by the Logistics Cluster in enhancing the logistics operations of the GoE and the NDRMC, which was the lead agency of the national response to the drought.

The exercise focused on the Logistics Cluster's core functions at the country level. These were, as defined by the Inter Agency Steering Committee (IASC): sectoral coordination, information management, and provision of common logistics services, alongside its facilitating role for the GoE and humanitarian actors.

Specifically, the Lessons Learned Exercise reviewed:
1. The relevance and appropriateness of the Logistics Cluster activities and response – how were local needs and priorities identified, and the subsequent Logistics Cluster operation designed and implemented?
2. The effectiveness of the Logistics Cluster response – did the Logistics Cluster operation meet the stated objectives in a timely fashion?
3. The efficiency of the Logistics Cluster response – how efficient were available resources used for the implementation of the Logistics Cluster operation?

2.2. Methodology

The Lessons Learned team included three members: a representative from the Global Logistics Cluster; a representative from Catholic Relief Services (CRS), the biggest food assistance NGO partner operating in Ethiopia; and an external consultant. The exercise was conducted in three phases:

1. Phase 1: Desk review of key documents.
2. Phase 2: Mission to Ethiopia to visit operations and conduct interviews with key staff and stakeholders (see annex 7.2 for an overview of interviews conducted).
3. Phase 3: Analysis of collected data, data validation, and formulation of findings and recommendations. This included a discussion of findings with the Global Logistics Cluster team, comments from the WFP Country Office, and a Quality Assurance process conducted by UNICEF. Final endorsement of the findings and recommendations was given by the GoE.

The findings and recommendations in the report are based on the perceptions of the stakeholders triangulated with background information and data from the operation. The operation objectives, as stated in the project document SO 200979, were compared with outputs to assess the effectiveness of the operation.
2.3. Limitations And Constraints

The Lessons Learned mission took place between 19 and 26 March 2017. Interviews with as many stakeholders as possible were conducted during the mission, or at a later stage over the phone. There was a limited number of partners engaged in the response, and so it was possible to meet with representatives from all major partner organisations.

The NDRMC central hub in Adama was visited, but downstream locations were not visited. This was due to the federal level focus of the operation, and also that no coordination cells were active in downstream locations.

Lastly, because of the limited scope of the operation (food-related support), it was decided not to conduct a survey amongst partners, as at least two representatives were interviewed from each of the participating partners.

PHOTO

Rehabilitation of existing storage capacity in Erob, Tigray, Ethiopia – 2017
-- Logistics Cluster
3.1. Humanitarian Context

The 2015 – 2016 El Niño weather phenomenon was one of the most severe of such events in recent decades, affecting nearly 60 million people across the globe and disrupting rainfall patterns causing widespread droughts, floods, and extreme weather in various countries including Ethiopia.

Within Ethiopia, the effects began to be felt in early 2015, in the southern and southeastern parts of the country. These areas experienced below average rainfall, and signs of increased vulnerabilities became evident during this period. In other parts of Ethiopia, flooding caused outbreaks of water-borne disease and the widespread displacement of people and livestock. By August 2015, nearly 4.5 million people required emergency food assistance.

Climatic shocks that greatly affected successive harvests alongside high food price inflation combined to drive food insecurity and malnutrition significantly higher.

The El Niño drought was followed by extensive flooding that affected 480,000 people, of whom 190,000 were displaced. The severe drought combined with the floods and disease outbreaks, such as Acute Watery Diarrhea, substantially eroded populations’ coping capacities which further increased the level of need. The impact of the crisis on livelihoods, nutritional and health status, and the provision of basic services, was significant. At the peak of the crisis in April 2016, 10.2 million people were targeted with life-saving food assistance, and an additional 7.9 million people benefitted from the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP), bringing the total beneficiary population to 18.1 million people.

The GoE led a multi-sectoral response, including the food, health, nutrition, sanitation, water and education sectors. However, was the primary focus of the response was food assistance, which had to be mobilized at scale and quickly. The NDRMC had (and still has) overall responsibility for coordinating the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

THE UNIQUENESS OF THE ETHIOPIA EL NIÑO DROUGHT RESPONSE OPERATION

1. The Logistics Cluster support focused almost entirely on food assistance supply chain.
2. The response was led predominantly by the Ethiopian Government with the involvement of a limited number of key partners (for food assistance: JEOP consortium and WFP).
3. The Logistics Cluster supported tracking of the entire national food supply chain and not the movement of commodities within the Logistics Cluster supply chain.
4. Almost 1,000 staff were deployed within the government supply chain to support efficiency and transparency. In order to facilitate such large scale HR support, hiring was outsourced to an external HR company.
5. Large scale storage augmentation took place, including 125 Mobile Storage Units (MSUs) that were set up mainly in final distribution points, and the renovation and augmentation of federal and regional government hubs.
3.2. Overall Humanitarian Response

The international and national response to the drought in Ethiopia was substantial. Since the scale of the crisis became clear in the latter part of 2015, international donors contributed US$985 million to the humanitarian response effort, and the GoE made US$735 million available. By the end of December 2016, the Ethiopia Humanitarian Response Document (HRD) was funded at 67 percent.

Each sector (cluster) operational plan included a short list of agreed prioritized activities. These were categorized as either ‘high’ or ‘critical’ priority, and the associated cost was prioritized accordingly. Geographical prioritization in most sectors was driven primarily by the GoE’s ‘hotspot woreda classification’.

Most of the humanitarian clusters such as the WASH, Education and Protection Clusters had an ongoing presence in Ethiopia as part of previous emergency operations, and therefore did not require activation along with the Logistics Cluster. Some clusters, such as the Protection Cluster and WASH Cluster, established sectoral working groups in affected regions in addition to their presence in Addis Ababa.

The response was led by the GoE. The role of the clusters was to support the GoE, in addressing the gaps in its capacity and in supporting the ability of its systems to address the needs of the population. This focused on the food assistance that constituted 86.5 percent of the resources dedicated for the El Niño Emergency Response.

**OCHA LESSONS LEARNED EXERCISE FINDINGS (DECEMBER 2016)**

The OCHA Lessons Learned Exercise found that the overall response mobilized by the GoE and international partners was largely successful and well coordinated, and garnered a strong commitment from national and international partners. The response arguably helped to prevent mass mortality and preserved livelihoods.

At the same time, some aspects of the response could have been better. More efforts could have been made to prepare for similar crises in the future to allow for an earlier response. This would require a more joined up and coordinated approach between development and humanitarian actors and with the GoE, to ensure complementarity of approaches, and an efficient use of resources.

The OCHA Lessons Learned report also states that in terms of national coverage and the two way coordination relationship between the capital and regions, there was a feeling that the presence of international organisations and coordination structures was inadequate to comprehensively cover the needs in a country the size of Ethiopia.
4.1. Logistics Cluster Activation

The Logistics Cluster was activated on 24 March 2016 in order to provide technical support and advice on strengthening the upstream and downstream components of the humanitarian supply chain at national, regional and sub-regional levels under the leadership of the NDRMC. The Logistics Cluster participated in the inter-cluster coordination group (ICCG) that met on a regular basis to harmonize operational response across sectors.

As part of the initial Logistics Cluster coordination and information management activities, the Cluster Coordinator and the Information Management Officer arrived within the first week of activation, and the first Cluster meeting was held on 7 April 2016.

Shortly after activation, a supply chain gaps analysis was conducted by the Logistics Cluster team in consultation with partners working on the ground. This analysis identified the following gaps and proposed a list of potential solutions for addressing them:

1. Congestion at the port of Djibouti;
2. Limited availability of transporters and inadequate contracting procedures;
3. Availability of adequate storage capacity;
4. Delays in distribution;
5. Customs delays;
6. Lack of logistics supply chain coordination;
7. Lack of timely and useful information sharing.
The Logistics Cluster operational activities started on 15 May 2016, after the gaps analysis had been reviewed and endorsed by the GoE and after the Special Operation (SO) project document, which detailed activities and a budget for the Logistics Cluster operation, had been approved.
4.2. Logistics Coordination Structure

The demands of the El Niño drought response placed extensive pressure on the entire GoE food supply chain. It stretched existing assets, including ports, transportation, storage and human resources, beyond their then-existing capacity. This pressure steadily increased over time, becoming extremely evident in the four months leading up to the activation of the Logistics Cluster. GoE staff were working overtime, equipment was worn out or insufficient, and overall technical and financial resources were not available to support coordination activities. This challenged the GoE’s ability to coordinate between the levels of the supply chain, across stakeholders, and to share information in a timely and efficient manner. In light of this, the gaps analysis proposed four mitigating activities to facilitate better coordination at a federal level. It proposed that the Logistics Cluster should:

1. Facilitate regular meetings with key representatives to identify logistics bottlenecks and agree on mitigating activities;
2. Deploy dedicated staff to support the coordination of efforts and the collection and dissemination of crucial logistics information for operational planning;
3. Support the augmentation of facilities and resources to ensure available and reliable internet connectivity and technical resources including computers;
4. Support the augmentation of the Ethiopia Emergency Operations Centre (EOC), to enhance its function as a central body for coordination and information sharing in the event of an emergency.

The Logistics Cluster established a coordination mechanism at the federal level facilitating close cooperation between the Logistics Cluster staff and the NDRMC. Regular active partners included the NDRMC, USAID and JEOP11, which constituted the main partners involved in food assistance in Ethiopia. Other partners would attend some of the meetings, but did not play an active role in the cluster.

In addition, the Logistics Cluster positioned supply chain experts along the entire supply chain. This included staff at the NDRMC hubs, in the EMAA, in the RTA, and in the Ethiopian Railways Corporation (ERC). Their role was not only to help strengthen capacity, but also to support further coordination efforts.

The Logistics Cluster did not establish dedicated coordination cells outside of Addis Ababa, reportedly because of the NDRMC’s centralised structure in which most management activities centred in Addis Ababa. Occasional coordination meetings were held in Adama and Jijiga.

4.3. Logistics Cluster Deactivation

The deactivation of the Logistics Cluster took place on 31 March 2017, approximately 12 months after activation.

At the start of the Logistics Cluster operation, a Logistics Cluster transition strategy was proposed, aimed at improving the overall supply chain efficiency. Related activities were to be transferred to, and in part facilitated through, the existing GoE-WFP Food Management Improvement Project (FMIP) at a time deemed appropriate.

The exit strategy developed by the Logistics Cluster bears a special importance because weather related shocks in varying intensity levels occur in Ethiopia almost every year. Even as operations were scaling down in early 2017, Ethiopia was facing a new drought crisis affecting much of the Somali region, as well as areas in Afar, Oromia and Southern Nations Nationalities and People’s Regions (SNNPR). As of May 2017, an estimated 5.6 million people were in need of urgent emergency assistance, with beneficiary numbers expected to increase further. Some partners, as well as the NDRMC, were questioning the decision to scale down the operations at that point in time due to the ongoing severity of the drought.

11The Joint Emergency Operation (JEOP) is a USAID funded consortium led by Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and was comprised of actors such as CARE, Save the Children International (SCI), World Vision (WV), Food for the Hungry (FH) and the Relief Society of Tigray (REST). JEOP is an emergency food distribution program targeting transitory or acute food insecure households (HHs) in 76 districts. The consortium was represented in the Logistics Cluster meetings by CRS.
WFP supports the NDRMC with the ongoing supply chain capacity building project, the FMIP. The FMIP focuses on strengthening processes, flow of information, and the creation of a commodity tracking system. The Logistics Cluster was working closely with the FMIP on the gaps analysis, and throughout the operation. The Logistics Cluster exit strategy focused on establishing a wider WFP Supply Chain Capacity Building Project, incorporating the main elements of the Logistics Cluster.

PHOTO

Installation of MSU in SNNPR, Ethiopia - 2016
-- Logistics Cluster

12 The FMIP supply chain support elements include: technical assistance to enhance logistics emergency preparedness capacities at the key GoE logistics hubs; continuous support for the dismantling, transportation and erection of MSUs to be utilized in alternative locations or stored for future use; support the government in the recruitment and training of workforce, including capacity development support through trainings; support for strengthening electronic commodity tracking and reporting system, and physical commodity management reports and forms; ensure comprehensive collection, consolidation and sharing of logistics information for efficient and effective logistics operations; ensure logistics supply chain coordination between the GoE and humanitarian partners through Logistics Coordination Meetings; strengthen commercial freight road transport actors; work with the EMAA and different relevant government authorities to tackle the issues of congestion at the Port of Djibouti and inefficient inland logistical operations.
This chapter outlines the main points that came up from the desk research and during the interviews.

5.1. Logistics Cluster Activation

5.1.1. Timing Of Activation

The diagram on the next page shows the timeline of events leading to the Logistics Cluster activation.

1. In March 2015, an El Niño advisory was issued by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Climate Prediction Center. This El Niño was potentially to have an impact on the weather in Ethiopia throughout the second half of 2015 and the first quarter of 2016.
2. Initial discussions on the activation of the Logistics Cluster started in April 2015. However, the standard procedures for an official activation of the Cluster were not similar to the emergency protocol used in Ethiopia, which created some challenges for activation.
3. On 23 August 2015, a revised 2015 Humanitarian Requirements Document was published, citing the failure of the short rainy season and the strengthening of the El Niño as the main causes for an increase in the number of relief food beneficiaries increased by 55 percent to 4.5 million.
4. A further amendment to the HRD was introduced on 13 October 2015, increasing the total number to 8.2 million. At that point, the GoE anticipated up to 10 million people requiring food assistance in 2015, while OCHA reported that 15 million people would likely require food assistance in early 2016.
5. The 2016 HRD was launched in January 2016 targeting 10.2 million people in need of humanitarian food assistance.
6. In a meeting on 11 March 2016, the NDRMC and Logistics Cluster partners agreed to undertake a joint assessment led by a trained UNDAC WFP consultant, who is positioned in the NDRMC management.
7. Based on the recommendations from the joint assessment, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) activated the Logistics Cluster on 24 March 2016 to support the coordination of the delivery of humanitarian assistance in response to the current drought.
INITIAL DISCUSSIONS AND ACTIVATION

1. 03/15
   An El-Nino advisory is issued by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Climate Prediction Center

2. 04/2015
   Initial discussions on activation of the Logistics Cluster

3. 23/08/2015
   A humanitarian requirements document (HRD) revision to 4.5 million

4. 13/10/2015
   Amendment to the HRD was introduced on the 13th increasing the total number to 8.2 million.

5. 16/01/2016
   HRD targeting 10.2 million people in need of humanitarian food assistance.

6. 11/03/2016
   The NDRMC and Logistics Cluster partners agree to undertake joint UNDAC assessment

7. 24/03/2016
   Inter-agency Standing Committee (IASC) activates the Logistics Cluster
The majority of the partners interviewed were of the opinion that the Logistics Cluster should have been activated earlier, potentially in October 2015, when there was a clear indication of the potential scale up of humanitarian requirements.

The OCHA-led Ethiopia Lessons Learned Exercise from the El Niño Drought Response highlights that the humanitarian response successfully mobilized sufficient resources from the GoE and international donors to respond to the crisis, but not without difficulties, partly due to the slow-onset nature of the crisis. These differences of opinion illustrate the difficulty of correctly timing the activation of a Logistics Cluster response in a slow-onset emergency.

Some of the WFP Country Office (CO) management interviewed mentioned that prior to activation, they were not sure that Logistics Cluster activation was necessary, or whether this would be the most appropriate modality for supporting the GoE in the El Niño drought response. Given the nature of the emergency, and the limited involvement of the Logistics Cluster in slow-onset emergencies in the past, this was a natural consideration. A discussion between the WFP CO and the GLC early on might have clarified the needs and possible options for operations and support earlier on. Such a discussion could have included alternatives for official activation, which would have been in line with the GoE approach.

Overall, the Logistics Cluster was activated relatively late and became operational only after the peak of the crisis. Whereas all other humanitarian clusters were already active in the county, the Logistics Cluster was the only one that required activation in order to start its operation. An early warning system on the GLC support team level that would have launched active discussions with partners on the ground might have helped to expedite the process.

As mentioned, in 2016 the GoE declared an emergency and requested international support, as a lack of capacity to respond from their end, was recognized. There are some methods to start an operation prior to or as an alternative to an official activation. In Nigeria, the Logistics Cluster is operating without an official activation. Other humanitarian clusters in Ethiopia (such as WASH and Protection) operate through working groups on a normal basis that are augmented during emergencies. In Mozambique, national clusters are active throughout the year to ensure they are prepared for emergencies.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

1. Ensure a global early warning system is closely followed, to ensure early engagement and deployment.
2. Explore the benefits of establishing a national logistics cluster working group, which can be augmented during periods of heightened needs.
3. Proactively approach key partners and actors on the ground to advocate for early activation or enhanced coordination in slow-onset emergencies.
4. Consider using a gaps analysis in complicated and large scale emergencies as standard practice.
5. Ensure the gaps analysis clearly states which gaps are within or outside the scope of operations.
6. Create a workshop for partners on the Logistics Cluster’s scope of work and expectations from both the Logistics Cluster team and from partners.
5.1.2. Logistics Cluster Engagement In Slow-Onset Emergencies

There is widespread recognition that the nature of humanitarian emergencies is changing and becoming more complicated due to a combination of complex and inter-related circumstances.

A study done by OCHA in 2011 defines a slow-onset emergency as one that does not emerge from a single, distinct event but one that emerges gradually over time, often based on a confluence of different events. Drought is a common example of a slow-onset emergency. In addition, global challenges – such as climate change, food and energy price spikes, macroeconomic trends, irregular migration, rapid population growth, and urbanisation – are contributing to increasing vulnerability and humanitarian need. In combination, these trends may result in more slow-onset emergencies in the future.  

According to the OCHA study, the line between different types of emergencies is often blurred. However, there is one key reason to distinguish, slow-onset from rapid-onset emergencies. Slow-onset emergencies can be mitigated by preparedness, early response and long term capacity building. If preparedness, early warning and early response systems are fully functioning, coordinated and integrated, the longer lead time means the humanitarian community can step in early enough to reduce human suffering and help prevent the downward spiral of increased vulnerability to future hazards. Unfortunately, the response to most slow-onset emergencies often ends up resembling the response to rapid-onset events – a large influx of resources aimed at saving lives, the creation of temporary and often parallel coordination structures, and a response perceived to be dominated by food aid. Time after time, the international community waits until a slow-onset event reaches the acute phase and then needs to be dealt with using tools designed for a rapid-onset disaster. This is both inefficient and ineffective, wasting resources and exacerbating human suffering.

The Logistics Cluster has been directly involved in most of these slow-onset emergencies, including other protracted emergencies since 2000, and since such emergencies tend to be multi-year, and sometimes interjected by sudden shocks that require additional resources, this can pose a unique set of challenges for a typical Logistics Cluster operation that is generally planned for one year.

The Ethiopia Logistics Cluster operation, and other Logistics Cluster operations in protracted emergencies, indicates the need for long term planning and a proactive and inclusive coordination approach between governments and responding agencies. In addition, a holistic approach to addressing supply chain gaps, long term capacity building, and long term funding strategies were all identified as important recommendations in a number of other Logistics Cluster operations such as Chad, Somalia, and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

5.1.3. Logistics Gaps Analysis

Once on the ground, the Logistics Cluster team decided to conduct a comprehensive supply chain gaps analysis. This is not a normal step for Logistics Cluster operations, which usually draw a relatively quick concept of operations and basic gaps analysis according to the situation, which will then be revised and updated as the operation progresses. The reason for conducting the gaps analysis was the complexity of the operation, and the need to understand all the requirements. It was clear that there were delays in getting humanitarian commodities through the supply chain, and that gaps existed in data collection. However, it was unclear what caused the delays and where the bottlenecks were located. This was exacerbated by a supply chain that extended across multiple countries, and into hard-to-reach areas within Ethiopia itself.

The process of identifying logistics gaps involved working with the GoE and humanitarian partners on an initial inventory of existing systems and a review of secondary data. In April 2016, an NDRMC-led team comprised of CRS, WFP Ethiopia, and Logistics Cluster members carried out in-depth assessments at all levels of the supply chain, including field visits and interviews along with supporting questionnaires prepared jointly by the NDRMC and the Logistics Cluster. Members of the USAID-DART team also took part in the assessment, and shared additional details of their own independent
assessment with the Logistics Cluster team in support of the final gaps analysis document. The assessments also built on work already completed by the FMIP, the WFP capacity development project that aims to support improvements in the NDRMC Supply Chain.

The gaps analysis exercise served as a tool to create a common understanding of the situation and trust amongst partners. The gaps analysis was seen by the different partners as the core document of the Logistics Cluster operation and was referred back to on a regular basis. Multiple partners highlighted the gaps analysis as a clear and comprehensive document that paved a strong way forward for a coordinated effort to address and overcome supply chain issues. It was an effective way to ensure a common language between partners in a complicated emergency.

The gaps analysis also served as a resource for long term planning and sustainable support beyond the emergency operation. It was based on existing work already done by WFP, and the long-term capacity building project created by WFP as part of the exit strategy follows the structure and findings of the gaps analysis. The gaps analysis process took some time which initially diverted some resources from planning and approving Logistics Cluster operations, but its thoroughness and its participatory nature was of much value. It included a desk review, consultations with partners, and surveys of capacities and challenges, both in the field and at the federal level.

Given how thorough the exercise was, it created buy in and approval from partners and removed potential obstacles from the operation.

While the gaps analysis was thorough and extensive, it is not within the mandate of the Logistics Cluster to fix all structural problems in the humanitarian supply chain down to the last mile. A number of partners interviewed raised the fact that the activation of the cluster and the gaps analysis might have raised high expectations that the Logistics Cluster would be able to resolve all structural problems within the supply chain. Simultaneously, several partners also highlighted the need for sensitization regarding the role of the Logistics Cluster, the scope and the ability of its operations to address these problems. Constant expectation management, potentially through dedicated workshops with partners and through repeated communications in Logistics Cluster meetings and coordination forums, could have helped to manage the situation.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Consider using gaps analyses in complicated and slow-onset emergencies as standard practice.

2. Ensure gaps analysis sets clear messaging on gaps that are either within or outside the scope of Logistics Cluster operations.

3. Create a workshop for partners on the Logistics Cluster’s scope of work and the expectations of both the Logistics Cluster team and partners.
5.2. Coordination

5.2.1. Participation

The Logistics Cluster had a small group of active partners and a larger group of partners that received information through an e-mail group. The large food management partners actively participated in the Logistics Cluster meetings: the NDRMC, which manages the food emergency relief efforts; JEOP, which manages USAID food assistance; and WFP. In addition, information was shared regularly during various relevant forums and meetings including the Disaster Risk Management technical working group, chaired by NRRMC and OCHA.

While partners testified that efforts were made to include additional partners, the scope of the support was quite focused on food assistance. Different partners had varying views about the decision to focus almost entirely on food assistance in this operation, which was the main requirement in the drought assistance, and on whether other sectors should have been assisted as well. Some partners also mentioned that Logistics Cluster meetings were perceived to be a reporting platform to update donors on the progress of operations, rather than being partner coordination meetings. This could also have been one of the deterrents for partners from participation, with some partners mentioning that the atmosphere and structure of the meetings were not conducive for coordination, saying it was influenced by the relationship with a donor. One NGO partner suggested that this might be because the perception was that Logistics Cluster engagement could be very UN-centric, and suggested that training for NGOs could be helpful in mitigating that.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Touch base with partners regularly on scoping and their participation, include clear messaging about scoping throughout the operation.
2. Manage relations and expectations with donors outside of coordination meetings.

5.2.2. Information Management For Decision Making

One of the issues that came up strongly in the gaps analysis was the lack of visibility within the supply chain. The distribution rounds took a very long time, and it was hard to get timely information on the status of delivered commodities. In order to enhance planning, reporting, and decision making, there was a need to support and improve the internal information flow both from federal to local level and the flow back from local to federal level.

At the request of the NDRMC and donor community, the Logistics Cluster coordinated a reporting system on behalf of the NDRMC, JEOP and WFP, to consolidate and share data on relief deliveries and distributions. This was a unique endeavor because the report was made for all partner commodities, and not for commodities specifically handled by the Logistics Cluster.

This reporting enabled the NDRMC, WFP and humanitarian partners to track the overall progress against the key Logistics Cluster objective of reducing the delivery time of the relief deliveries and distributions to four weeks or less. The Logistics Cluster also initiated a dispatch reporting system on behalf of the NDRMC, with the objective of monitoring trends by month and also the time taken for delivery to the Food Distribution Point (FDP). At the time of this Lessons Learned mission, 1,861 FDPs regularly reported food deliveries and distributions from JEOP, NDRMC and WFP.
Following the implementation of the reporting system, a significant improvement was apparent in relief items being delivered and distributed within four weeks. This can be seen in the diagram below, in which the number of relief food deliveries completed within four weeks increased by 12 percent and distributions by 9 percent from round five to round nine of the operation. Moreover, the NDRMC, JEOP and WFP had delivered 70 percent of goods by the sixth week of round 9, which was an improvement on round five when 70 percent had only been delivered by the eighth week. The tool was highly valuable for creating visibility in the supply chain. It can be considered to be replicated in other operations.

Many partners highlighted the vessel arrival information, and information on congestion at the Port of Djibouti and on alternative ports, as key products that supported internal decision making within organisations, as well as coordination amongst partners.

Two interviewees suggested that consolidated Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) with the different partners would have helped in creating more meaningful reporting and visibility throughout the supply chain.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

1. Tools developed for reporting on overall national food supply chain can be replicated and used in other operations.
5.3. Information Management

The Logistics Cluster has been supporting the GoE, NDRMC and humanitarian community through the collection and consolidation of relevant logistics information and updates, shared via a dedicated mailing list and made available through the dedicated Ethiopia Operation page on the Logistics Cluster website (http://www.logcluster.org/ops/eth16a). More than 120 operational updates and information products, including maps of access points and road constraints, Port of Djibouti snapshots and infographics have been shared since March 2016.

The Logistics Cluster website was unavailable throughout most of the operation until approval was gained for the web platform from the GoE in February 2017. Because of the late launch of the web page, it acted more as a library or a repository, rather than a source for real time information. The graphic below shows statistics for the use of the website and online presence.

The website itself was active for approximately three months at the end of the Logistics Cluster operation, but nonetheless during that time it proved to be a valuable platform through which to share information. More than 17 operational documents including situation updates, operational overviews, assessments, snapshots, infographics and four maps were published during this period, and the web page was accessed from various countries averaging more than 150 page views a month.

The main avenue for disseminating information throughout the 12 months of operation was through mailing lists that received regular updates and information management products. None of the interviewed partners felt a limitation in access to information, and stated that all necessary information was available regularly through the mailing list or upon request. This proactive approach, that consistently reaches the target audience with a set of agreed products, should be continued as a key information management practice in Logistics Cluster operations.

Information products were highlighted by most of the interviewees as very helpful for decision making. Infographics were mentioned as quite helpful in visualizing and understanding the information.
Vessel arrival information and port congestion were highlighted by a majority of the partners as key documents that helped inform decision making internally and drive coordination amongst partners. Some partners raised concerns about the sustainability of those tools beyond the life of the Logistics Cluster operation, through WFP or the government.

As part of the ongoing support to logistics capacity augmentation in Ethiopia, the Logistics Cluster facilitated the update of the Ethiopia Logistics Capacity Assessment (LCA), an important source of information related to the logistics infrastructure and services of Ethiopia.

Relevant baseline logistics information for Ethiopia is continuously updated on the LCA website (http://dlca.logcluster.org/display/public/DLCA/Ethiopia) and shared via the mailing list. Information was on areas such as port assessments, aviation, road networks, railway assessment, and storage.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

1. Regular dissemination of information management products through dedicated mailing lists proved to be beneficial, and could be used in other operations to promote usage of products by diverse partners.

2. Infographics and tools used in this operation, such as vessel arrival information, and port congestion dashboards could be used as templates and best practices for other operations.

**5.4. Common Logistics Services Delivery**

**5.4.1. Port Of Entry**

The main upstream point of entry for humanitarian, commercial and GoE cargo for Ethiopia is the Port of Djibouti. However, in April 2016, when the gaps analysis was conducted, the port was congested and some 800,000 mt of commodities belonging to the GoE, NGOs, UN agencies and donors were reportedly waiting to be offloaded and transported in-country. Congestion at the port led to delays, demurrage charges, and impacted operational planning. As well as serving Ethiopia, the Port of Djibouti serves as a gateway to additional emergencies in the region, including Yemen.

In addition to creating and sharing a vessel arrival report, the Logistics Cluster seconded a shipping advisor to support the EMAA in facilitating the implementation of the national logistics strategy and support port planning operations. The advisor assisted in promoting coordination between the EMAA and Port of Djibouti Authorities, as well as coordination between different importers (humanitarian, government, and commercial importers). This helped to enhance the flow of commodities from ports and entry points into Ethiopia.

In line with the objective of improving communication and interaction and of streamlining supply chain management and landside planning, a planning forum was established for bulk cargo, containers, and port advisory for future planning. To support the reduction of port congestion in the bulk supply chain, KPIs for port planning and operations were implemented in collaboration with the EMAA.
Additional support included providing advice on the possibilities created by the new Djibouti – Ethiopia railway, which began operation in early 2017 and which provides a potential alternative option for cargo transport into Ethiopia. Support included a railway system assessment in order to identify the gaps and prioritize actions to enhance and maximize the utilization of the new railway system, and coordination of the launch of the first humanitarian cargo transportation via the Djibouti-Ethiopia line with the Ethiopia Railway Corporation (ERC). In addition, other ports in the region were assessed as alternative corridors into Ethiopia.

Since July 2016, the average waiting time on anchorage was reduced to two days for vessels with documentation in order. Since July 2016, the average daily truck off-take from the Port of Djibouti increased to over 5,000 mt per day. In addition, coordination meetings with key bulk importers have now been established and are ongoing on a regular basis. Discussions are focused on forecasting and procurement procedures, in order to improve visibility on incoming commodities and achieve a centralized GoE procurement system for bulk importers.

The support provided to different government agencies was highlighted by all partners as an important step in creating a holistic approach for the Ethiopian supply chain, addressing supply chain gaps and improving the timeliness of delivery of relief commodities. The Logistics Cluster was instrumental in the establishment of a logistics community that included diverse stakeholders from different sectors that influenced the Ethiopian national supply chain. It provided experts to help national operations, regulation and strategy development. As a secretariat for the logistics community, the Logistics Cluster secondee helped to create standards that are being implemented by the Ethiopian Maritime Affairs Authority (EMAA). This included collecting information from importers and enhancing accountability. It is also recommended to consider the secondment of seasoned experts in government and local partner agencies to improve the emergency supply chain in future operations.

The holistic and comprehensive approach to supply chain problems within the drought response was very effective in improving the supply chain... considering the value the seconded experts brought to the operation and the NDRMC/ EMAA/ERC, it was money very well spent.”

- WFP Staff Member

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

1. The secondment of logistics experts in key strategic government offices relevant to the supply chain had a strong impact on the supply chain and could be considered for additional operations.

**5.4.2. Availability of Adequate Storage**

**Erection of Mobile Storage Units (MSUs)**

The large amount of incoming humanitarian cargo placed a strain on existing storage capacity. The need for additional warehouses and temporary storage facilities at hub, woreda and FDPs was identified as an additional gap.

Locations where MSUs would be erected were identified by the NDRMC by collecting requests for storage installation received from all regions. Locations identified by the NDRMC as key for the response were prioritised. Once a location was selected, an assessment mission was sent to identify the most appropriate storage type and exact location for the MSU to be erected. All in all, 125 MSUs were set up, alongside longer term solutions such as the construction of 13 permanent local storage structures and the rehabilitation of seven existing storage structures.
Due to time constraints, the MSUs were erected without forming a concrete slab or a drainage system. This was communicated with regional governments in a meeting held in NDRMC, transferring the responsibility for constructing these elements in the future to the local governments and communities if necessary. According to the utilization data collected by the Logistics Cluster, 50 percent of the MSUs were in use at the time of the Logistics Cluster’s de-activation.

Some interviewees suggested that expectations should have been managed differently, with detailed agreements being signed with local governments stipulating the expectations from each party, and with regional workshops bringing district level governments to participate and agree with the terms. The loan transfer form used in this operation is available in Annex 6.7.

Some partners also suggested that minimum cost-sharing should have been done with local governments, in order to ensure that ownership of the storage units would be exercised by local governments and that the necessary steps for ensuring the usage of the units would be taken by them.

As part of the exit strategy, the Logistics Cluster team advised that the MSUs were implemented as a temporary storage solution to meet the needs of the emergency. MSUs are able to be moved to alternative locations where there is a clear identified need for additional storage, or to be moved to storage facilities to be redeployed at a later date. WFP committed to avail the relevant resources to support the follow up and movement of the MSUs.

Hub Augmentation

Hub augmentation took place in the two of the NDRMC main logistics hubs, at Adama (Nazret), and at Dire Dawa. Major improvements were made to commodity handling and stacking procedures, the re-bagging of 17,500 bags of food, as well as shifting non-food items (NFIs) to a dedicated storage space. In addition, food stock inventory, food quality and pest control procedures were reinforced. Essential equipment to support the operation was also provided to the NDRMC including warehouse operations equipment (scales, stitching machines, tarpaulins, hand trolleys, fumigation material, wooden and plastic pallets) and office furniture. At the hubs, the Logistics Cluster supported the NDRMC with the refurbishing of 710m2 of office space, rewiring, upgrading electrical infrastructure and installation of telecommunications networks at the hubs.

At the NDRMC Adama hub, the second phase of the rehabilitation began in February 2017 with the improvement of the fleet area, constructions to ensure flood protection, sorting of NFIs and upgrading of additional office space including the
Storage service considerations

Storage was the most costly element of the Logistics Cluster response and only 50 percent of the MSUs were used at the time of deactivation. This could be the result of a few factors. The first one is changing needs, and increased resilience of communities. This might be true to some communities. In other cases, storage space might have been taken as an opportunity irrespective of the actual need. Some interviewees suggested that stronger involvement from JEOP field offices and from WFP sub-offices might have supported a better needs assessment at the field level. These actors were involved in the MSU erection process, but were not brought in for the initial assessment process.

Some interviewees questioned the need for the storage capacity augmentation and suggested that not all locations were in need of such storage capacity. Some of the locations had storage facilities of partners that could be used for food storage. A couple of interviewees suggested that additional payment for transporters to stay in the community until all the necessary food was distributed might have been a more cost effective solution. Interviewees both from the Logistics Cluster team and from partners suggested that a more rigorous needs assessments could have helped in identifying which locations really needed additional storage.

As Logistics Cluster operations are now scaling down, WFP proposed to support the government in moving MSUs where necessary, or dismantling and storing MSUs that are now out of use. There is a risk that the MSUs will be ruined and depleted if no clear responsibility is delineated in following up and managing this resource.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Conduct the needs assessment with the support of partner’s field presence.
2. Create detailed and clear contracts with partners and receiving communities stipulating the roles and responsibilities of each party with regards to the resource given to the community.
3. Ensure clear and rigorous expectation management with downstream partners before handing over the MSU or any resource to the community.
4. Ensure a clear accountability system is available after the closure of operation, so that available MSUs can also be potentially used in future operations in Ethiopia.

5.4.3. Human Resources To Manage Logistics

The El Niño response was unique in the sense that most food commodities were purchased by the GoE. Usually, when a donor purchases food and donates it to the GoE, funding is also given for storage, handling, and transport. These costs provide some of the funding that sustains the NDRMC operations. As the GoE purchased food commodities directly, not all the associated costs were covered. Staffing structures and budgets had not been sufficiently augmented due to the very rapid and large scale increase in requirements and the constraints associated with quickly hiring staff with suitable capacity. Therefore, a temporary surge in qualified staff was needed to address the emergency related human resource gaps.

Initially, the Logistics Cluster facilitated the availability of financial resources for the NDRMC and the Somali Region Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Bureau (DPPB) to secure a temporary surge in qualified staff to meet the increased
logistics needs for the drought response. Due to the urgency of hiring staff and the large amount of staff needed, it was decided to engage the services of an external recruitment company to assist with the recruitment process. The idea and possible benefits of using an external recruiter came from experience of other humanitarian partners. Given the timeframe and geographic scope of deployments, this approach proved to be highly successful. Qualified staff were hired in a timely manner and in line with local capacity building and augmentation efforts.

Surge staff improved the reporting of stock movements and record keeping, facilitating and expediting the clearance of the data backlog in the Commodity Allocation & Tracking System (CATS). The production of daily stock reports increased from 10 percent to 95 percent in the different hubs.

Going forward, WFP plans to support the government in the recruitment and training of a skilled workforce, in order to ensure that sufficient human resource capacity is available to effectively manage and report on the food pipeline and food distribution network beyond the cluster operations. Additional international-level supply chain management training accreditations will be provided to logistics staff to ensure skills are transferred, and that sustainable human resource capacity building is provided.

Trainings

Through knowledge sharing and skill transfer to build the logistics skills of staff from the GoE, NDRMC and humanitarian community, a series of training programs were supported and implemented by the Logistics Cluster. Six hundred and forty three staff from the NDRMC, EMAA, RTA, WFP and JEOP have been trained in 21 locations. Topics included the following:

- Food aid, warehouse management and best practices: 140 trainees
- Targeted Supplementary Feeding: 216 trainees
- Relief and technical induction: 241 trainees
- Land transport and port operations: 29 trainees
- MSUs training: 17 trainees

Commodity loss mitigation measures have been adopted. This included the timely repackaging and reconstitution of damaged commodities, and the documenting of these processes and results using standard commodity management tools.

Following the countrywide warehouse training conducted in November 2016, reconditioning practices were also drastically improved and as a result, during the last two weeks of November 2016 an average of 1,000 bags were reconditioned per day. Commodity storage practices were also improved through the adoption of proper food stacking practices, segregation of food and non-food items and timely recording of stock movements.

HR considerations

Government staff augmentation was highlighted by most interviewees as an important activity that allowed the increase in the scale of the operation to be managed. The majority of the interviewees mentioned the lack of downstream staffing capacity as a structural problem impacting the capacity of the NDRMC to provide visibility within the supply chain in times of smaller beneficiary requirements that was exacerbated by the increase in requirements.

Limited government capacity to manage the requirements during an emergency is a recurring problem in many humanitarian responses, in both slow and fast-onset emergencies. Therefore, augmentation of government or local partner staffing, including training and capacity building could be an activity undertaken in additional operations.

Such was the scale of hiring (982 staff members) that neither the GoE, nor WFP nor partners HR systems were able to manage it. The operation therefore resorted to using an external HR company. Interviews with Logistics Cluster, GoE and WFP (FMIP) staff all suggested that this practice was the only way to bring on board such staffing and would be repeated in the future if the need arises, but few suggestions were made on how to improve the effectiveness of this exercise. Before beginning the work, the capacity of the company to hire such a large workforce should be estimated and the size and diversity of its database should be evaluated. Its field presence should be reviewed, and its capacity to manage staff
in various locations.

In addition, roles and responsibilities should be clearly outlined, alongside a method for performance management. Communication with staff should be established, so that work on the ground will be done in an optimal manner.

Although pre-warning on the deactivation of the Logistics Cluster was given to the NDRMC a few months prior to the expected date, and about 200 staff members were identified to be critical for the continued management of the NDRMC supply chain, the NDRMC was not able to finalize the arrangements for hiring the staff through government personnel. This was the highest concern raised by the NDRMC prior to the deactivation of the Logistics Cluster.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

1. Consider the use of partner staff augmentation as an activity in additional operations.
2. Create guidelines for using outsourcing HR companies either for Logistics Cluster or partner staff augmentation in the future.
3. Consider including companies that specialize in HR/HR for Logistics in LCAs.
4. Ensure sustainability of staffing within partner, understanding budgeting cycle for partner, and ensuring personnel is included in partner financial planning.

### 5.5. Global Logistic Cluster Support Cell

#### 5.5.1. Human Resources Support

Within a week of activation of the Logistics Cluster in Ethiopia, both the Logistics Cluster Coordinator and the Information Management Officer were on the ground. While the staff were seen as professional and highly capable, a few partners suggested that because of the complexity of the operation in Ethiopia, it would have been better to deploy staff who had knowledge of the operating system and main actors in Ethiopia.

The operation also embedded experts in different governmental agencies supporting the NDRMC hubs, the EMMA and the RTA. While at the beginning some governmental agencies were reluctant to bring in external experts, in the end this support was seen as extremely valuable in overcoming supply chain gaps and increasing visibility within the supply chain, and was highly valued by the government and partners.

Logistics Cluster staff suggested that creating rosters of such experts could also support future operations. One Logistics Cluster staff member highlighted that good collaboration with the HR Division helped in diversifying the skillset of the team deployed to Ethiopia, and suggested to collaborate further with diverse stakeholders such as HR, NGOs, Logistics Networks, and academic Institutions. The Logistics Cluster team also seemed extremely satisfied with the internal teamwork.

One of the distinct features of staffing in this operation was the use of a bundled package of secondees from the partner MSB, which ensured the availability of certain capacities throughout the operation. While this allows less control over the staffing for the Logistics Cluster, it widens the network of experts available for the Logistics Cluster, and as mentioned by

“The staff embedded in government offices were key. It is important for them to not only have technical expertise. I would say 50 percent technical expertise and 50 percent soft skills and political savvy.”
one of the Logistics Cluster staff, gives the Logistics Cluster Coordinator ‘one thing less to worry about’.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

1. Ensure deployment of people that know the context of the operation and the actors in complex emergencies as much as possible.
2. Retain staff for longer periods of time in complex emergencies, avoiding where possible the move from surge capacity to second and third wave deployments.
3. Continue working with standby partners using bundled packages of staffing.
4. Create a roster of available WFP local staff from different country operations that can be deployed and operate WFP internal systems for the Logistics Cluster, in areas such as Finance, HR and logistics systems.

**5.5.2. Technical Support**

The Logistics Cluster team highlighted that in the initial phase of writing the SO and budget revision documents, there was much involvement from the Global Logistics Cluster support team. After that, the interaction was quite limited. While some of the team members suggested that increased support could have been helpful and saved time, for instance with setting up reporting procedures and tools, others highlighted that whenever support was requested, the global support team was quite responsive.

Some team members mentioned that more attention, for example in the form of a visit by the Global Logistics Cluster management, would have been beneficial in creating a stronger link with the support team, in addition to being a morale boost for the team. It would also have increased the visibility of the operation within Ethiopia and the region.

“This is the best team I've worked with. A good mix between young people and experts. There was no hierarchy or competition. We all supported and helped each other. Management helped a lot as well, and gave me many responsibilities.”

- Logistics Cluster Staff Member

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

1. Create a clear process for proactive engagement with operations on an ongoing basis, whether there is a specific requirement for that or not.
2. Ensure interaction, for example through a visit with management in all operations if possible. Whenever it is not possible, ensure that messaging is done to ensure the operation is perceived as receiving the right management attention and support.
The Global Logistics Cluster commissioned a Lessons Learned Exercise for the Logistics Cluster operation in Ethiopia covering the time period March 2016 to March 2017 as part of the Global Cluster Strategy to ensure accountability to all stakeholders. The objective of this exercise is to learn from the Ethiopia model for drought response and draw upon lessons learned for future operations in similar contexts. The outcome of the exercise will be a final report summarising the key findings and recommendations.

Ethiopia experienced one of its worst droughts in decades and the increased humanitarian needs put a strain on the existing logistics infrastructure capacity and human resources. Based on an assessment conducted in March 2016, a number of logistics constraints from port of arrival to final delivery point were making it very challenging for the Government of Ethiopia (GoE) and humanitarian actors to deliver an effective and efficient response.

The Government of Ethiopia lead the response to the drought and the National Disaster Risk Management Commission (NDRMC) had overall responsibility for coordinating the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Through WFP, global lead agency, the Logistics Cluster was activated in March 2016 to support the GoE and NDRMC in their response and to identify logistics gaps and bottlenecks; propose mitigating measures and to augment the logistics coordination, information management and logistics capacity of government and other humanitarian actors.

The Lessons Learned exercise will focus on the Logistics Cluster’s core functions at country level as defined by the Inter Agency Steering Committee - the sectoral coordination, information management, provision of common logistics services and its facilitating role for the GoE and humanitarian actors. Specifically, the exercise will focus on drawing lessons from the Ethiopia model for drought response and assessing the support role provided by the Logistics Cluster in enhancing the logistics operations of the GoE and NDRMC as lead of the response to the drought. The reviewed time period will cover the initial gaps assessment phase and Special Operation 200977, from activation on 24 March 2016 until 31 March 2017.

Specifically, the Lessons Learned Exercise will look at:

1. The relevance and appropriateness of the Logistics Cluster activities and response – how were local needs and priorities identified, and the subsequent Cluster operation designed and implemented?
2. The effectiveness of the Logistics Cluster response – did the Cluster operation meet the stated objectives in a timely fashion?
3. The efficiency of the Logistics Cluster response – how efficient were available resources used for the implementation of the Logistics Cluster operation?
METHODOLOGY

The Lessons Learned Exercise will be conducted in three phases:

**Phase 1:** Extensive desk review of key documents such as project documents, performance reports, meeting minutes, quantitative data related to the Cluster services, etc.

**Phase 2:** Mission to Ethiopia to visit operations and conduct single or group interviews with key staff involved including Cluster partners, government staff, donors, coordinating institutions such as other Clusters/Sectors, OCHA, Humanitarian Coordinator, and others as relevant. Some interviews maybe conducted remotely.

**Phase 3:** Analysis of collected data and drafting of the report. In a workshop with the Global Logistics Cluster team preliminary findings will be discussed and validated.

EXPECTED OUTCOMES

1. Identify lessons and learn from the example of the Logistics Cluster operation in Ethiopia and the Ethiopia drought response model;
2. Identify lessons on how to best support governments in leading drought responses or other natural disaster situations in the future;
3. Identify lessons on the Logistics Cluster response and if the operation could have been implemented in a different way and use these lessons for future operations.

6.2. List Of Mission Members And Interviewees

LESSONS LEARNED MISSION TEAM MEMBERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Louis Boshoff</td>
<td>Head of Operations</td>
<td>Global Logistics Cluster Support Cell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Yemane Kahssay</td>
<td>Senior Technical Advisor</td>
<td>CRS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Michal Bruck</td>
<td>Consultant</td>
<td>Independent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# INTERVIEWEES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Segolene de Beco</td>
<td>Head of Office</td>
<td>ECHO</td>
<td>Addis Ababa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Mekonnen Abbera</td>
<td>EMAA Commissioner</td>
<td>EMAA</td>
<td>Addis Ababa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Shane Lennon</td>
<td>Chief of Party</td>
<td>JEOP/CRS</td>
<td>Addis Ababa</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Ewnetu Yohannes</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Party</td>
<td>JEOP/CRS</td>
<td>Addis Ababa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Lucy Styles</td>
<td>Cluster Coordinator</td>
<td>Logistics Cluster</td>
<td>Addis Ababa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Chiara Camassa</td>
<td>Logistics Officer</td>
<td>Logistics Cluster</td>
<td>Addis Ababa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Gilles Cimetiere</td>
<td>Cluster Coordinator</td>
<td>Logistics Cluster</td>
<td>Skype</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Abdul Kerim Essa</td>
<td>NDRMC Logistics Cluster Focal Point</td>
<td>NDRMC</td>
<td>Addis Ababa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Tadesse Bekelle</td>
<td>Senior DRM Advisor</td>
<td>NDRMC</td>
<td>Addis Ababa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Alemayehu Abebe</td>
<td>NDRMC Adama Hub Manager</td>
<td>NDRMC</td>
<td>Addis Ababa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Michal Ullmann</td>
<td>Humanitarian Affairs Officer</td>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Addis Ababa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Paul Handley</td>
<td>Humanitarian Coordinator</td>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Addis Ababa</td>
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<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Usman Ali</td>
<td>Logistics Officer</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>Addis Ababa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Scott McNiven</td>
<td>Regional Food for Peace Adviser</td>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>Phone</td>
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<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Muna Bayou</td>
<td>USAID/ALT</td>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>Addis Ababa</td>
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<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Henock Teferra</td>
<td>NDRMC Seconded / Adama Hub</td>
<td>WFP / Logistics Cluster</td>
<td>Adama</td>
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<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Zeff Kapoor</td>
<td>Head of Sub-Office</td>
<td>WFP Ethiopia</td>
<td>Adama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Paola Corrado</td>
<td>Head of Supply Chain</td>
<td>WFP Ethiopia</td>
<td>Addis Ababa</td>
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<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Samir Wanmali</td>
<td>Deputy Country Director</td>
<td>WFP Ethiopia</td>
<td>Addis Ababa</td>
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<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Daniela Nkamicaniye</td>
<td>FMIP Project Manager</td>
<td>WFP Ethiopia</td>
<td>Addis Ababa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>John Aylieff</td>
<td>Country Director</td>
<td>WFP Ethiopia</td>
<td>Addis Ababa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6.3. Timeline Of Logistics Cluster Activation In Ethiopia

03/15
AN EL-NINO ADVISORY IS ISSUED BY THE NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION (NOAA) CLIMATE PREDICTION CENTER

04/2015
INITIAL DISCUSSIONS ON ACTIVATION OF THE LOGISTICS CLUSTER

23/08/2015
A HUMANITARIAN REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT (HRD) REVISION TO 4.5 MILLION

13/10/2015
AMENDMENT TO THE HRD WAS INTRODUCED ON THE 13TH INCREASING THE TOTAL NUMBER TO 8.2 MILLION.

16/01/2016
HRD TARGETING 10.2 MILLION PEOPLE IN NEED OF HUMANITARIAN FOOD ASSISTANCE.

11/03/2016
THE NDRMC AND LOGISTICS CLUSTER PARTNERS AGREE TO UNDERTAKE JOINT UNDAC ASSESSMENT

24/03/2016
INTER-AGENCY STANDING COMMITTEE (IASC) ACTIVATES THE LOGISTICS CLUSTER

30/03/2016
THE LOGISTICS CLUSTER COORDINATOR ARRIVED TO ETHIOPIA

31/03/2016
ARRIVAL OF INFORMATION MANAGER

07/04/2016
FIRST CLUSTER MEETING

25/04/2016
GAP ANALYSIS IS FINALIZED

15/05/2016
ENDORSEMENT OF SO

06/06/2016
ERECITION OF FIRST MSU

07/2016
HIRING OF FIRST GOVERNMENT STAFF

07/2016
ERECITION OF 100TH MSU

01/06/2016
PLACEMENT OF STAFF IN EMMA

08/08/2016
HIRING OF FIRST UNDAC STAFF

31/03/2017
CLUSTER OPERATIONS DEACTIVATION

30/04/2017
EXPECTED END OF DEPLOYMENT OF REST OF STAFF
6.4. Pre-Crisis Logistic Baseline Data (LCA)

For relevant information on logistics infrastructure and services available in Ethiopia prior to the crisis, the Ethiopia Logistics Capacity Assessment can be accessed.

6.5. Logistics Gaps Analysis And Mitigating Activities

The Logistics Gaps Analysis referred to throughout this report is available here, on the Ethiopia country page on the Logistics Cluster website.

6.6. Special Operation Narrative

The SO narrative can be found here.
6.7. Loan Transfer Form - Mobile Storage Unit

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description of Items (incl. type, make, model, inventory number)</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mobile Storage Unit (6.6 X 8 m)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

REASON for request to transfer property:
Request from NORMC to support with storage augmentation

PROPERTY SURVEY TEAM REVIEW OF LOAN TRANSFERRED WFP PROPERTY

RESULT of review and recommendation

Approved Action:

For the Recipient:  
For the World Food Programme:

INSTRUCTIONS

1. Whenever equipment, or supplies are proposed for transfer, the WFP Director is responsible for completing this form. The original copy is kept at the WFP site and one copy each to the recipient, Property Survey Board and Property Officer.
2. Upon receipt of this equipment, or supplies, the recipient is responsible for immediately affixing and maintaining all relevant equipment items to the form. The form shall not be responsible for any transportation, operating, and maintenance costs of the said equipment.
3. In cases of transfer to another WFP site including Peace or HQs only the original purchase price should be indicated and the supporting documents should be attached to this form.